1526 lines
53 KiB
Go
1526 lines
53 KiB
Go
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package qtls
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import (
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"bytes"
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"container/list"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
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)
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const (
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VersionTLS10 = 0x0301
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VersionTLS11 = 0x0302
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VersionTLS12 = 0x0303
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VersionTLS13 = 0x0304
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// Deprecated: SSLv3 is cryptographically broken, and is no longer
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// supported by this package. See golang.org/issue/32716.
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VersionSSL30 = 0x0300
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)
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const (
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maxPlaintext = 16384 // maximum plaintext payload length
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maxCiphertext = 16384 + 2048 // maximum ciphertext payload length
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maxCiphertextTLS13 = 16384 + 256 // maximum ciphertext length in TLS 1.3
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recordHeaderLen = 5 // record header length
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maxHandshake = 65536 // maximum handshake we support (protocol max is 16 MB)
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maxUselessRecords = 16 // maximum number of consecutive non-advancing records
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)
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// TLS record types.
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type recordType uint8
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const (
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recordTypeChangeCipherSpec recordType = 20
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recordTypeAlert recordType = 21
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recordTypeHandshake recordType = 22
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recordTypeApplicationData recordType = 23
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)
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// TLS handshake message types.
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const (
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typeHelloRequest uint8 = 0
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typeClientHello uint8 = 1
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typeServerHello uint8 = 2
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typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4
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typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5
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typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8
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typeCertificate uint8 = 11
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typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12
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typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13
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typeServerHelloDone uint8 = 14
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typeCertificateVerify uint8 = 15
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typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16
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typeFinished uint8 = 20
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typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22
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typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24
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typeNextProtocol uint8 = 67 // Not IANA assigned
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typeMessageHash uint8 = 254 // synthetic message
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)
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// TLS compression types.
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const (
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compressionNone uint8 = 0
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)
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type Extension struct {
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Type uint16
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Data []byte
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}
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// TLS extension numbers
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const (
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extensionServerName uint16 = 0
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extensionStatusRequest uint16 = 5
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extensionSupportedCurves uint16 = 10 // supported_groups in TLS 1.3, see RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7
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extensionSupportedPoints uint16 = 11
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extensionSignatureAlgorithms uint16 = 13
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extensionALPN uint16 = 16
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extensionSCT uint16 = 18
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extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35
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extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41
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extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42
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extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43
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extensionCookie uint16 = 44
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extensionPSKModes uint16 = 45
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extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47
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extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50
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extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51
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extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01
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)
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// TLS signaling cipher suite values
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const (
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scsvRenegotiation uint16 = 0x00ff
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)
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type EncryptionLevel uint8
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const (
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EncryptionHandshake EncryptionLevel = iota
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Encryption0RTT
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EncryptionApplication
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)
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// CurveID is a tls.CurveID
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type CurveID = tls.CurveID
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const (
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CurveP256 CurveID = 23
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CurveP384 CurveID = 24
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CurveP521 CurveID = 25
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X25519 CurveID = 29
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)
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// TLS 1.3 Key Share. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.
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type keyShare struct {
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group CurveID
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data []byte
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}
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// TLS 1.3 PSK Key Exchange Modes. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
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const (
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pskModePlain uint8 = 0
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pskModeDHE uint8 = 1
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)
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// TLS 1.3 PSK Identity. Can be a Session Ticket, or a reference to a saved
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// session. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.
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type pskIdentity struct {
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label []byte
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obfuscatedTicketAge uint32
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}
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// TLS Elliptic Curve Point Formats
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// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-9
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const (
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pointFormatUncompressed uint8 = 0
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)
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// TLS CertificateStatusType (RFC 3546)
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const (
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statusTypeOCSP uint8 = 1
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)
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// Certificate types (for certificateRequestMsg)
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const (
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certTypeRSASign = 1
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certTypeECDSASign = 64 // ECDSA or EdDSA keys, see RFC 8422, Section 3.
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)
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// Signature algorithms (for internal signaling use). Starting at 225 to avoid overlap with
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// TLS 1.2 codepoints (RFC 5246, Appendix A.4.1), with which these have nothing to do.
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const (
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signaturePKCS1v15 uint8 = iota + 225
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signatureRSAPSS
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signatureECDSA
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signatureEd25519
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)
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// directSigning is a standard Hash value that signals that no pre-hashing
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// should be performed, and that the input should be signed directly. It is the
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// hash function associated with the Ed25519 signature scheme.
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var directSigning crypto.Hash = 0
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// supportedSignatureAlgorithms contains the signature and hash algorithms that
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// the code advertises as supported in a TLS 1.2+ ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2+
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// CertificateRequest. The two fields are merged to match with TLS 1.3.
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// Note that in TLS 1.2, the ECDSA algorithms are not constrained to P-256, etc.
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var supportedSignatureAlgorithms = []SignatureScheme{
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PSSWithSHA256,
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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Ed25519,
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PSSWithSHA384,
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PSSWithSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA256,
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PKCS1WithSHA384,
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PKCS1WithSHA512,
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA1,
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ECDSAWithSHA1,
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}
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// helloRetryRequestRandom is set as the Random value of a ServerHello
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// to signal that the message is actually a HelloRetryRequest.
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var helloRetryRequestRandom = []byte{ // See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
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0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11,
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0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91,
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0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E,
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0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C,
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}
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const (
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// downgradeCanaryTLS12 or downgradeCanaryTLS11 is embedded in the server
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// random as a downgrade protection if the server would be capable of
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// negotiating a higher version. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
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downgradeCanaryTLS12 = "DOWNGRD\x01"
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downgradeCanaryTLS11 = "DOWNGRD\x00"
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)
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// testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary is set in tests to force the server side to
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// include downgrade canaries even if it's using its highers supported version.
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var testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary bool
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type ConnectionState = tls.ConnectionState
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// ConnectionState records basic TLS details about the connection.
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type connectionState struct {
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// Version is the TLS version used by the connection (e.g. VersionTLS12).
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Version uint16
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// HandshakeComplete is true if the handshake has concluded.
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HandshakeComplete bool
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// DidResume is true if this connection was successfully resumed from a
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// previous session with a session ticket or similar mechanism.
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DidResume bool
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// CipherSuite is the cipher suite negotiated for the connection (e.g.
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// TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256).
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CipherSuite uint16
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// NegotiatedProtocol is the application protocol negotiated with ALPN.
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//
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// Note that on the client side, this is currently not guaranteed to be from
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// Config.NextProtos.
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NegotiatedProtocol string
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// NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual used to indicate a mutual NPN negotiation.
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//
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// Deprecated: this value is always true.
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NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual bool
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// ServerName is the value of the Server Name Indication extension sent by
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// the client. It's available both on the server and on the client side.
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ServerName string
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// PeerCertificates are the parsed certificates sent by the peer, in the
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// order in which they were sent. The first element is the leaf certificate
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// that the connection is verified against.
