TUN-6637: Upgrade go version and quic-go

Dockerfile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # use a builder image for building cloudflare
 ARG TARGET_GOOS
 ARG TARGET_GOARCH
-FROM golang:1.17.1 as builder
+FROM golang:1.18.1 as builder
 ENV GO111MODULE=on \
     CGO_ENABLED=0 \
     TARGET_GOOS=${TARGET_GOOS} \

cfsetup.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-pinned_go: &pinned_go go=1.17.10-1
+pinned_go: &pinned_go go=1.18-1
-pinned_go_fips: &pinned_go_fips go-boring=1.17.9-1
+pinned_go_fips: &pinned_go_fips go-boring=1.18-1
 
 build_dir: &build_dir /cfsetup_build
 default-flavor: bullseye
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ stretch: &stretch
       - build-essential
       - gotest-to-teamcity
     pre-cache: &test_pre_cache
-      - go get golang.org/x/tools/cmd/goimports
+      - go install golang.org/x/tools/cmd/goimports@latest
     post-cache:
       - export GOOS=linux
       - export GOARCH=amd64
@@ -255,8 +255,8 @@ centos-7:
     pre-cache:
       - yum install -y fakeroot
       - yum upgrade -y binutils-2.27-44.base.el7.x86_64
-      - wget https://go.dev/dl/go1.17.10.linux-amd64.tar.gz -P /tmp/
+      - wget https://go.dev/dl/go1.18.1.linux-amd64.tar.gz -P /tmp/
-      - tar -C /usr/local -xzf /tmp/go1.17.10.linux-amd64.tar.gz
+      - tar -C /usr/local -xzf /tmp/go1.18.1.linux-amd64.tar.gz
     post-cache:
       - export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/go/bin
       - export GOOS=linux

dev.Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM golang:1.17.10 as builder
+FROM golang:1.18.1 as builder
 ENV GO111MODULE=on \
     CGO_ENABLED=0
 WORKDIR /go/src/github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/

go.mod

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 module github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
 
-go 1.17
+go 1.18
 
 require (
 	github.com/cloudflare/brotli-go v0.0.0-20191101163834-d34379f7ff93
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/gorilla/mux v1.8.0
 	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.4.2
 	github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.12
-	github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.27.1
+	github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.28.1
 	github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.8
 	github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.45
 	github.com/mitchellh/go-homedir v1.1.0
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ require (
 	go.opentelemetry.io/proto/otlp v0.15.0
 	go.uber.org/automaxprocs v1.4.0
 	golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220427172511-eb4f295cb31f
-	golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220114011407-0dd24b26b47d
+	golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220624214902-1bab6f366d9e
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20210220032951-036812b2e83c
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220114195835-da31bd327af9
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220520151302-bc2c85ada10a
-	golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210615171337-6886f2dfbf5b
+	golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211
 	google.golang.org/protobuf v1.28.0
 	gopkg.in/coreos/go-oidc.v2 v2.2.1
 	gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2 v2.0.0
@@ -71,8 +71,9 @@ require (
 	github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-opentracing v0.0.0-20180507213350-8e809c8a8645 // indirect
 	github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-16 v0.1.5 // indirect
-	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 v0.1.1 // indirect
+	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 v0.1.2 // indirect
-	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.1 // indirect
+	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.2 // indirect
+	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.0-beta.1 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.12 // indirect
 	github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/modern-go/concurrent v0.0.0-20180306012644-bacd9c7ef1dd // indirect
@@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ require (
 
 replace github.com/urfave/cli/v2 => github.com/ipostelnik/cli/v2 v2.3.1-0.20210324024421-b6ea8234fe3d
 
-replace github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go => github.com/chungthuang/quic-go v0.27.1-0.20220607112311-13144fbde8da
+replace github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go => github.com/chungthuang/quic-go v0.27.1-0.20220808144024-f036dcbe387e
 
 // Avoid 'CVE-2022-21698'
 replace github.com/prometheus/golang_client => github.com/prometheus/golang_client v1.12.1

