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			Merge branch 'remodulate-on-rekey' of https://gogs.blitter.com/RLabs/xs into remodulate-on-rekey
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							|  | @ -63,6 +63,16 @@ In all releases prior to v0.9.3, absent a specific whitelist of algs to allow, t | ||||||
| As of release v0.9.3, the default when supplying no explicit KEX, cipher or HMAC algorithms to `xsd` results in *no* algs being accepted; so the admin must decide on a specific whitelist of algorithms. | As of release v0.9.3, the default when supplying no explicit KEX, cipher or HMAC algorithms to `xsd` results in *no* algs being accepted; so the admin must decide on a specific whitelist of algorithms. | ||||||
| *** | *** | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
|  | *** | ||||||
|  | **Experimental Session Crypto 'Remodulation' on Rekeying** | ||||||
|  | 
 | ||||||
|  | Support has been added for an experimental 'remodulation' of the active session cipher and hash algorithms | ||||||
|  | when a rekey is performed. This feature, only active if the `-R` option is specified by *both* server and | ||||||
|  | client, will cause the two sides to negotiate a (potentially) new cipher and hash algorithm as part of the rekeying (normal rekeying *without* 'remodulation' is on by default, with the interval optionally specified independently by client and server via the `-r` (note lowercase) option). | ||||||
|  | 
 | ||||||
|  | This experimental 'remodulation' is intended to inhibit a potential attacker's efforts to analyze session data, by reducing the usefulness of any distinguisher, presuming one exists, that may exist in one of the symmetric cipher algos used during a session. Note however, that if the initial KEM negotiation were broken and the attacker has recorded all following session traffic, they can still 'stay in sync' with the rekeys *and* algo remodulations, and be able to continue decrypting across session rekeys. (That is, this feature does not | ||||||
|  | add any security if the initial KEM exchange were broken.) | ||||||
|  | *** | ||||||
| 
 | 
 | ||||||
| ### Conn | ### Conn | ||||||
| Calls to xsnet.Dial() and xsnet.Listen()/Accept() are generally the same as calls to the equivalents within the _net_ package; however upon connection a key exchange automatically occurs whereby client and server independently derive the same keying material, and all following traffic is secured by a symmetric encryption algorithm. | Calls to xsnet.Dial() and xsnet.Listen()/Accept() are generally the same as calls to the equivalents within the _net_ package; however upon connection a key exchange automatically occurs whereby client and server independently derive the same keying material, and all following traffic is secured by a symmetric encryption algorithm. | ||||||
|  |  | ||||||
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