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//
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// On the client side, it can't be empty. On the server side, it can be
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// empty if Config.ClientAuth is not RequireAnyClientCert or
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// RequireAndVerifyClientCert.
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PeerCertificates []*x509.Certificate
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// VerifiedChains is a list of one or more chains where the first element is
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// PeerCertificates[0] and the last element is from Config.RootCAs (on the
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// client side) or Config.ClientCAs (on the server side).
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//
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// On the client side, it's set if Config.InsecureSkipVerify is false. On
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// the server side, it's set if Config.ClientAuth is VerifyClientCertIfGiven
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// (and the peer provided a certificate) or RequireAndVerifyClientCert.
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VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate
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// SignedCertificateTimestamps is a list of SCTs provided by the peer
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// through the TLS handshake for the leaf certificate, if any.
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SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte
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// OCSPResponse is a stapled Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
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// response provided by the peer for the leaf certificate, if any.
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OCSPResponse []byte
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// TLSUnique contains the "tls-unique" channel binding value (see RFC 5929,
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// Section 3). This value will be nil for TLS 1.3 connections and for all
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// resumed connections.
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//
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// Deprecated: there are conditions in which this value might not be unique
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// to a connection. See the Security Considerations sections of RFC 5705 and
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// RFC 7627, and https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE#channelbindings.
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TLSUnique []byte
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// ekm is a closure exposed via ExportKeyingMaterial.
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ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error)
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}
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type ConnectionStateWith0RTT struct {
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ConnectionState
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Used0RTT bool // true if 0-RTT was both offered and accepted
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}
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// ClientAuthType is tls.ClientAuthType
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type ClientAuthType = tls.ClientAuthType
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const (
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NoClientCert = tls.NoClientCert
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RequestClientCert = tls.RequestClientCert
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RequireAnyClientCert = tls.RequireAnyClientCert
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VerifyClientCertIfGiven = tls.VerifyClientCertIfGiven
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RequireAndVerifyClientCert = tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert
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)
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// requiresClientCert reports whether the ClientAuthType requires a client
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// certificate to be provided.
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func requiresClientCert(c ClientAuthType) bool {
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switch c {
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case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert:
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return true
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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// ClientSessionState contains the state needed by clients to resume TLS
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// sessions.
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type ClientSessionState = tls.ClientSessionState
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type clientSessionState struct {
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sessionTicket []uint8 // Encrypted ticket used for session resumption with server
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vers uint16 // TLS version negotiated for the session
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cipherSuite uint16 // Ciphersuite negotiated for the session
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masterSecret []byte // Full handshake MasterSecret, or TLS 1.3 resumption_master_secret
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serverCertificates []*x509.Certificate // Certificate chain presented by the server
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verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // Certificate chains we built for verification
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receivedAt time.Time // When the session ticket was received from the server
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ocspResponse []byte // Stapled OCSP response presented by the server
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scts [][]byte // SCTs presented by the server
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// TLS 1.3 fields.
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nonce []byte // Ticket nonce sent by the server, to derive PSK
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useBy time.Time // Expiration of the ticket lifetime as set by the server
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ageAdd uint32 // Random obfuscation factor for sending the ticket age
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}
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// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState objects that can be used
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// by a client to resume a TLS session with a given server. ClientSessionCache
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// implementations should expect to be called concurrently from different
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// goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not
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// SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which
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// are supported via this interface.
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//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-15 ClientSessionCache"
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type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache
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// SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme
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type SignatureScheme = tls.SignatureScheme
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const (
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// RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms.
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PKCS1WithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0401
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PKCS1WithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0501
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PKCS1WithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0601
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|
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// RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption.
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PSSWithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804
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PSSWithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805
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PSSWithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806
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// ECDSA algorithms. Only constrained to a specific curve in TLS 1.3.
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0403
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0503
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0603
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|
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// EdDSA algorithms.
|
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Ed25519 SignatureScheme = 0x0807
|
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|
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// Legacy signature and hash algorithms for TLS 1.2.
|
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PKCS1WithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0201
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ECDSAWithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0203
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|
)
|
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|
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// ClientHelloInfo contains information from a ClientHello message in order to
|
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// guide application logic in the GetCertificate and GetConfigForClient callbacks.
|
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type ClientHelloInfo = tls.ClientHelloInfo
|
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|
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type clientHelloInfo struct {
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// CipherSuites lists the CipherSuites supported by the client (e.g.
|
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// TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256).
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||
|
CipherSuites []uint16
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|
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// ServerName indicates the name of the server requested by the client
|
||
|
// in order to support virtual hosting. ServerName is only set if the
|
||
|
// client is using SNI (see RFC 4366, Section 3.1).
|
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|
ServerName string
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||
|
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||
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// SupportedCurves lists the elliptic curves supported by the client.
|
||
|
// SupportedCurves is set only if the Supported Elliptic Curves
|
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|
// Extension is being used (see RFC 4492, Section 5.1.1).
|
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|
SupportedCurves []CurveID
|
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|
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// SupportedPoints lists the point formats supported by the client.
|
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// SupportedPoints is set only if the Supported Point Formats Extension
|
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// is being used (see RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2).
|
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|
SupportedPoints []uint8
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|
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||
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// SignatureSchemes lists the signature and hash schemes that the client
|
||
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// is willing to verify. SignatureSchemes is set only if the Signature
|
||
|
// Algorithms Extension is being used (see RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1).
|
||
|
SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme
|
||
|
|
||
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// SupportedProtos lists the application protocols supported by the client.
|
||
|
// SupportedProtos is set only if the Application-Layer Protocol
|
||
|
// Negotiation Extension is being used (see RFC 7301, Section 3.1).
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Servers can select a protocol by setting Config.NextProtos in a
|
||
|
// GetConfigForClient return value.
|
||
|
SupportedProtos []string
|
||
|
|
||
|
// SupportedVersions lists the TLS versions supported by the client.
|
||
|
// For TLS versions less than 1.3, this is extrapolated from the max
|
||
|
// version advertised by the client, so values other than the greatest
|
||
|
// might be rejected if used.
|
||
|
SupportedVersions []uint16
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Conn is the underlying net.Conn for the connection. Do not read
|
||
|
// from, or write to, this connection; that will cause the TLS
|
||
|
// connection to fail.
|
||
|
Conn net.Conn
|
||
|
|
||
|
// config is embedded by the GetCertificate or GetConfigForClient caller,
|
||
|
// for use with SupportsCertificate.
|
||
|
config *Config
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's
|
||
|
// CertificateRequest message, which is used to demand a certificate and proof
|
||
|
// of control from a client.