go.sum

@@ -103,15 +103,14 @@ github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4 v4.1.2/go.mod h1:scbssz8iZGpm3xbr14ovlUdkxfGXNInq
 github.com/census-instrumentation/opencensus-proto v0.2.1/go.mod h1:f6KPmirojxKA12rnyqOA5BBL4O983OfeGPqjHWSTneU=
 github.com/certifi/gocertifi v0.0.0-20200211180108-c7c1fbc02894 h1:JLaf/iINcLyjwbtTsCJjc6rtlASgHeIJPrB6QmwURnA=
 github.com/certifi/gocertifi v0.0.0-20200211180108-c7c1fbc02894/go.mod h1:sGbDF6GwGcLpkNXPUTkMRoywsNa/ol15pxFe6ERfguA=
-github.com/cespare/xxhash v1.1.0 h1:a6HrQnmkObjyL+Gs60czilIUGqrzKutQD6XZog3p+ko=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash v1.1.0/go.mod h1:XrSqR1VqqWfGrhpAt58auRo0WTKS1nRRg3ghfAqPWnc=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.1.2 h1:YRXhKfTDauu4ajMg1TPgFO5jnlC2HCbmLXMcTG5cbYE=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.1.2/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
 github.com/cheekybits/genny v1.0.0 h1:uGGa4nei+j20rOSeDeP5Of12XVm7TGUd4dJA9RDitfE=
 github.com/cheekybits/genny v1.0.0/go.mod h1:+tQajlRqAUrPI7DOSpB0XAqZYtQakVtB7wXkRAgjxjQ=
-github.com/chungthuang/quic-go v0.27.1-0.20220607112311-13144fbde8da h1:FmuwbQ8RU/ftTKnfz5diawqvQFH1KDB9wN2Q8S2wqds=
+github.com/chungthuang/quic-go v0.27.1-0.20220808144024-f036dcbe387e h1:HanU8Gx2eTN9X0miD0HNdl/doTs08ZLQzlQMIrGVHgk=
-github.com/chungthuang/quic-go v0.27.1-0.20220607112311-13144fbde8da/go.mod h1:AzgQoPda7N+3IqMMMkywBKggIFo2KT6pfnlrQ2QieeI=
+github.com/chungthuang/quic-go v0.27.1-0.20220808144024-f036dcbe387e/go.mod h1:oGz5DKK41cJt5+773+BSO9BXDsREY4HLf7+0odGAPO0=
 github.com/chzyer/logex v1.1.10/go.mod h1:+Ywpsq7O8HXn0nuIou7OrIPyXbp3wmkHB+jjWRnGsAI=
 github.com/chzyer/readline v0.0.0-20180603132655-2972be24d48e/go.mod h1:nSuG5e5PlCu98SY8svDHJxuZscDgtXS6KTTbou5AhLI=
 github.com/chzyer/test v0.0.0-20180213035817-a1ea475d72b1/go.mod h1:Q3SI9o4m/ZMnBNeIyt5eFwwo7qiLfzFZmjNmxjkiQlU=
@@ -338,7 +337,6 @@ github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.4.2/go.mod h1:YR8l580nyteQvAITg2hZ9XVh4b55+EU/ad
 github.com/gregjones/httpcache v0.0.0-20180305231024-9cad4c3443a7/go.mod h1:FecbI9+v66THATjSRHfNgh1IVFe/9kFxbXtjV0ctIMA=
 github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-prometheus v1.2.0/go.mod h1:8NvIoxWQoOIhqOTXgfV/d3M/q6VIi02HzZEHgUlZvzk=
 github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway v1.5.0/go.mod h1:RSKVYQBd5MCa4OVpNdGskqpgL2+G+NZTnrVHpWWfpdw=
-github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway v1.16.0 h1:gmcG1KaJ57LophUzW0Hy8NmPhnMZb4M0+kPpLofRdBo=
 github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway v1.16.0/go.mod h1:BDjrQk3hbvj6Nolgz8mAMFbcEtjT1g+wF4CSlocrBnw=
 github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2 v2.7.0 h1:BZHcxBETFHIdVyhyEfOvn/RdU/QGdLI4y34qQGjGWO0=
 github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:hgWBS7lorOAVIJEQMi4ZsPv9hVvWI6+ch50m39Pf2Ks=
@@ -399,10 +397,12 @@ github.com/mailru/easyjson v0.0.0-20190626092158-b2ccc519800e/go.mod h1:C1wdFJiN
 github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.2.1/go.mod h1:F7Gl5L1jIgN1D11ucXefiuJS9UMVP2opoCp2jDKb7wc=
 github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-16 v0.1.5 h1:o9JrYPPco/Nukd/HpOHMHZoBDXQqoNtUCmny98/1uqQ=
 github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-16 v0.1.5/go.mod h1:gNpI2Ol+lRS3WwSOtIUUtRwZEQMXjYK+dQSBFbethAk=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 v0.1.1 h1:DQjHPq+aOzUeh9/lixAGunn6rIOQyWChPSI4+hgW7jc=
+github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 v0.1.2 h1:JADBlm0LYiVbuSySCHeY863dNkcpMmDR7s0bLKJeYlQ=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 v0.1.1/go.mod h1:C2ekUKcDdz9SDWxec1N/MvcXBpaX9l3Nx67XaR84L5s=
+github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 v0.1.2/go.mod h1:C2ekUKcDdz9SDWxec1N/MvcXBpaX9l3Nx67XaR84L5s=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.1 h1:qp7p7XXUFL7fpBvSS1sWD+uSqPvzNQK43DH+/qEkj0Y=
+github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.2 h1:JH6jmzbduz0ITVQ7ShevK10Av5+jBEKAHMntXmIV7kM=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.1/go.mod h1:mJttiymBAByA49mhlNZZGrH5u1uXYZJ+RW28Py7f4m4=
+github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.2/go.mod h1:mJttiymBAByA49mhlNZZGrH5u1uXYZJ+RW28Py7f4m4=
+github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.0-beta.1 h1:7m/WlWcSROrcK5NxuXaxYD32BZqe/LEEnBrWcH/cOqQ=
+github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.0-beta.1/go.mod h1:5HTDWtVudo/WFsHKRNuOhWlbdjrfs5JHrYb0wIJqGpI=
 github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.8 h1:c1ghPdyEDarC70ftn0y+A/Ee++9zz8ljHG1b13eJ0s8=
 github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.8/go.mod h1:u6P/XSegPjTcexA+o6vUJrdnUu04hMope9wVRipJSqc=
 github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.12 h1:wuysRhFDzyxgEmMf5xjvJ2M9dZoWAXNNr5LSBS7uHXY=
@@ -507,7 +507,6 @@ github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M8bDsm7K2OlrFYOpmOWEs/qY81heoFR
 github.com/rs/xid v1.2.1/go.mod h1:+uKXf+4Djp6Md1KODXJxgGQPKngRmWyn10oCKFzNHOQ=
 github.com/rs/zerolog v1.20.0 h1:38k9hgtUBdxFwE34yS8rTHmHBa4eN16E4DJlv177LNs=
 github.com/rs/zerolog v1.20.0/go.mod h1:IzD0RJ65iWH0w97OQQebJEvTZYvsCUm9WVLWBQrJRjo=
-github.com/russross/blackfriday v1.5.2 h1:HyvC0ARfnZBqnXwABFeSZHpKvJHJJfPz81GNueLj0oo=
 github.com/russross/blackfriday v1.5.2/go.mod h1:JO/DiYxRf+HjHt06OyowR9PTA263kcR/rfWxYHBV53g=
 github.com/russross/blackfriday/v2 v2.0.1/go.mod h1:+Rmxgy9KzJVeS9/2gXHxylqXiyQDYRxCVz55jmeOWTM=
 github.com/russross/blackfriday/v2 v2.1.0 h1:JIOH55/0cWyOuilr9/qlrm0BSXldqnqwMsf35Ld67mk=
@@ -707,11 +706,10 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210503060351-7fd8e65b6420/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qx
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210525063256-abc453219eb5/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210726213435-c6fcb2dbf985/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210917221730-978cfadd31cf/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
-golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211112202133-69e39bad7dc2/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211209124913-491a49abca63/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211216030914-fe4d6282115f/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
-golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220114011407-0dd24b26b47d h1:1n1fc535VhN8SYtD4cDUyNlfpAF2ROMM9+11equK3hs=
+golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220624214902-1bab6f366d9e h1:TsQ7F31D3bUCLeqPT0u+yjp1guoArKaNKmCr22PYgTQ=
-golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220114011407-0dd24b26b47d/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
+golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20220624214902-1bab6f366d9e/go.mod h1:XRhObCWvk6IyKnWLug+ECip1KBveYUHfp+8e9klMJ9c=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20180821212333-d2e6202438be/go.mod h1:N/0e6XlmueqKjAGxoOufVs8QHGRruUQn6yWY3a++T0U=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20181017192945-9dcd33a902f4/go.mod h1:N/0e6XlmueqKjAGxoOufVs8QHGRruUQn6yWY3a++T0U=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20181203162652-d668ce993890/go.mod h1:N/0e6XlmueqKjAGxoOufVs8QHGRruUQn6yWY3a++T0U=
@@ -815,11 +813,13 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210831042530-f4d43177bf5e/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBc
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210908233432-aa78b53d3365/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20211124211545-fe61309f8881/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20211216021012-1d35b9e2eb4e/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220114195835-da31bd327af9 h1:XfKQ4OlFl8okEOr5UvAqFRVj8pY/4yfcXrddB8qAbU0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220114195835-da31bd327af9/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220520151302-bc2c85ada10a h1:dGzPydgVsqGcTRVwiLJ1jVbufYwmzD3LfVPLKsKg+0k=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220520151302-bc2c85ada10a/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
-golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210615171337-6886f2dfbf5b h1:9zKuko04nR4gjZ4+DNjHqRlAJqbJETHwiNKDqTfOjfE=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210615171337-6886f2dfbf5b/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
+golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211 h1:JGgROgKl9N8DuW20oFS5gxc+lE67/N3FcwmBPMe7ArY=
+golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
 golang.org/x/text v0.0.0-20170915032832-14c0d48ead0c/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.1-0.20180807135948-17ff2d5776d2/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/README.md

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
 [![PkgGoDev](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go)
 [![Code Coverage](https://img.shields.io/codecov/c/github/lucas-clemente/quic-go/master.svg?style=flat-square)](https://codecov.io/gh/lucas-clemente/quic-go/)
 
-quic-go is an implementation of the [QUIC protocol, RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000) protocol in Go.
+quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol ([RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000), [RFC 9001](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9001), [RFC 9002](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9002)) in Go, including the [Unreliable Datagram Extension, RFC 9221](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9221). It has support for HTTP/3 [RFC 9114](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114).
-In addition to RFC 9000, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem.
+
+In addition the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem.
 