|
||
|
type CertificateRequestInfo = tls.CertificateRequestInfo
|
||
|
|
||
|
// RenegotiationSupport enumerates the different levels of support for TLS
|
||
|
// renegotiation. TLS renegotiation is the act of performing subsequent
|
||
|
// handshakes on a connection after the first. This significantly complicates
|
||
|
// the state machine and has been the source of numerous, subtle security
|
||
|
// issues. Initiating a renegotiation is not supported, but support for
|
||
|
// accepting renegotiation requests may be enabled.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Even when enabled, the server may not change its identity between handshakes
|
||
|
// (i.e. the leaf certificate must be the same). Additionally, concurrent
|
||
|
// handshake and application data flow is not permitted so renegotiation can
|
||
|
// only be used with protocols that synchronise with the renegotiation, such as
|
||
|
// HTTPS.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Renegotiation is not defined in TLS 1.3.
|
||
|
type RenegotiationSupport = tls.RenegotiationSupport
|
||
|
|
||
|
const (
|
||
|
// RenegotiateNever disables renegotiation.
|
||
|
RenegotiateNever = tls.RenegotiateNever
|
||
|
|
||
|
// RenegotiateOnceAsClient allows a remote server to request
|
||
|
// renegotiation once per connection.
|
||
|
RenegotiateOnceAsClient = tls.RenegotiateOnceAsClient
|
||
|
|
||
|
// RenegotiateFreelyAsClient allows a remote server to repeatedly
|
||
|
// request renegotiation.
|
||
|
RenegotiateFreelyAsClient = tls.RenegotiateFreelyAsClient
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// A Config structure is used to configure a TLS client or server.
|
||
|
// After one has been passed to a TLS function it must not be
|
||
|
// modified. A Config may be reused; the tls package will also not
|
||
|
// modify it.
|
||
|
type Config = tls.Config
|
||
|
|
||
|
type config struct {
|
||
|
// Rand provides the source of entropy for nonces and RSA blinding.
|
||
|
// If Rand is nil, TLS uses the cryptographic random reader in package
|
||
|
// crypto/rand.
|
||
|
// The Reader must be safe for use by multiple goroutines.
|
||
|
Rand io.Reader
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Time returns the current time as the number of seconds since the epoch.
|
||
|
// If Time is nil, TLS uses time.Now.
|
||
|
Time func() time.Time
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Certificates contains one or more certificate chains to present to the
|
||
|
// other side of the connection. The first certificate compatible with the
|
||
|
// peer's requirements is selected automatically.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Server configurations must set one of Certificates, GetCertificate or
|
||
|
// GetConfigForClient. Clients doing client-authentication may set either
|
||
|
// Certificates or GetClientCertificate.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Note: if there are multiple Certificates, and they don't have the
|
||
|
// optional field Leaf set, certificate selection will incur a significant
|
||
|
// per-handshake performance cost.
|
||
|
Certificates []Certificate
|
||
|
|
||
|
// NameToCertificate maps from a certificate name to an element of
|
||
|
// Certificates. Note that a certificate name can be of the form
|
||
|
// '*.example.com' and so doesn't have to be a domain name as such.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Deprecated: NameToCertificate only allows associating a single
|
||
|
// certificate with a given name. Leave this field nil to let the library
|
||
|
// select the first compatible chain from Certificates.
|
||
|
NameToCertificate map[string]*Certificate
|
||
|
|
||
|
// GetCertificate returns a Certificate based on the given
|
||
|
// ClientHelloInfo. It will only be called if the client supplies SNI
|
||
|
// information or if Certificates is empty.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If GetCertificate is nil or returns nil, then the certificate is
|
||
|
// retrieved from NameToCertificate. If NameToCertificate is nil, the
|
||
|
// best element of Certificates will be used.
|
||
|
GetCertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// GetClientCertificate, if not nil, is called when a server requests a
|
||
|
// certificate from a client. If set, the contents of Certificates will
|
||
|
// be ignored.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If GetClientCertificate returns an error, the handshake will be
|
||
|
// aborted and that error will be returned. Otherwise
|
||
|
// GetClientCertificate must return a non-nil Certificate. If
|
||
|
// Certificate.Certificate is empty then no certificate will be sent to
|
||
|
// the server. If this is unacceptable to the server then it may abort
|
||
|
// the handshake.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// GetClientCertificate may be called multiple times for the same
|
||
|
// connection if renegotiation occurs or if TLS 1.3 is in use.
|
||
|
GetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// GetConfigForClient, if not nil, is called after a ClientHello is
|
||
|
// received from a client. It may return a non-nil Config in order to
|
||
|
// change the Config that will be used to handle this connection. If
|
||
|
// the returned Config is nil, the original Config will be used. The
|
||
|
// Config returned by this callback may not be subsequently modified.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If GetConfigForClient is nil, the Config passed to Server() will be
|
||
|
// used for all connections.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If SessionTicketKey was explicitly set on the returned Config, or if
|
||
|
// SetSessionTicketKeys was called on the returned Config, those keys will
|
||
|
// be used. Otherwise, the original Config keys will be used (and possibly
|
||
|
// rotated if they are automatically managed).
|
||
|
GetConfigForClient func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Config, error)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// VerifyPeerCertificate, if not nil, is called after normal
|
||
|
// certificate verification by either a TLS client or server. It
|
||
|
// receives the raw ASN.1 certificates provided by the peer and also
|
||
|
// any verified chains that normal processing found. If it returns a
|
||
|
// non-nil error, the handshake is aborted and that error results.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before
|
||
|
// considering this callback. If normal verification is disabled by
|
||
|
// setting InsecureSkipVerify, or (for a server) when ClientAuth is
|
||
|
// RequestClientCert or RequireAnyClientCert, then this callback will
|
||
|
// be considered but the verifiedChains argument will always be nil.
|
||
|
VerifyPeerCertificate func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error
|
||
|
|
||
|
// VerifyConnection, if not nil, is called after normal certificate
|
||
|
// verification and after VerifyPeerCertificate by either a TLS client
|
||
|
// or server. If it returns a non-nil error, the handshake is aborted
|
||
|
// and that error results.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before
|
||
|
// considering this callback. This callback will run for all connections
|
||
|
// regardless of InsecureSkipVerify or ClientAuth settings.
|
||
|
VerifyConnection func(ConnectionState) error
|
||
|
|
||
|
// RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
|
||
|
// that clients use when verifying server certificates.
|
||
|
// If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set.
|
||
|
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// NextProtos is a list of supported application level protocols, in
|
||
|
// order of preference.
|
||
|
NextProtos []string
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ServerName is used to verify the hostname on the returned
|
||
|
// certificates unless InsecureSkipVerify is given. It is also included
|
||
|
// in the client's handshake to support virtual hosting unless it is
|
||
|
// an IP address.
|
||
|
ServerName string
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ClientAuth determines the server's policy for
|
||
|
// TLS Client Authentication. The default is NoClientCert.
|
||
|
ClientAuth ClientAuthType
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ClientCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
|
||
|
// that servers use if required to verify a client certificate
|
||
|
// by the policy in ClientAuth.