 ## Guides
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/client.go

@@ -231,6 +231,8 @@ func newClient(
 ) (*client, error) {
 	if tlsConf == nil {
 		tlsConf = &tls.Config{}
+	} else {
+		tlsConf = tlsConf.Clone()
 	}
 	if tlsConf.ServerName == "" {
 		sni := host

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/connection.go

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ type connection struct {
 	clientHelloWritten    <-chan *wire.TransportParameters
 	earlyConnReadyChan    chan struct{}
 	handshakeCompleteChan chan struct{} // is closed when the handshake completes
+	sentFirstPacket       bool
 	handshakeComplete     bool
 	handshakeConfirmed    bool
 
@@ -1522,6 +1523,12 @@ func (s *connection) handleCloseError(closeErr *closeError) {
 		s.connIDGenerator.RemoveAll()
 		return
 	}
+	// Don't send out any CONNECTION_CLOSE if this is an error that occurred
+	// before we even sent out the first packet.
+	if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && !s.sentFirstPacket {
+		s.connIDGenerator.RemoveAll()
+		return
+	}
 	connClosePacket, err := s.sendConnectionClose(e)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.logger.Debugf("Error sending CONNECTION_CLOSE: %s", err)
@@ -1763,6 +1770,7 @@ func (s *connection) sendPacket() (bool, error) {
 		if err != nil || packet == nil {
 			return false, err
 		}
+		s.sentFirstPacket = true
 		s.logCoalescedPacket(packet)
 		for _, p := range packet.packets {
 			if s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime.IsZero() && p.IsAckEliciting() {

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/interface.go

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ const (
 	VersionDraft29 = protocol.VersionDraft29
 	// Version1 is RFC 9000
 	Version1 = protocol.Version1
+	Version2 = protocol.Version2
 )
 
 // A Token can be used to verify the ownership of the client address.
@@ -127,7 +128,6 @@ type SendStream interface {
 	// The Context is canceled as soon as the write-side of the stream is closed.
 	// This happens when Close() or CancelWrite() is called, or when the peer
 	// cancels the read-side of their stream.
-	// Warning: This API should not be considered stable and might change soon.
 	Context() context.Context
 	// SetWriteDeadline sets the deadline for future Write calls
 	// and any currently-blocked Write call.
@@ -184,18 +184,15 @@ type Connection interface {
 	// The error string will be sent to the peer.
 	CloseWithError(ApplicationErrorCode, string) error
 	// The context is cancelled when the connection is closed.
-	// Warning: This API should not be considered stable and might change soon.
 	Context() context.Context
 	// ConnectionState returns basic details about the QUIC connection.
 	// It blocks until the handshake completes.
 	// Warning: This API should not be considered stable and might change soon.
 	ConnectionState() ConnectionState
 
-	// SendMessage sends a message as a datagram.
+	// SendMessage sends a message as a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221.
-	// See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pauly-quic-datagram/.
 	SendMessage([]byte) error
-	// ReceiveMessage gets a message received in a datagram.
+	// ReceiveMessage gets a message received in a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221.
-	// See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pauly-quic-datagram/.
 	ReceiveMessage() ([]byte, error)
 }
 
@@ -218,7 +215,6 @@ type EarlyConnection interface {
 type Config struct {
 	// The QUIC versions that can be negotiated.
 	// If not set, it uses all versions available.
-	// Warning: This API should not be considered stable and will change soon.
 	Versions []VersionNumber
 	// The length of the connection ID in bytes.
 	// It can be 0, or any value between 4 and 18.

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/interfaces.go

@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ type Packet struct {
 	skippedPacket           bool
 }
 
+func (p *Packet) outstanding() bool {
+	return !p.declaredLost && !p.skippedPacket && !p.IsPathMTUProbePacket
+}
+
 // SentPacketHandler handles ACKs received for outgoing packets
 type SentPacketHandler interface {
 	// SentPacket may modify the packet

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_handler.go

@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) detectLostPackets(now time.Time, encLevel protocol.E
 			pnSpace.lossTime = lossTime
 		}
 		if packetLost {
-			p.declaredLost = true
+			p = pnSpace.history.DeclareLost(p)
 			// the bytes in flight need to be reduced no matter if the frames in this packet will be retransmitted
 			h.removeFromBytesInFlight(p)
 			h.queueFramesForRetransmission(p)
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) QueueProbePacket(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel)
 	// TODO: don't declare the packet lost here.
 	// Keep track of acknowledged frames instead.
 	h.removeFromBytesInFlight(p)
-	p.declaredLost = true
+	pnSpace.history.DeclareLost(p)
 	return true
 }
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_history.go

@@ -9,18 +9,20 @@ import (
 )
 
 type sentPacketHistory struct {
-	rttStats    *utils.RTTStats
+	rttStats              *utils.RTTStats
-	packetList  *PacketList
+	outstandingPacketList *PacketList
-	packetMap   map[protocol.PacketNumber]*PacketElement
+	etcPacketList         *PacketList
-	highestSent protocol.PacketNumber
+	packetMap             map[protocol.PacketNumber]*PacketElement
+	highestSent           protocol.PacketNumber
 }
 
 func newSentPacketHistory(rttStats *utils.RTTStats) *sentPacketHistory {
 	return &sentPacketHistory{
-		rttStats:    rttStats,
+		rttStats:              rttStats,
-		packetList:  NewPacketList(),
+		outstandingPacketList: NewPacketList(),
-		packetMap:   make(map[protocol.PacketNumber]*PacketElement),
+		etcPacketList:         NewPacketList(),
-		highestSent: protocol.InvalidPacketNumber,
+		packetMap:             make(map[protocol.PacketNumber]*PacketElement),
+		highestSent:           protocol.InvalidPacketNumber,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHistory) SentPacket(p *Packet, isAckEliciting bool) {
 	}
 	// Skipped packet numbers.
 	for pn := h.highestSent + 1; pn < p.PacketNumber; pn++ {
-		el := h.packetList.PushBack(Packet{
+		el := h.etcPacketList.PushBack(Packet{
 			PacketNumber:    pn,
 			EncryptionLevel: p.EncryptionLevel,
 			SendTime:        p.SendTime,
@@ -41,7 +43,12 @@ func (h *sentPacketHistory) SentPacket(p *Packet, isAckEliciting bool) {
 	h.highestSent = p.PacketNumber
 
 	if isAckEliciting {
-		el := h.packetList.PushBack(*p)
+		var el *PacketElement
+		if p.outstanding() {
+			el = h.outstandingPacketList.PushBack(*p)
+		} else {
+			el = h.etcPacketList.PushBack(*p)
+		}
 		h.packetMap[p.PacketNumber] = el
 	}
 }
@@ -49,10 +56,25 @@ func (h *sentPacketHistory) SentPacket(p *Packet, isAckEliciting bool) {
 // Iterate iterates through all packets.
 func (h *sentPacketHistory) Iterate(cb func(*Packet) (cont bool, err error)) error {
 	cont := true
-	var next *PacketElement
+	outstandingEl := h.outstandingPacketList.Front()
-	for el := h.packetList.Front(); cont && el != nil; el = next {
+	etcEl := h.etcPacketList.Front()
+	var el *PacketElement
+	// whichever has the next packet number is returned first
+	for cont {
+		if outstandingEl == nil || (etcEl != nil && etcEl.Value.PacketNumber < outstandingEl.Value.PacketNumber) {
+			el = etcEl
+		} else {
+			el = outstandingEl
+		}
+		if el == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if el == outstandingEl {
+			outstandingEl = outstandingEl.Next()
+		} else {
+			etcEl = etcEl.Next()
+		}
 		var err error
-		next = el.Next()
 		cont, err = cb(&el.Value)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
@@ -61,15 +83,13 @@ func (h *sentPacketHistory) Iterate(cb func(*Packet) (cont bool, err error)) err
 	return nil
 }
 
-// FirstOutStanding returns the first outstanding packet.
+// FirstOutstanding returns the first outstanding packet.
 func (h *sentPacketHistory) FirstOutstanding() *Packet {
-	for el := h.packetList.Front(); el != nil; el = el.Next() {
+	el := h.outstandingPacketList.Front()
-		p := &el.Value
+	if el == nil {
-		if !p.declaredLost && !p.skippedPacket && !p.IsPathMTUProbePacket {
+		return nil
-			return p
-		}
 	}
-	return nil
+	return &el.Value
 }
 
 func (h *sentPacketHistory) Len() int {
@@ -81,28 +101,53 @@ func (h *sentPacketHistory) Remove(p protocol.PacketNumber) error {
 	if !ok {
 		return fmt.Errorf("packet %d not found in sent packet history", p)
 	}
-	h.packetList.Remove(el)
+	h.outstandingPacketList.Remove(el)
+	h.etcPacketList.Remove(el)
 	delete(h.packetMap, p)
 	return nil
 }
 
 func (h *sentPacketHistory) HasOutstandingPackets() bool {
-	return h.FirstOutstanding() != nil
+	return h.outstandingPacketList.Len() > 0
 }
 
 func (h *sentPacketHistory) DeleteOldPackets(now time.Time) {
 	maxAge := 3 * h.rttStats.PTO(false)
 	var nextEl *PacketElement
-	for el := h.packetList.Front(); el != nil; el = nextEl {
+	// we don't iterate outstandingPacketList, as we should not delete outstanding packets.
+	// being outstanding for more than 3*PTO should only happen in the case of drastic RTT changes.
+	for el := h.etcPacketList.Front(); el != nil; el = nextEl {
 		nextEl = el.Next()
 		p := el.Value
 		if p.SendTime.After(now.Add(-maxAge)) {
 			break
 		}
-		if !p.skippedPacket && !p.declaredLost { // should only happen in the case of drastic RTT changes
-			continue
-		}
 		delete(h.packetMap, p.PacketNumber)
-		h.packetList.Remove(el)
+		h.etcPacketList.Remove(el)
 	}
 }
+
+func (h *sentPacketHistory) DeclareLost(p *Packet) *Packet {
+	el, ok := h.packetMap[p.PacketNumber]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	// try to remove it from both lists, as we don't know which one it currently belongs to.
+	// Remove is a no-op for elements that are not in the list.
+	h.outstandingPacketList.Remove(el)
+	h.etcPacketList.Remove(el)
+	p.declaredLost = true
+	// move it to the correct position in the etc list (based on the packet number)
+	for el = h.etcPacketList.Back(); el != nil; el = el.Prev() {
+		if el.Value.PacketNumber < p.PacketNumber {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if el == nil {
+		el = h.etcPacketList.PushFront(*p)
+	} else {
+		el = h.etcPacketList.InsertAfter(*p, el)
+	}
+	h.packetMap[p.PacketNumber] = el
+	return &el.Value
+}

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/aead.go

@@ -9,9 +9,15 @@ import (
 	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
 )
 
-func createAEAD(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+func createAEAD(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) cipher.AEAD {
-	key := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, "quic key", suite.KeyLen)
+	keyLabel := hkdfLabelKeyV1
-	iv := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, "quic iv", suite.IVLen())
+	ivLabel := hkdfLabelIVV1
+	if v == protocol.Version2 {
+		keyLabel = hkdfLabelKeyV2
+		ivLabel = hkdfLabelIVV2
+	}
+	key := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, keyLabel, suite.KeyLen)
+	iv := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, ivLabel, suite.IVLen())
 	return suite.AEAD(key, iv)
 }
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go

@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ type cryptoSetup struct {
 
 	zeroRTTParameters      *wire.TransportParameters
 	clientHelloWritten     bool
-	clientHelloWrittenChan chan *wire.TransportParameters
+	clientHelloWrittenChan chan struct{} // is closed as soon as the ClientHello is written
+	zeroRTTParametersChan  chan<- *wire.TransportParameters
 
 	rttStats *utils.RTTStats
 
@@ -238,13 +239,14 @@ func newCryptoSetup(
 		tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(protocol.EncryptionInitial, protocol.PerspectiveServer)
 	}
 	extHandler := newExtensionHandler(tp.Marshal(perspective), perspective, version)
+	zeroRTTParametersChan := make(chan *wire.TransportParameters, 1)
 	cs := &cryptoSetup{
 		tlsConf:                   tlsConf,
 		initialStream:             initialStream,
 		initialSealer:             initialSealer,
 		initialOpener:             initialOpener,
 		handshakeStream:           handshakeStream,
-		aead:                      newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats, tracer, logger),
+		aead:                      newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats, tracer, logger, version),
 		readEncLevel:              protocol.EncryptionInitial,
 		writeEncLevel:             protocol.EncryptionInitial,
 		runner:                    runner,
@@ -256,7 +258,8 @@ func newCryptoSetup(
 		perspective:               perspective,
 		handshakeDone:             make(chan struct{}),
 		alertChan:                 make(chan uint8),
-		clientHelloWrittenChan:    make(chan *wire.TransportParameters, 1),
+		clientHelloWrittenChan:    make(chan struct{}),
+		zeroRTTParametersChan:     zeroRTTParametersChan,
 		messageChan:               make(chan []byte, 100),
 		isReadingHandshakeMessage: make(chan struct{}),
 		closeChan:                 make(chan struct{}),
@@ -278,7 +281,7 @@ func newCryptoSetup(
 		GetAppDataForSessionState:  cs.marshalDataForSessionState,
 		SetAppDataFromSessionState: cs.handleDataFromSessionState,
 	}
-	return cs, cs.clientHelloWrittenChan
+	return cs, zeroRTTParametersChan
 }
 
 func (h *cryptoSetup) ChangeConnectionID(id protocol.ConnectionID) {
@@ -308,6 +311,15 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) RunHandshake() {
 		close(handshakeComplete)
 	}()
 
+	if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
+		select {
+		case err := <-handshakeErrChan:
+			h.onError(0, err.Error())
+			return
+		case <-h.clientHelloWrittenChan:
+		}
+	}
+
 	select {
 	case <-handshakeComplete: // return when the handshake is done
 		h.mutex.Lock()
@@ -324,7 +336,13 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) RunHandshake() {
 }
 
 func (h *cryptoSetup) onError(alert uint8, message string) {
-	h.runner.OnError(qerr.NewCryptoError(alert, message))
+	var err error
+	if alert == 0 {
+		err = &qerr.TransportError{ErrorCode: qerr.InternalError, ErrorMessage: message}
+	} else {
+		err = qerr.NewCryptoError(alert, message)
+	}
+	h.runner.OnError(err)
 }
 
 // Close closes the crypto setup.
@@ -554,8 +572,8 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Ciph
 			panic("Received 0-RTT read key for the client")
 		}
 		h.zeroRTTOpener = newLongHeaderOpener(
-			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret),
+			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version),
-			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true),
+			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version),
 		)
 		h.mutex.Unlock()
 		h.logger.Debugf("Installed 0-RTT Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID))
@@ -566,8 +584,8 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Ciph
 	case qtls.EncryptionHandshake:
 		h.readEncLevel = protocol.EncryptionHandshake
 		h.handshakeOpener = newHandshakeOpener(
-			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret),
+			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version),
-			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true),
+			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version),
 			h.dropInitialKeys,
 			h.perspective,
 		)
@@ -594,8 +612,8 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Cip
 			panic("Received 0-RTT write key for the server")
 		}
 		h.zeroRTTSealer = newLongHeaderSealer(
-			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret),
+			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version),
-			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true),
+			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version),
 		)
 		h.mutex.Unlock()
 		h.logger.Debugf("Installed 0-RTT Write keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID))
@@ -606,8 +624,8 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Cip
 	case qtls.EncryptionHandshake:
 		h.writeEncLevel = protocol.EncryptionHandshake
 		h.handshakeSealer = newHandshakeSealer(
-			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret),
+			createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version),
-			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true),
+			newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version),
 			h.dropInitialKeys,
 			h.perspective,
 		)
@@ -645,12 +663,13 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) WriteRecord(p []byte) (int, error) {
 		n, err := h.initialStream.Write(p)
 		if !h.clientHelloWritten && h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
 			h.clientHelloWritten = true
+			close(h.clientHelloWrittenChan)
 			if h.zeroRTTSealer != nil && h.zeroRTTParameters != nil {
 				h.logger.Debugf("Doing 0-RTT.")
-				h.clientHelloWrittenChan <- h.zeroRTTParameters
+				h.zeroRTTParametersChan <- h.zeroRTTParameters
 			} else {
 				h.logger.Debugf("Not doing 0-RTT.")
-				h.clientHelloWrittenChan <- nil
+				h.zeroRTTParametersChan <- nil
 			}
 		}
 		return n, err

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/header_protector.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
 
+	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
 	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls"
 )
 
@@ -17,12 +18,20 @@ type headerProtector interface {
 	DecryptHeader(sample []byte, firstByte *byte, hdrBytes []byte)
 }
 