|
||
|
ClientCAs *x509.CertPool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// InsecureSkipVerify controls whether a client verifies the server's
|
||
|
// certificate chain and host name. If InsecureSkipVerify is true, crypto/tls
|
||
|
// accepts any certificate presented by the server and any host name in that
|
||
|
// certificate. In this mode, TLS is susceptible to machine-in-the-middle
|
||
|
// attacks unless custom verification is used. This should be used only for
|
||
|
// testing or in combination with VerifyConnection or VerifyPeerCertificate.
|
||
|
InsecureSkipVerify bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// CipherSuites is a list of supported cipher suites for TLS versions up to
|
||
|
// TLS 1.2. If CipherSuites is nil, a default list of secure cipher suites
|
||
|
// is used, with a preference order based on hardware performance. The
|
||
|
// default cipher suites might change over Go versions. Note that TLS 1.3
|
||
|
// ciphersuites are not configurable.
|
||
|
CipherSuites []uint16
|
||
|
|
||
|
// PreferServerCipherSuites controls whether the server selects the
|
||
|
// client's most preferred ciphersuite, or the server's most preferred
|
||
|
// ciphersuite. If true then the server's preference, as expressed in
|
||
|
// the order of elements in CipherSuites, is used.
|
||
|
PreferServerCipherSuites bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket and
|
||
|
// PSK (resumption) support. Note that on clients, session ticket support is
|
||
|
// also disabled if ClientSessionCache is nil.
|
||
|
SessionTicketsDisabled bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session resumption.
|
||
|
// See RFC 5077 and the PSK mode of RFC 8446. If zero, it will be filled
|
||
|
// with random data before the first server handshake.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Deprecated: if this field is left at zero, session ticket keys will be
|
||
|
// automatically rotated every day and dropped after seven days. For
|
||
|
// customizing the rotation schedule or synchronizing servers that are
|
||
|
// terminating connections for the same host, use SetSessionTicketKeys.
|
||
|
SessionTicketKey [32]byte
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState entries for TLS
|
||
|
// session resumption. It is only used by clients.
|
||
|
ClientSessionCache ClientSessionCache
|
||
|
|
||
|
// MinVersion contains the minimum TLS version that is acceptable.
|
||
|
// If zero, TLS 1.0 is currently taken as the minimum.
|
||
|
MinVersion uint16
|
||
|
|
||
|
// MaxVersion contains the maximum TLS version that is acceptable.
|
||
|
// If zero, the maximum version supported by this package is used,
|
||
|
// which is currently TLS 1.3.
|
||
|
MaxVersion uint16
|
||
|
|
||
|
// CurvePreferences contains the elliptic curves that will be used in
|
||
|
// an ECDHE handshake, in preference order. If empty, the default will
|
||
|
// be used. The client will use the first preference as the type for
|
||
|
// its key share in TLS 1.3. This may change in the future.
|
||
|
CurvePreferences []CurveID
|
||
|
|
||
|
// DynamicRecordSizingDisabled disables adaptive sizing of TLS records.
|
||
|
// When true, the largest possible TLS record size is always used. When
|
||
|
// false, the size of TLS records may be adjusted in an attempt to
|
||
|
// improve latency.
|
||
|
DynamicRecordSizingDisabled bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Renegotiation controls what types of renegotiation are supported.
|
||
|
// The default, none, is correct for the vast majority of applications.
|
||
|
Renegotiation RenegotiationSupport
|
||
|
|
||
|
// KeyLogWriter optionally specifies a destination for TLS master secrets
|
||
|
// in NSS key log format that can be used to allow external programs
|
||
|
// such as Wireshark to decrypt TLS connections.
|
||
|
// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format.
|
||
|
// Use of KeyLogWriter compromises security and should only be
|
||
|
// used for debugging.
|
||
|
KeyLogWriter io.Writer
|
||
|
|
||
|
// mutex protects sessionTicketKeys and autoSessionTicketKeys.
|
||
|
mutex sync.RWMutex
|
||
|
// sessionTicketKeys contains zero or more ticket keys. If set, it means the
|
||
|
// the keys were set with SessionTicketKey or SetSessionTicketKeys. The
|
||
|
// first key is used for new tickets and any subsequent keys can be used to
|
||
|
// decrypt old tickets. The slice contents are not protected by the mutex
|
||
|
// and are immutable.
|
||
|
sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey
|
||
|
// autoSessionTicketKeys is like sessionTicketKeys but is owned by the
|
||
|
// auto-rotation logic. See Config.ticketKeys.
|
||
|
autoSessionTicketKeys []ticketKey
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// A RecordLayer handles encrypting and decrypting of TLS messages.
|
||
|
type RecordLayer interface {
|
||
|
SetReadKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte)
|
||
|
SetWriteKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte)
|
||
|
ReadHandshakeMessage() ([]byte, error)
|
||
|
WriteRecord([]byte) (int, error)
|
||
|
SendAlert(uint8)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
type ExtraConfig struct {
|
||
|
// GetExtensions, if not nil, is called before a message that allows
|
||
|
// sending of extensions is sent.
|
||
|
// Currently only implemented for the ClientHello message (for the client)
|
||
|
// and for the EncryptedExtensions message (for the server).
|
||
|
// Only valid for TLS 1.3.
|
||
|
GetExtensions func(handshakeMessageType uint8) []Extension
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ReceivedExtensions, if not nil, is called when a message that allows the
|
||
|
// inclusion of extensions is received.
|
||
|
// It is called with an empty slice of extensions, if the message didn't
|
||
|
// contain any extensions.
|
||
|
// Currently only implemented for the ClientHello message (sent by the
|
||
|
// client) and for the EncryptedExtensions message (sent by the server).
|
||
|
// Only valid for TLS 1.3.
|
||
|
ReceivedExtensions func(handshakeMessageType uint8, exts []Extension)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// AlternativeRecordLayer is used by QUIC
|
||
|
AlternativeRecordLayer RecordLayer
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Enforce the selection of a supported application protocol.
|
||
|
// Only works for TLS 1.3.
|
||
|
// If enabled, client and server have to agree on an application protocol.
|
||
|
// Otherwise, connection establishment fails.
|
||
|
EnforceNextProtoSelection bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If MaxEarlyData is greater than 0, the client will be allowed to send early
|
||
|
// data when resuming a session.
|
||
|
// Requires the AlternativeRecordLayer to be set.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// It has no meaning on the client.
|
||
|
MaxEarlyData uint32
|
||
|
|
||
|
// The Accept0RTT callback is called when the client offers 0-RTT.
|
||
|
// The server then has to decide if it wants to accept or reject 0-RTT.
|
||
|
// It is only used for servers.
|
||
|
Accept0RTT func(appData []byte) bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// 0RTTRejected is called when the server rejectes 0-RTT.
|
||
|
// It is only used for clients.
|
||
|
Rejected0RTT func()
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If set, the client will export the 0-RTT key when resuming a session that
|
||
|
// allows sending of early data.
|
||
|
// Requires the AlternativeRecordLayer to be set.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// It has no meaning to the server.
|
||
|
Enable0RTT bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Is called when the client saves a session ticket to the session ticket.