-func newHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool) headerProtector {
+func hkdfHeaderProtectionLabel(v protocol.VersionNumber) string {
+	if v == protocol.Version2 {
+		return "quicv2 hp"
+	}
+	return "quic hp"
+}
+
+func newHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, v protocol.VersionNumber) headerProtector {
+	hkdfLabel := hkdfHeaderProtectionLabel(v)
 	switch suite.ID {
 	case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
-		return newAESHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, isLongHeader)
+		return newAESHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, isLongHeader, hkdfLabel)
 	case tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
-		return newChaChaHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, isLongHeader)
+		return newChaChaHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, isLongHeader, hkdfLabel)
 	default:
 		panic(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid cipher suite id: %d", suite.ID))
 	}
@@ -36,8 +45,8 @@ type aesHeaderProtector struct {
 
 var _ headerProtector = &aesHeaderProtector{}
 
-func newAESHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool) headerProtector {
+func newAESHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, hkdfLabel string) headerProtector {
-	hpKey := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, "quic hp", suite.KeyLen)
+	hpKey := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, hkdfLabel, suite.KeyLen)
 	block, err := aes.NewCipher(hpKey)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(fmt.Sprintf("error creating new AES cipher: %s", err))
@@ -81,8 +90,8 @@ type chachaHeaderProtector struct {
 
 var _ headerProtector = &chachaHeaderProtector{}
 
-func newChaChaHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool) headerProtector {
+func newChaChaHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, hkdfLabel string) headerProtector {
-	hpKey := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, "quic hp", suite.KeyLen)
+	hpKey := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, hkdfLabel, suite.KeyLen)
 
 	p := &chachaHeaderProtector{
 		isLongHeader: isLongHeader,

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/initial_aead.go

@@ -12,12 +12,23 @@ import (
 
 var (
 	quicSaltOld = []byte{0xaf, 0xbf, 0xec, 0x28, 0x99, 0x93, 0xd2, 0x4c, 0x9e, 0x97, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x9c, 0x61, 0x11, 0xe0, 0x43, 0x90, 0xa8, 0x99}
-	quicSalt    = []byte{0x38, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x34, 0xb3, 0x4d, 0x17, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x0c, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x0a}
+	quicSaltV1  = []byte{0x38, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x34, 0xb3, 0x4d, 0x17, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x0c, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x0a}
+	quicSaltV2  = []byte{0xa7, 0x07, 0xc2, 0x03, 0xa5, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x18, 0x4a, 0x1d, 0x62, 0xca, 0x57, 0x04, 0x06, 0xea, 0x7a, 0xe3, 0xe5, 0xd3}
+)
+
+const (
+	hkdfLabelKeyV1 = "quic key"
+	hkdfLabelKeyV2 = "quicv2 key"
+	hkdfLabelIVV1  = "quic iv"
+	hkdfLabelIVV2  = "quicv2 iv"
 )
 
 func getSalt(v protocol.VersionNumber) []byte {
+	if v == protocol.Version2 {
+		return quicSaltV2
+	}
 	if v == protocol.Version1 {
-		return quicSalt
+		return quicSaltV1
 	}
 	return quicSaltOld
 }
@@ -40,14 +51,14 @@ func NewInitialAEAD(connID protocol.ConnectionID, pers protocol.Perspective, v p
 		mySecret = serverSecret
 		otherSecret = clientSecret
 	}
-	myKey, myIV := computeInitialKeyAndIV(mySecret)
+	myKey, myIV := computeInitialKeyAndIV(mySecret, v)
-	otherKey, otherIV := computeInitialKeyAndIV(otherSecret)
+	otherKey, otherIV := computeInitialKeyAndIV(otherSecret, v)
 
 	encrypter := qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(myKey, myIV)
 	decrypter := qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(otherKey, otherIV)
 
-	return newLongHeaderSealer(encrypter, newHeaderProtector(initialSuite, mySecret, true)),
+	return newLongHeaderSealer(encrypter, newHeaderProtector(initialSuite, mySecret, true, v)),
-		newLongHeaderOpener(decrypter, newAESHeaderProtector(initialSuite, otherSecret, true))
+		newLongHeaderOpener(decrypter, newAESHeaderProtector(initialSuite, otherSecret, true, hkdfHeaderProtectionLabel(v)))
 }
 
 func computeSecrets(connID protocol.ConnectionID, v protocol.VersionNumber) (clientSecret, serverSecret []byte) {
@@ -57,8 +68,14 @@ func computeSecrets(connID protocol.ConnectionID, v protocol.VersionNumber) (cli
 	return
 }
 
-func computeInitialKeyAndIV(secret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
+func computeInitialKeyAndIV(secret []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) (key, iv []byte) {
-	key = hkdfExpandLabel(crypto.SHA256, secret, []byte{}, "quic key", 16)
+	keyLabel := hkdfLabelKeyV1
-	iv = hkdfExpandLabel(crypto.SHA256, secret, []byte{}, "quic iv", 12)
+	ivLabel := hkdfLabelIVV1
+	if v == protocol.Version2 {
+		keyLabel = hkdfLabelKeyV2
+		ivLabel = hkdfLabelIVV2
+	}
+	key = hkdfExpandLabel(crypto.SHA256, secret, []byte{}, keyLabel, 16)
+	iv = hkdfExpandLabel(crypto.SHA256, secret, []byte{}, ivLabel, 12)
 	return
 }

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/updatable_aead.go

@@ -55,8 +55,9 @@ type updatableAEAD struct {
 
 	rttStats *utils.RTTStats
 
-	tracer logging.ConnectionTracer
+	tracer  logging.ConnectionTracer
-	logger utils.Logger
+	logger  utils.Logger
+	version protocol.VersionNumber
 
 	// use a single slice to avoid allocations
 	nonceBuf []byte
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ var (
 	_ ShortHeaderSealer = &updatableAEAD{}
 )
 
-func newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats *utils.RTTStats, tracer logging.ConnectionTracer, logger utils.Logger) *updatableAEAD {
+func newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats *utils.RTTStats, tracer logging.ConnectionTracer, logger utils.Logger, version protocol.VersionNumber) *updatableAEAD {
 	return &updatableAEAD{
 		firstPacketNumber:       protocol.InvalidPacketNumber,
 		largestAcked:            protocol.InvalidPacketNumber,
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ func newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats *utils.RTTStats, tracer logging.ConnectionTracer,
 		rttStats:                rttStats,
 		tracer:                  tracer,
 		logger:                  logger,
+		version:                 version,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -100,8 +102,8 @@ func (a *updatableAEAD) rollKeys() {
 
 	a.nextRcvTrafficSecret = a.getNextTrafficSecret(a.suite.Hash, a.nextRcvTrafficSecret)
 	a.nextSendTrafficSecret = a.getNextTrafficSecret(a.suite.Hash, a.nextSendTrafficSecret)
-	a.nextRcvAEAD = createAEAD(a.suite, a.nextRcvTrafficSecret)
+	a.nextRcvAEAD = createAEAD(a.suite, a.nextRcvTrafficSecret, a.version)
-	a.nextSendAEAD = createAEAD(a.suite, a.nextSendTrafficSecret)
+	a.nextSendAEAD = createAEAD(a.suite, a.nextSendTrafficSecret, a.version)
 }
 
 func (a *updatableAEAD) startKeyDropTimer(now time.Time) {
@@ -117,27 +119,27 @@ func (a *updatableAEAD) getNextTrafficSecret(hash crypto.Hash, ts []byte) []byte
 // For the client, this function is called before SetWriteKey.
 // For the server, this function is called after SetWriteKey.
 func (a *updatableAEAD) SetReadKey(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) {
-	a.rcvAEAD = createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret)
+	a.rcvAEAD = createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, a.version)
-	a.headerDecrypter = newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, false)
+	a.headerDecrypter = newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, false, a.version)
 	if a.suite == nil {
 		a.setAEADParameters(a.rcvAEAD, suite)
 	}
 
 	a.nextRcvTrafficSecret = a.getNextTrafficSecret(suite.Hash, trafficSecret)
-	a.nextRcvAEAD = createAEAD(suite, a.nextRcvTrafficSecret)
+	a.nextRcvAEAD = createAEAD(suite, a.nextRcvTrafficSecret, a.version)
 }
 
 // For the client, this function is called after SetReadKey.
 // For the server, this function is called before SetWriteKey.
 func (a *updatableAEAD) SetWriteKey(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) {
-	a.sendAEAD = createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret)
+	a.sendAEAD = createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, a.version)
-	a.headerEncrypter = newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, false)
+	a.headerEncrypter = newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, false, a.version)
 	if a.suite == nil {
 		a.setAEADParameters(a.sendAEAD, suite)
 	}
 
 	a.nextSendTrafficSecret = a.getNextTrafficSecret(suite.Hash, trafficSecret)
-	a.nextSendAEAD = createAEAD(suite, a.nextSendTrafficSecret)
+	a.nextSendAEAD = createAEAD(suite, a.nextSendTrafficSecret, a.version)
 }
 
 func (a *updatableAEAD) setAEADParameters(aead cipher.AEAD, suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13) {

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol/params.go

@@ -137,8 +137,7 @@ const MaxAckFrameSize ByteCount = 1000
 // The size is chosen such that a DATAGRAM frame fits into a QUIC packet.
 const DefaultMaxDatagramFrameSize ByteCount = 1220
 
-// DatagramRcvQueueLen is the length of the receive queue for DATAGRAM frames.
+// DatagramRcvQueueLen is the length of the receive queue for DATAGRAM frames (RFC 9221)
-// See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pauly-quic-datagram/.
 const DatagramRcvQueueLen = 128
 
 // MaxNumAckRanges is the maximum number of ACK ranges that we send in an ACK frame.

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol/version.go

@@ -23,11 +23,12 @@ const (
 	VersionUnknown  VersionNumber = math.MaxUint32
 	VersionDraft29  VersionNumber = 0xff00001d
 	Version1        VersionNumber = 0x1
+	Version2        VersionNumber = 0x709a50c4
 )
 
 // SupportedVersions lists the versions that the server supports
 // must be in sorted descending order
-var SupportedVersions = []VersionNumber{Version1, VersionDraft29}
+var SupportedVersions = []VersionNumber{Version1, Version2, VersionDraft29}
 
 // IsValidVersion says if the version is known to quic-go
 func IsValidVersion(v VersionNumber) bool {
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ func (vn VersionNumber) String() string {
 		return "draft-29"
 	case Version1:
 		return "v1"
+	case Version2:
+		return "v2"
 	default:
 		if vn.isGQUIC() {
 			return fmt.Sprintf("gQUIC %d", vn.toGQUICVersion())

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls/go118.go

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-//go:build go1.18
+//go:build go1.18 && !go1.19
-// +build go1.18
+// +build go1.18,!go1.19
 
 package qtls
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls/go119.go

@@ -3,4 +3,98 @@
 
 package qtls
 
-var _ int = "The version of quic-go you're using can't be built on Go 1.19 yet. For more details, please see https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/wiki/quic-go-and-Go-versions."
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"net"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	"github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19"
+)
+
+type (
+	// Alert is a TLS alert
+	Alert = qtls.Alert
+	// A Certificate is qtls.Certificate.
+	Certificate = qtls.Certificate
+	// CertificateRequestInfo contains information about a certificate request.
+	CertificateRequestInfo = qtls.CertificateRequestInfo
+	// A CipherSuiteTLS13 is a cipher suite for TLS 1.3
+	CipherSuiteTLS13 = qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13
+	// ClientHelloInfo contains information about a ClientHello.
+	ClientHelloInfo = qtls.ClientHelloInfo
+	// ClientSessionCache is a cache used for session resumption.
+	ClientSessionCache = qtls.ClientSessionCache
+	// ClientSessionState is a state needed for session resumption.
+	ClientSessionState = qtls.ClientSessionState
+	// A Config is a qtls.Config.
+	Config = qtls.Config
+	// A Conn is a qtls.Conn.
+	Conn = qtls.Conn
+	// ConnectionState contains information about the state of the connection.
+	ConnectionState = qtls.ConnectionStateWith0RTT
+	// EncryptionLevel is the encryption level of a message.
+	EncryptionLevel = qtls.EncryptionLevel
+	// Extension is a TLS extension
+	Extension = qtls.Extension
+	// ExtraConfig is the qtls.ExtraConfig
+	ExtraConfig = qtls.ExtraConfig
+	// RecordLayer is a qtls RecordLayer.
+	RecordLayer = qtls.RecordLayer
+)
+
+const (
+	// EncryptionHandshake is the Handshake encryption level
+	EncryptionHandshake = qtls.EncryptionHandshake
+	// Encryption0RTT is the 0-RTT encryption level
+	Encryption0RTT = qtls.Encryption0RTT
+	// EncryptionApplication is the application data encryption level
+	EncryptionApplication = qtls.EncryptionApplication
+)
+
+// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
+func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	return qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
+}
+
+// Client returns a new TLS client side connection.
+func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
+	return qtls.Client(conn, config, extraConfig)
+}
+
+// Server returns a new TLS server side connection.
+func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
+	return qtls.Server(conn, config, extraConfig)
+}
+
+func GetConnectionState(conn *Conn) ConnectionState {
+	return conn.ConnectionStateWith0RTT()
+}
+
+// ToTLSConnectionState extracts the tls.ConnectionState
+func ToTLSConnectionState(cs ConnectionState) tls.ConnectionState {
+	return cs.ConnectionState
+}
+
+type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
+	ID     uint16
+	KeyLen int
+	AEAD   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
+	Hash   crypto.Hash
+}
+
+//go:linkname cipherSuiteTLS13ByID github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19.cipherSuiteTLS13ByID
+func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13
+
+// CipherSuiteTLS13ByID gets a TLS 1.3 cipher suite.
+func CipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *CipherSuiteTLS13 {
+	val := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
+	cs := (*cipherSuiteTLS13)(unsafe.Pointer(val))
+	return &qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13{
+		ID:     cs.ID,
+		KeyLen: cs.KeyLen,
+		AEAD:   cs.AEAD,
+		Hash:   cs.Hash,
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+//go:build go1.20
+// +build go1.20
+
+package qtls
+
+var _ int = "The version of quic-go you're using can't be built on Go 1.20 yet. For more details, please see https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/wiki/quic-go-and-Go-versions."

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/extended_header.go

@@ -127,18 +127,32 @@ func (h *ExtendedHeader) Write(b *bytes.Buffer, ver protocol.VersionNumber) erro
 	return h.writeShortHeader(b, ver)
 }
 
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) writeLongHeader(b *bytes.Buffer, _ protocol.VersionNumber) error {
+func (h *ExtendedHeader) writeLongHeader(b *bytes.Buffer, version protocol.VersionNumber) error {
 	var packetType uint8
-	//nolint:exhaustive
+	if version == protocol.Version2 {
-	switch h.Type {
+		//nolint:exhaustive
-	case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
+		switch h.Type {
-		packetType = 0x0
+		case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
-	case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
+			packetType = 0b01
-		packetType = 0x1
+		case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
-	case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
+			packetType = 0b10
-		packetType = 0x2
+		case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
-	case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
+			packetType = 0b11
-		packetType = 0x3
+		case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
+			packetType = 0b00
+		}
+	} else {
+		//nolint:exhaustive
+		switch h.Type {
+		case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
+			packetType = 0b00
+		case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
+			packetType = 0b01
+		case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
+			packetType = 0b10
+		case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
+			packetType = 0b11
+		}
 	}
 	firstByte := 0xc0 | packetType<<4
 	if h.Type != protocol.PacketTypeRetry {