|
||
|
// This gives the application the opportunity to save some data along with the ticket,
|
||
|
// which can be restored when the session ticket is used.
|
||
|
GetAppDataForSessionState func() []byte
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Is called when the client uses a session ticket.
|
||
|
// Restores the application data that was saved earlier on GetAppDataForSessionTicket.
|
||
|
SetAppDataFromSessionState func([]byte)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Clone clones.
|
||
|
func (c *ExtraConfig) Clone() *ExtraConfig {
|
||
|
return &ExtraConfig{
|
||
|
GetExtensions: c.GetExtensions,
|
||
|
ReceivedExtensions: c.ReceivedExtensions,
|
||
|
AlternativeRecordLayer: c.AlternativeRecordLayer,
|
||
|
EnforceNextProtoSelection: c.EnforceNextProtoSelection,
|
||
|
MaxEarlyData: c.MaxEarlyData,
|
||
|
Enable0RTT: c.Enable0RTT,
|
||
|
Accept0RTT: c.Accept0RTT,
|
||
|
Rejected0RTT: c.Rejected0RTT,
|
||
|
GetAppDataForSessionState: c.GetAppDataForSessionState,
|
||
|
SetAppDataFromSessionState: c.SetAppDataFromSessionState,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *ExtraConfig) usesAlternativeRecordLayer() bool {
|
||
|
return c != nil && c.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
const (
|
||
|
// ticketKeyNameLen is the number of bytes of identifier that is prepended to
|
||
|
// an encrypted session ticket in order to identify the key used to encrypt it.
|
||
|
ticketKeyNameLen = 16
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ticketKeyLifetime is how long a ticket key remains valid and can be used to
|
||
|
// resume a client connection.
|
||
|
ticketKeyLifetime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour // 7 days
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ticketKeyRotation is how often the server should rotate the session ticket key
|
||
|
// that is used for new tickets.
|
||
|
ticketKeyRotation = 24 * time.Hour
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ticketKey is the internal representation of a session ticket key.
|
||
|
type ticketKey struct {
|
||
|
// keyName is an opaque byte string that serves to identify the session
|
||
|
// ticket key. It's exposed as plaintext in every session ticket.
|
||
|
keyName [ticketKeyNameLen]byte
|
||
|
aesKey [16]byte
|
||
|
hmacKey [16]byte
|
||
|
// created is the time at which this ticket key was created. See Config.ticketKeys.
|
||
|
created time.Time
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ticketKeyFromBytes converts from the external representation of a session
|
||
|
// ticket key to a ticketKey. Externally, session ticket keys are 32 random
|
||
|
// bytes and this function expands that into sufficient name and key material.
|
||
|
func (c *config) ticketKeyFromBytes(b [32]byte) (key ticketKey) {
|
||
|
hashed := sha512.Sum512(b[:])
|
||
|
copy(key.keyName[:], hashed[:ticketKeyNameLen])
|
||
|
copy(key.aesKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen:ticketKeyNameLen+16])
|
||
|
copy(key.hmacKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen+16:ticketKeyNameLen+32])
|
||
|
key.created = c.time()
|
||
|
return key
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// maxSessionTicketLifetime is the maximum allowed lifetime of a TLS 1.3 session
|
||
|
// ticket, and the lifetime we set for tickets we send.
|
||
|
const maxSessionTicketLifetime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Clone returns a shallow clone of c. It is safe to clone a Config that is
|
||
|
// being used concurrently by a TLS client or server.
|
||
|
func (c *config) Clone() *config {
|
||
|
c.mutex.RLock()
|
||
|
defer c.mutex.RUnlock()
|
||
|
return &config{
|
||
|
Rand: c.Rand,
|
||
|
Time: c.Time,
|
||
|
Certificates: c.Certificates,
|
||
|
NameToCertificate: c.NameToCertificate,
|
||
|
GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate,
|
||
|
GetClientCertificate: c.GetClientCertificate,
|
||
|
GetConfigForClient: c.GetConfigForClient,
|
||
|
VerifyPeerCertificate: c.VerifyPeerCertificate,
|
||
|
VerifyConnection: c.VerifyConnection,
|
||
|
RootCAs: c.RootCAs,
|
||
|
NextProtos: c.NextProtos,
|
||
|
ServerName: c.ServerName,
|
||
|
ClientAuth: c.ClientAuth,
|
||
|
ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs,
|
||
|
InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify,
|
||
|
CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites,
|
||
|
PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites,
|
||
|
SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled,
|
||
|
SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey,
|
||
|
ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache,
|
||
|
MinVersion: c.MinVersion,
|
||
|
MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion,
|
||
|
CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences,
|
||
|
DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled,
|
||
|
Renegotiation: c.Renegotiation,
|
||
|
KeyLogWriter: c.KeyLogWriter,
|
||
|
sessionTicketKeys: c.sessionTicketKeys,
|
||
|
autoSessionTicketKeys: c.autoSessionTicketKeys,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// deprecatedSessionTicketKey is set as the prefix of SessionTicketKey if it was
|
||
|
// randomized for backwards compatibility but is not in use.
|
||
|
var deprecatedSessionTicketKey = []byte("DEPRECATED")
|
||
|
|
||
|
// initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked ensures the legacy SessionTicketKey field is
|
||
|
// randomized if empty, and that sessionTicketKeys is populated from it otherwise.
|
||
|
func (c *config) initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked() {
|
||
|
// Don't write if SessionTicketKey is already defined as our deprecated string,
|
||
|
// or if it is defined by the user but sessionTicketKeys is already set.
|
||
|
if c.SessionTicketKey != [32]byte{} &&
|
||
|
(bytes.HasPrefix(c.SessionTicketKey[:], deprecatedSessionTicketKey) || len(c.sessionTicketKeys) > 0) {
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// We need to write some data, so get an exclusive lock and re-check any conditions.
|
||
|
c.mutex.RUnlock()
|
||
|
defer c.mutex.RLock()
|
||
|
c.mutex.Lock()
|
||
|
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
|
||
|
if c.SessionTicketKey == [32]byte{} {
|
||
|
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.SessionTicketKey[:]); err != nil {
|
||
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("tls: unable to generate random session ticket key: %v", err))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
// Write the deprecated prefix at the beginning so we know we created
|
||
|
// it. This key with the DEPRECATED prefix isn't used as an actual
|
||
|
// session ticket key, and is only randomized in case the application
|
||
|
// reuses it for some reason.
|
||
|
copy(c.SessionTicketKey[:], deprecatedSessionTicketKey)
|
||
|
} else if !bytes.HasPrefix(c.SessionTicketKey[:], deprecatedSessionTicketKey) && len(c.sessionTicketKeys) == 0 {
|
||
|
c.sessionTicketKeys = []ticketKey{c.ticketKeyFromBytes(c.SessionTicketKey)}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// ticketKeys returns the ticketKeys for this connection.
|
||
|
// If configForClient has explicitly set keys, those will
|
||
|
// be returned. Otherwise, the keys on c will be used and
|
||
|
// may be rotated if auto-managed.