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/header.go

@@ -53,10 +53,14 @@ func Is0RTTPacket(b []byte) bool {
 	if b[0]&0x80 == 0 {
 		return false
 	}
-	if !protocol.IsSupportedVersion(protocol.SupportedVersions, protocol.VersionNumber(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[1:5]))) {
+	version := protocol.VersionNumber(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[1:5]))
+	if !protocol.IsSupportedVersion(protocol.SupportedVersions, version) {
 		return false
 	}
-	return b[0]&0x30>>4 == 0x1
+	if version == protocol.Version2 {
+		return b[0]>>4&0b11 == 0b10
+	}
+	return b[0]>>4&0b11 == 0b01
 }
 
 var ErrUnsupportedVersion = errors.New("unsupported version")
@@ -179,15 +183,28 @@ func (h *Header) parseLongHeader(b *bytes.Reader) error {
 		return ErrUnsupportedVersion
 	}
 
-	switch (h.typeByte & 0x30) >> 4 {
+	if h.Version == protocol.Version2 {
-	case 0x0:
+		switch h.typeByte >> 4 & 0b11 {
-		h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeInitial
+		case 0b00:
-	case 0x1:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeRetry
-		h.Type = protocol.PacketType0RTT
+		case 0b01:
-	case 0x2:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeInitial
-		h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeHandshake
+		case 0b10:
-	case 0x3:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketType0RTT
-		h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeRetry
+		case 0b11:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeHandshake
+		}
+	} else {
+		switch h.typeByte >> 4 & 0b11 {
+		case 0b00:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeInitial
+		case 0b01:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketType0RTT
+		case 0b10:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeHandshake
+		case 0b11:
+			h.Type = protocol.PacketTypeRetry
+		}
 	}
 
 	if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeRetry {

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/transport_parameters.go

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ const (
 	activeConnectionIDLimitParameterID         transportParameterID = 0xe
 	initialSourceConnectionIDParameterID       transportParameterID = 0xf
 	retrySourceConnectionIDParameterID         transportParameterID = 0x10
-	// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-quic-datagram/
+	// RFC 9221
 	maxDatagramFrameSizeParameterID transportParameterID = 0x20
 )
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/version_negotiation.go

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func ParseVersionNegotiationPacket(b *bytes.Reader) (*Header, []protocol.Version
 }
 
 // ComposeVersionNegotiation composes a Version Negotiation
-func ComposeVersionNegotiation(destConnID, srcConnID protocol.ConnectionID, versions []protocol.VersionNumber) ([]byte, error) {
+func ComposeVersionNegotiation(destConnID, srcConnID protocol.ConnectionID, versions []protocol.VersionNumber) []byte {
 	greasedVersions := protocol.GetGreasedVersions(versions)
 	expectedLen := 1 /* type byte */ + 4 /* version field */ + 1 /* dest connection ID length field */ + destConnID.Len() + 1 /* src connection ID length field */ + srcConnID.Len() + len(greasedVersions)*4
 	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(make([]byte, 0, expectedLen))
@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ func ComposeVersionNegotiation(destConnID, srcConnID protocol.ConnectionID, vers
 	for _, v := range greasedVersions {
 		utils.BigEndian.WriteUint32(buf, uint32(v))
 	}
-	return buf.Bytes(), nil
+	return buf.Bytes()
 }

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/packet_handler_map.go

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ func setReceiveBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error {
 	}
 	if size >= protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize {
 		logger.Debugf("Conn has receive buffer of %d kiB (wanted: at least %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize/1024)
+		return nil
 	}
 	if err := conn.SetReadBuffer(protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to increase receive buffer size: %w", err)

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/quicvarint/io.go

@@ -31,7 +31,10 @@ func NewReader(r io.Reader) Reader {
 
 func (r *byteReader) ReadByte() (byte, error) {
 	var b [1]byte
-	_, err := r.Reader.Read(b[:])
+	n, err := r.Reader.Read(b[:])
+	if n == 1 && err == io.EOF {
+		err = nil
+	}
 	return b[0], err
 }
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/receive_stream.go

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ type receiveStream struct {
 	resetRemotely     bool // set when HandleResetStreamFrame() is called
 
 	readChan chan struct{}
+	readOnce chan struct{} // cap: 1, to protect against concurrent use of Read
 	deadline time.Time
 
 	flowController flowcontrol.StreamFlowController
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ func newReceiveStream(
 		flowController: flowController,
 		frameQueue:     newFrameSorter(),
 		readChan:       make(chan struct{}, 1),
+		readOnce:       make(chan struct{}, 1),
 		finalOffset:    protocol.MaxByteCount,
 		version:        version,
 	}
@@ -81,6 +83,12 @@ func (s *receiveStream) StreamID() protocol.StreamID {
 
 // Read implements io.Reader. It is not thread safe!
 func (s *receiveStream) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	// Concurrent use of Read is not permitted (and doesn't make any sense),
+	// but sometimes people do it anyway.
+	// Make sure that we only execute one call at any given time to avoid hard to debug failures.
+	s.readOnce <- struct{}{}
+	defer func() { <-s.readOnce }()
+
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	completed, n, err := s.readImpl(p)
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
@@ -105,7 +113,7 @@ func (s *receiveStream) readImpl(p []byte) (bool /*stream completed */, int, err
 		return false, 0, s.closeForShutdownErr
 	}
 
-	bytesRead := 0
+	var bytesRead int
 	var deadlineTimer *utils.Timer
 	for bytesRead < len(p) {
 		if s.currentFrame == nil || s.readPosInFrame >= len(s.currentFrame) {

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/send_stream.go

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ type sendStream struct {
 	nextFrame      *wire.StreamFrame
 
 	writeChan chan struct{}
+	writeOnce chan struct{}
 	deadline  time.Time
 
 	flowController flowcontrol.StreamFlowController
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ func newSendStream(
 		sender:         sender,
 		flowController: flowController,
 		writeChan:      make(chan struct{}, 1),
+		writeOnce:      make(chan struct{}, 1), // cap: 1, to protect against concurrent use of Write
 		version:        version,
 	}
 	s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
@@ -84,6 +86,12 @@ func (s *sendStream) StreamID() protocol.StreamID {
 }
 
 func (s *sendStream) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	// Concurrent use of Write is not permitted (and doesn't make any sense),
+	// but sometimes people do it anyway.
+	// Make sure that we only execute one call at any given time to avoid hard to debug failures.
+	s.writeOnce <- struct{}{}
+	defer func() { <-s.writeOnce }()
+
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/server.go

@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ import (
 	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging"
 )
 
+// ErrServerClosed is returned by the Listener or EarlyListener's Accept method after a call to Close.
+var ErrServerClosed = errors.New("quic: Server closed")
+
 // packetHandler handles packets
 type packetHandler interface {
 	handlePacket(*receivedPacket)
@@ -284,7 +287,7 @@ func (s *baseServer) Close() error {
 		return nil
 	}
 	if s.serverError == nil {
-		s.serverError = errors.New("server closed")
+		s.serverError = ErrServerClosed
 	}
 	// If the server was started with ListenAddr, we created the packet conn.
 	// We need to close it in order to make the go routine reading from that conn return.
@@ -648,11 +651,7 @@ func (s *baseServer) sendError(remoteAddr net.Addr, hdr *wire.Header, sealer han
 
 func (s *baseServer) sendVersionNegotiationPacket(p *receivedPacket, hdr *wire.Header) {
 	s.logger.Debugf("Client offered version %s, sending Version Negotiation", hdr.Version)
-	data, err := wire.ComposeVersionNegotiation(hdr.SrcConnectionID, hdr.DestConnectionID, s.config.Versions)
+	data := wire.ComposeVersionNegotiation(hdr.SrcConnectionID, hdr.DestConnectionID, s.config.Versions)
-	if err != nil {
-		s.logger.Debugf("Error composing Version Negotiation: %s", err)
-		return
-	}
 	if s.config.Tracer != nil {
 		s.config.Tracer.SentPacket(
 			p.remoteAddr,