|
||
|
// During rotation, any expired session ticket keys are deleted from
|
||
|
// c.sessionTicketKeys. If the session ticket key that is currently
|
||
|
// encrypting tickets (ie. the first ticketKey in c.sessionTicketKeys)
|
||
|
// is not fresh, then a new session ticket key will be
|
||
|
// created and prepended to c.sessionTicketKeys.
|
||
|
func (c *config) ticketKeys(configForClient *config) []ticketKey {
|
||
|
// If the ConfigForClient callback returned a Config with explicitly set
|
||
|
// keys, use those, otherwise just use the original Config.
|
||
|
if configForClient != nil {
|
||
|
configForClient.mutex.RLock()
|
||
|
if configForClient.SessionTicketsDisabled {
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
configForClient.initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked()
|
||
|
if len(configForClient.sessionTicketKeys) != 0 {
|
||
|
ret := configForClient.sessionTicketKeys
|
||
|
configForClient.mutex.RUnlock()
|
||
|
return ret
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
configForClient.mutex.RUnlock()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
c.mutex.RLock()
|
||
|
defer c.mutex.RUnlock()
|
||
|
if c.SessionTicketsDisabled {
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
c.initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked()
|
||
|
if len(c.sessionTicketKeys) != 0 {
|
||
|
return c.sessionTicketKeys
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
// Fast path for the common case where the key is fresh enough.
|
||
|
if len(c.autoSessionTicketKeys) > 0 && c.time().Sub(c.autoSessionTicketKeys[0].created) < ticketKeyRotation {
|
||
|
return c.autoSessionTicketKeys
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// autoSessionTicketKeys are managed by auto-rotation.
|
||
|
c.mutex.RUnlock()
|
||
|
defer c.mutex.RLock()
|
||
|
c.mutex.Lock()
|
||
|
defer c.mutex.Unlock()
|
||
|
// Re-check the condition in case it changed since obtaining the new lock.
|
||
|
if len(c.autoSessionTicketKeys) == 0 || c.time().Sub(c.autoSessionTicketKeys[0].created) >= ticketKeyRotation {
|
||
|
var newKey [32]byte
|
||
|
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), newKey[:]); err != nil {
|
||
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unable to generate random session ticket key: %v", err))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
valid := make([]ticketKey, 0, len(c.autoSessionTicketKeys)+1)
|
||
|
valid = append(valid, c.ticketKeyFromBytes(newKey))
|
||
|
for _, k := range c.autoSessionTicketKeys {
|
||
|
// While rotating the current key, also remove any expired ones.
|
||
|
if c.time().Sub(k.created) < ticketKeyLifetime {
|
||
|
valid = append(valid, k)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
c.autoSessionTicketKeys = valid
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return c.autoSessionTicketKeys
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// SetSessionTicketKeys updates the session ticket keys for a server.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// The first key will be used when creating new tickets, while all keys can be
|
||
|
// used for decrypting tickets. It is safe to call this function while the
|
||
|
// server is running in order to rotate the session ticket keys. The function
|
||
|
// will panic if keys is empty.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Calling this function will turn off automatic session ticket key rotation.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If multiple servers are terminating connections for the same host they should
|
||
|
// all have the same session ticket keys. If the session ticket keys leaks,
|
||
|
// previously recorded and future TLS connections using those keys might be
|
||
|
// compromised.
|
||
|
func (c *config) SetSessionTicketKeys(keys [][32]byte) {
|
||
|
if len(keys) == 0 {
|
||
|
panic("tls: keys must have at least one key")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
newKeys := make([]ticketKey, len(keys))
|
||
|
for i, bytes := range keys {
|
||
|
newKeys[i] = c.ticketKeyFromBytes(bytes)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
c.mutex.Lock()
|
||
|
c.sessionTicketKeys = newKeys
|
||
|
c.mutex.Unlock()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) rand() io.Reader {
|
||
|
r := c.Rand
|
||
|
if r == nil {
|
||
|
return rand.Reader
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return r
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) time() time.Time {
|
||
|
t := c.Time
|
||
|
if t == nil {
|
||
|
t = time.Now
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return t()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) cipherSuites() []uint16 {
|
||
|
s := c.CipherSuites
|
||
|
if s == nil {
|
||
|
s = defaultCipherSuites()
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return s
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var supportedVersions = []uint16{
|
||
|
VersionTLS13,
|
||
|
VersionTLS12,
|
||
|
VersionTLS11,
|
||
|
VersionTLS10,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) supportedVersions() []uint16 {
|
||
|
versions := make([]uint16, 0, len(supportedVersions))
|
||
|
for _, v := range supportedVersions {
|
||
|
if c != nil && c.MinVersion != 0 && v < c.MinVersion {
|
||
|
continue
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if c != nil && c.MaxVersion != 0 && v > c.MaxVersion {
|
||
|
continue
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
versions = append(versions, v)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return versions
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) maxSupportedVersion() uint16 {
|
||
|
supportedVersions := c.supportedVersions()
|
||
|
if len(supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
||
|
return 0
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return supportedVersions[0]
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// supportedVersionsFromMax returns a list of supported versions derived from a
|
||
|
// legacy maximum version value. Note that only versions supported by this
|
||
|
// library are returned. Any newer peer will use supportedVersions anyway.
|
||
|
func supportedVersionsFromMax(maxVersion uint16) []uint16 {
|
||
|
versions := make([]uint16, 0, len(supportedVersions))
|
||
|
for _, v := range supportedVersions {
|
||
|
if v > maxVersion {
|
||
|
continue
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
versions = append(versions, v)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return versions
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var defaultCurvePreferences = []CurveID{X25519, CurveP256, CurveP384, CurveP521}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) curvePreferences() []CurveID {
|
||
|
if c == nil || len(c.CurvePreferences) == 0 {
|
||
|
return defaultCurvePreferences
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return c.CurvePreferences
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) supportsCurve(curve CurveID) bool {
|
||
|
for _, cc := range c.curvePreferences() {
|
||
|
if cc == curve {
|
||
|
return true
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// mutualVersion returns the protocol version to use given the advertised
|
||
|
// versions of the peer. Priority is given to the peer preference order.
|
||
|
func (c *config) mutualVersion(peerVersions []uint16) (uint16, bool) {
|
||
|
supportedVersions := c.supportedVersions()
|
||
|
for _, peerVersion := range peerVersions {
|
||
|
for _, v := range supportedVersions {
|
||
|
if v == peerVersion {
|
||
|
return v, true
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 0, false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var errNoCertificates = errors.New("tls: no certificates configured")
|
||
|
|
||
|
// getCertificate returns the best certificate for the given ClientHelloInfo,
|
||
|
// defaulting to the first element of c.Certificates.
|
||
|
func (c *config) getCertificate(clientHello *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) {
|
||
|
if c.GetCertificate != nil &&
|
||
|
(len(c.Certificates) == 0 || len(clientHello.ServerName) > 0) {
|
||
|
cert, err := c.GetCertificate(clientHello)
|
||
|
if cert != nil || err != nil {
|
||
|
return cert, err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if len(c.Certificates) == 0 {
|
||
|
return nil, errNoCertificates
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if len(c.Certificates) == 1 {
|
||
|
// There's only one choice, so no point doing any work.
|
||
|
return &c.Certificates[0], nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if c.NameToCertificate != nil {
|
||
|
name := strings.ToLower(clientHello.ServerName)
|
||
|
if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[name]; ok {
|
||
|
return cert, nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if len(name) > 0 {
|
||
|
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
|
||
|
labels[0] = "*"
|
||
|
wildcardName := strings.Join(labels, ".")
|
||
|
if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[wildcardName]; ok {
|
||
|
return cert, nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
for _, cert := range c.Certificates {
|
||
|
if err := clientHello.SupportsCertificate(&cert); err == nil {
|
||
|
return &cert, nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If nothing matches, return the first certificate.
|
||
|
return &c.Certificates[0], nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// SupportsCertificate returns nil if the provided certificate is supported by
|
||
|
// the client that sent the ClientHello. Otherwise, it returns an error
|
||
|
// describing the reason for the incompatibility.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// If this ClientHelloInfo was passed to a GetConfigForClient or GetCertificate
|
||
|
// callback, this method will take into account the associated Config. Note that
|
||
|
// if GetConfigForClient returns a different Config, the change can't be
|
||
|
// accounted for by this method.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// This function will call x509.ParseCertificate unless c.Leaf is set, which can
|
||
|
// incur a significant performance cost.
|
||
|
func (chi *clientHelloInfo) SupportsCertificate(c *Certificate) error {
|
||
|
// Note we don't currently support certificate_authorities nor
|
||
|
// signature_algorithms_cert, and don't check the algorithms of the
|
||
|
// signatures on the chain (which anyway are a SHOULD, see RFC 8446,
|
||
|
// Section 4.4.2.2).
|
||
|
|
||
|
config := chi.config
|
||
|
if config == nil {
|
||
|
config = &Config{}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
conf := fromConfig(config)
|
||
|
vers, ok := conf.mutualVersion(chi.SupportedVersions)
|
||
|
if !ok {
|
||
|
return errors.New("no mutually supported protocol versions")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If the client specified the name they are trying to connect to, the
|
||
|
// certificate needs to be valid for it.
|
||
|
if chi.ServerName != "" {
|
||
|
x509Cert, err := leafCertificate(c)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate: %w", err)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if err := x509Cert.VerifyHostname(chi.ServerName); err != nil {
|
||
|
return fmt.Errorf("certificate is not valid for requested server name: %w", err)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// supportsRSAFallback returns nil if the certificate and connection support
|
||
|
// the static RSA key exchange, and unsupported otherwise. The logic for
|
||
|
// supporting static RSA is completely disjoint from the logic for
|
||
|
// supporting signed key exchanges, so we just check it as a fallback.
|
||
|
supportsRSAFallback := func(unsupported error) error {
|
||
|
// TLS 1.3 dropped support for the static RSA key exchange.
|
||
|
if vers == VersionTLS13 {
|
||
|
return unsupported
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
// The static RSA key exchange works by decrypting a challenge with the
|
||
|
// RSA private key, not by signing, so check the PrivateKey implements
|
||
|
// crypto.Decrypter, like *rsa.PrivateKey does.
|
||
|
if priv, ok := c.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
|
||
|
if _, ok := priv.Public().(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {
|
||
|
return unsupported
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
return unsupported
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
// Finally, there needs to be a mutual cipher suite that uses the static
|
||
|
// RSA key exchange instead of ECDHE.
|
||
|
rsaCipherSuite := selectCipherSuite(chi.CipherSuites, conf.cipherSuites(), func(c *cipherSuite) bool {
|
||
|
if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return true
|
||
|
})
|
||
|
if rsaCipherSuite == nil {
|
||
|
return unsupported
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If the client sent the signature_algorithms extension, ensure it supports
|
||
|
// schemes we can use with this certificate and TLS version.
|
||
|
if len(chi.SignatureSchemes) > 0 {
|
||
|
if _, err := selectSignatureScheme(vers, c, chi.SignatureSchemes); err != nil {
|
||
|
return supportsRSAFallback(err)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// In TLS 1.3 we are done because supported_groups is only relevant to the
|
||
|
// ECDHE computation, point format negotiation is removed, cipher suites are
|
||
|
// only relevant to the AEAD choice, and static RSA does not exist.
|
||
|
if vers == VersionTLS13 {
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// The only signed key exchange we support is ECDHE.
|
||
|
if !supportsECDHE(conf, chi.SupportedCurves, chi.SupportedPoints) {
|
||
|
return supportsRSAFallback(errors.New("client doesn't support ECDHE, can only use legacy RSA key exchange"))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var ecdsaCipherSuite bool
|
||
|
if priv, ok := c.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
|
||
|
switch pub := priv.Public().(type) {
|
||
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||
|
var curve CurveID
|
||
|
switch pub.Curve {
|
||
|
case elliptic.P256():
|
||
|
curve = CurveP256
|
||
|
case elliptic.P384():
|
||
|
curve = CurveP384
|
||
|
case elliptic.P521():
|
||
|
curve = CurveP521
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return supportsRSAFallback(unsupportedCertificateError(c))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
var curveOk bool
|
||
|
for _, c := range chi.SupportedCurves {
|
||
|
if c == curve && conf.supportsCurve(c) {
|
||
|
curveOk = true
|
||
|
break
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if !curveOk {
|
||
|
return errors.New("client doesn't support certificate curve")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ecdsaCipherSuite = true
|
||
|
case ed25519.PublicKey:
|
||
|
if vers < VersionTLS12 || len(chi.SignatureSchemes) == 0 {
|
||
|
return errors.New("connection doesn't support Ed25519")
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ecdsaCipherSuite = true
|
||
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return supportsRSAFallback(unsupportedCertificateError(c))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
return supportsRSAFallback(unsupportedCertificateError(c))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Make sure that there is a mutually supported cipher suite that works with
|
||
|
// this certificate. Cipher suite selection will then apply the logic in
|
||
|
// reverse to pick it. See also serverHandshakeState.cipherSuiteOk.
|
||
|
cipherSuite := selectCipherSuite(chi.CipherSuites, conf.cipherSuites(), func(c *cipherSuite) bool {
|
||
|
if c.flags&suiteECDHE == 0 {
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
|
||
|
if !ecdsaCipherSuite {
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if ecdsaCipherSuite {
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return true
|
||
|
})
|
||
|
if cipherSuite == nil {
|
||
|
return supportsRSAFallback(errors.New("client doesn't support any cipher suites compatible with the certificate"))
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// BuildNameToCertificate parses c.Certificates and builds c.NameToCertificate
|
||
|
// from the CommonName and SubjectAlternateName fields of each of the leaf
|
||
|
// certificates.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// Deprecated: NameToCertificate only allows associating a single certificate
|
||
|
// with a given name. Leave that field nil to let the library select the first
|
||
|
// compatible chain from Certificates.
|
||
|
func (c *config) BuildNameToCertificate() {
|
||
|
c.NameToCertificate = make(map[string]*Certificate)
|
||
|
for i := range c.Certificates {
|
||
|
cert := &c.Certificates[i]
|
||
|
x509Cert, err := leafCertificate(cert)
|
||
|
if err != nil {
|
||
|
continue
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if len(x509Cert.Subject.CommonName) > 0 {
|
||
|
c.NameToCertificate[x509Cert.Subject.CommonName] = cert
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
for _, san := range x509Cert.DNSNames {
|
||
|
c.NameToCertificate[san] = cert
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
const (
|
||
|
keyLogLabelTLS12 = "CLIENT_RANDOM"
|
||
|
keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET"
|
||
|
keyLogLabelClientHandshake = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"
|
||
|
keyLogLabelServerHandshake = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"
|
||
|
keyLogLabelClientTraffic = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"
|
||
|
keyLogLabelServerTraffic = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (c *config) writeKeyLog(label string, clientRandom, secret []byte) error {
|
||
|
if c.KeyLogWriter == nil {
|
||
|
return nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
logLine := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s %x %x\n", label, clientRandom, secret))
|
||
|
|
||
|
writerMutex.Lock()
|
||
|
_, err := c.KeyLogWriter.Write(logLine)
|
||
|
writerMutex.Unlock()
|
||
|
|
||
|
return err
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// writerMutex protects all KeyLogWriters globally. It is rarely enabled,
|
||
|
// and is only for debugging, so a global mutex saves space.
|
||
|
var writerMutex sync.Mutex
|
||
|
|
||
|
// A Certificate is a chain of one or more certificates, leaf first.
|
||
|
type Certificate = tls.Certificate
|
||
|
|
||
|
// leaf returns the parsed leaf certificate, either from c.Leaf or by parsing
|
||
|
// the corresponding c.Certificate[0].
|
||
|
func leafCertificate(c *Certificate) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
|
||
|
if c.Leaf != nil {
|
||
|
return c.Leaf, nil
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return x509.ParseCertificate(c.Certificate[0])
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
type handshakeMessage interface {
|
||
|
marshal() []byte
|
||
|
unmarshal([]byte) bool
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// lruSessionCache is a ClientSessionCache implementation that uses an LRU
|
||
|
// caching strategy.
|
||
|
type lruSessionCache struct {
|
||
|
sync.Mutex
|
||
|
|
||
|
m map[string]*list.Element
|
||
|
q *list.List
|
||
|
capacity int
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
type lruSessionCacheEntry struct {
|
||
|
sessionKey string
|
||
|
state *ClientSessionState
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// NewLRUClientSessionCache returns a ClientSessionCache with the given
|
||
|
// capacity that uses an LRU strategy. If capacity is < 1, a default capacity
|
||
|
// is used instead.
|
||
|
func NewLRUClientSessionCache(capacity int) ClientSessionCache {
|
||
|
const defaultSessionCacheCapacity = 64
|
||
|
|
||
|
if capacity < 1 {
|
||
|
capacity = defaultSessionCacheCapacity
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return &lruSessionCache{
|
||
|
m: make(map[string]*list.Element),
|
||
|
q: list.New(),
|
||
|
capacity: capacity,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Put adds the provided (sessionKey, cs) pair to the cache. If cs is nil, the entry
|
||
|
// corresponding to sessionKey is removed from the cache instead.
|
||
|
func (c *lruSessionCache) Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) {
|
||
|
c.Lock()
|
||
|
defer c.Unlock()
|
||
|
|
||
|
if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok {
|
||
|
if cs == nil {
|
||
|
c.q.Remove(elem)
|
||
|
delete(c.m, sessionKey)
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry)
|
||
|
entry.state = cs
|
||
|
c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if c.q.Len() < c.capacity {
|
||
|
entry := &lruSessionCacheEntry{sessionKey, cs}
|
||
|
c.m[sessionKey] = c.q.PushFront(entry)
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
elem := c.q.Back()
|
||
|
entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry)
|
||
|
delete(c.m, entry.sessionKey)
|
||
|
entry.sessionKey = sessionKey
|
||
|
entry.state = cs
|
||
|
c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
|
||
|
c.m[sessionKey] = elem
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Get returns the ClientSessionState value associated with a given key. It
|
||
|
// returns (nil, false) if no value is found.
|
||
|
func (c *lruSessionCache) Get(sessionKey string) (*ClientSessionState, bool) {
|
||
|
c.Lock()
|
||
|
defer c.Unlock()
|
||
|
|
||
|
if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok {
|
||
|
c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
|
||
|
return elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry).state, true
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return nil, false
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var emptyConfig Config
|
||
|
|
||
|
func defaultConfig() *Config {
|
||
|
return &emptyConfig
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
var (
|
||
|
once sync.Once
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuites []uint16
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 []uint16
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
func defaultCipherSuites() []uint16 {
|
||
|
once.Do(initDefaultCipherSuites)
|
||
|
return varDefaultCipherSuites
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func defaultCipherSuitesTLS13() []uint16 {
|
||
|
once.Do(initDefaultCipherSuites)
|
||
|
return varDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func initDefaultCipherSuites() {
|
||
|
var topCipherSuites []uint16
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Check the cpu flags for each platform that has optimized GCM implementations.
|
||
|
// Worst case, these variables will just all be false.
|
||
|
var (
|
||
|
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
|
||
|
hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
|
||
|
// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
|
||
|
// TODO: check for s390
|
||
|
// hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR && (cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
|
||
|
hasGCMAsmS390X = false
|
||
|
|
||
|
hasGCMAsm = hasGCMAsmAMD64 || hasGCMAsmARM64 || hasGCMAsmS390X
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
if hasGCMAsm {
|
||
|
// If AES-GCM hardware is provided then prioritise AES-GCM
|
||
|
// cipher suites.
|
||
|
topCipherSuites = []uint16{
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
|
||
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
// Without AES-GCM hardware, we put the ChaCha20-Poly1305
|
||
|
// cipher suites first.
|
||
|
topCipherSuites = []uint16{
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
|
||
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
||
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(cipherSuites))
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, topCipherSuites...)
|
||
|
|
||
|
NextCipherSuite:
|
||
|
for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
|
||
|
if suite.flags&suiteDefaultOff != 0 {
|
||
|
continue
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
for _, existing := range varDefaultCipherSuites {
|
||
|
if existing == suite.id {
|
||
|
continue NextCipherSuite
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, suite.id)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got interface{}) error {
|
||
|
return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T when waiting for %T", got, wanted)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg SignatureScheme, supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme) bool {
|
||
|
for _, s := range supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
|
||
|
if s == sigAlg {
|
||
|
return true
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return false
|
||
|
}
|