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/sys_conn.go

@@ -30,9 +30,13 @@ func wrapConn(pc net.PacketConn) (rawConn, error) {
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		err = setDF(rawConn)
+
-		if err != nil {
+		if _, ok := pc.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr); ok {
-			return nil, err
+			// Only set DF on sockets that we expect to be able to handle that configuration.
+			err = setDF(rawConn)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	c, ok := pc.(OOBCapablePacketConn)

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/sys_conn_df_linux.go

@@ -7,9 +7,8 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"syscall"
 
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-
 	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
 )
 
 func setDF(rawConn syscall.RawConn) error {
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ func setDF(rawConn syscall.RawConn) error {
 	case errDFIPv4 != nil && errDFIPv6 == nil:
 		utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Setting DF for IPv6.")
 	case errDFIPv4 != nil && errDFIPv6 != nil:
-		utils.DefaultLogger.Errorf("setting DF failed for both IPv4 and IPv6")
+		return errors.New("setting DF failed for both IPv4 and IPv6")
 	}
 	return nil
 }

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/conn.go

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ type Conn struct {
 
 	// handshakeStatus is 1 if the connection is currently transferring
 	// application data (i.e. is not currently processing a handshake).
+	// handshakeStatus == 1 implies handshakeErr == nil.
 	// This field is only to be accessed with sync/atomic.
 	handshakeStatus uint32
 	// constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex
@@ -1451,6 +1452,13 @@ func (c *Conn) HandshakeContext(ctx context.Context) error {
 }
 
 func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
+	// Fast sync/atomic-based exit if there is no handshake in flight and the
+	// last one succeeded without an error. Avoids the expensive context setup
+	// and mutex for most Read and Write calls.
+	if c.handshakeComplete() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	handshakeCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	// Note: defer this before starting the "interrupter" goroutine
 	// so that we can tell the difference between the input being canceled and
@@ -1509,6 +1517,9 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
 	if c.handshakeErr == nil && !c.handshakeComplete() {
 		c.handshakeErr = errors.New("tls: internal error: handshake should have had a result")
 	}
+	if c.handshakeErr != nil && c.handshakeComplete() {
+		panic("tls: internal error: handshake returned an error but is marked successful")
+	}
 
 	return c.handshakeErr
 }

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -777,6 +777,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+
 	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/ticket.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/hmac"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"time"
@@ -232,6 +233,20 @@ func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, e
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
+
+	// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
+	// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
+	// because 0-RTT is not supported.
+	ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
+	_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd)
+
+	// ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at
+	// zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection.
+
 	if c.extraConfig != nil {
 		m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
 	}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18/conn.go

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ type Conn struct {
 
 	// handshakeStatus is 1 if the connection is currently transferring
 	// application data (i.e. is not currently processing a handshake).
+	// handshakeStatus == 1 implies handshakeErr == nil.
 	// This field is only to be accessed with sync/atomic.
 	handshakeStatus uint32
 	// constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex
@@ -1458,6 +1459,13 @@ func (c *Conn) HandshakeContext(ctx context.Context) error {
 }
 
 func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
+	// Fast sync/atomic-based exit if there is no handshake in flight and the
+	// last one succeeded without an error. Avoids the expensive context setup
+	// and mutex for most Read and Write calls.
+	if c.handshakeComplete() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	handshakeCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	// Note: defer this before starting the "interrupter" goroutine
 	// so that we can tell the difference between the input being canceled and
@@ -1516,6 +1524,9 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
 	if c.handshakeErr == nil && !c.handshakeComplete() {
 		c.handshakeErr = errors.New("tls: internal error: handshake should have had a result")
 	}
+	if c.handshakeErr != nil && c.handshakeComplete() {
+		panic("tls: internal error: handshake returned an error but is marked successful")
+	}
 
 	return c.handshakeErr
 }

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -777,6 +777,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+
 	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18/ticket.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/hmac"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"time"
@@ -232,6 +233,20 @@ func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, e
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
+
+	// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
+	// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
+	// because 0-RTT is not supported.
+	ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
+	_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd)
+
+	// ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at
+	// zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection.
+
 	if c.extraConfig != nil {
 		m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
 	}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+met:
+
+   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
+in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+distribution.
+   * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
+contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# qtls
+
+[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17)
+[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
+
+This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/alert.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import "strconv"
+
+type alert uint8
+
+// Alert is a TLS alert
+type Alert = alert
+
+const (
+	// alert level
+	alertLevelWarning = 1
+	alertLevelError   = 2
+)
+
+const (
+	alertCloseNotify                  alert = 0
+	alertUnexpectedMessage            alert = 10
+	alertBadRecordMAC                 alert = 20
+	alertDecryptionFailed             alert = 21
+	alertRecordOverflow               alert = 22
+	alertDecompressionFailure         alert = 30
+	alertHandshakeFailure             alert = 40
+	alertBadCertificate               alert = 42
+	alertUnsupportedCertificate       alert = 43
+	alertCertificateRevoked           alert = 44
+	alertCertificateExpired           alert = 45
+	alertCertificateUnknown           alert = 46
+	alertIllegalParameter             alert = 47
+	alertUnknownCA                    alert = 48
+	alertAccessDenied                 alert = 49
+	alertDecodeError                  alert = 50
+	alertDecryptError                 alert = 51
+	alertExportRestriction            alert = 60
+	alertProtocolVersion              alert = 70
+	alertInsufficientSecurity         alert = 71
+	alertInternalError                alert = 80
+	alertInappropriateFallback        alert = 86
+	alertUserCanceled                 alert = 90
+	alertNoRenegotiation              alert = 100
+	alertMissingExtension             alert = 109
+	alertUnsupportedExtension         alert = 110
+	alertCertificateUnobtainable      alert = 111
+	alertUnrecognizedName             alert = 112
+	alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113
+	alertBadCertificateHashValue      alert = 114
+	alertUnknownPSKIdentity           alert = 115
+	alertCertificateRequired          alert = 116
+	alertNoApplicationProtocol        alert = 120
+)
+
+var alertText = map[alert]string{
+	alertCloseNotify:                  "close notify",
+	alertUnexpectedMessage:            "unexpected message",
+	alertBadRecordMAC:                 "bad record MAC",
+	alertDecryptionFailed:             "decryption failed",
+	alertRecordOverflow:               "record overflow",
+	alertDecompressionFailure:         "decompression failure",
+	alertHandshakeFailure:             "handshake failure",
+	alertBadCertificate:               "bad certificate",
+	alertUnsupportedCertificate:       "unsupported certificate",
+	alertCertificateRevoked:           "revoked certificate",
+	alertCertificateExpired:           "expired certificate",
+	alertCertificateUnknown:           "unknown certificate",
+	alertIllegalParameter:             "illegal parameter",
+	alertUnknownCA:                    "unknown certificate authority",
+	alertAccessDenied:                 "access denied",
+	alertDecodeError:                  "error decoding message",
+	alertDecryptError:                 "error decrypting message",
+	alertExportRestriction:            "export restriction",
+	alertProtocolVersion:              "protocol version not supported",
+	alertInsufficientSecurity:         "insufficient security level",
+	alertInternalError:                "internal error",
+	alertInappropriateFallback:        "inappropriate fallback",
+	alertUserCanceled:                 "user canceled",
+	alertNoRenegotiation:              "no renegotiation",
+	alertMissingExtension:             "missing extension",
+	alertUnsupportedExtension:         "unsupported extension",
+	alertCertificateUnobtainable:      "certificate unobtainable",
+	alertUnrecognizedName:             "unrecognized name",
+	alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response",
+	alertBadCertificateHashValue:      "bad certificate hash value",
+	alertUnknownPSKIdentity:           "unknown PSK identity",
+	alertCertificateRequired:          "certificate required",
+	alertNoApplicationProtocol:        "no application protocol",
+}
+
+func (e alert) String() string {
+	s, ok := alertText[e]
+	if ok {
+		return "tls: " + s
+	}
+	return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")"
+}
+
+func (e alert) Error() string {
+	return e.String()
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/auth.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed
+// (if required) handshake contents.
+func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error {
+	switch sigType {
+	case signatureECDSA:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pubKey, signed, sig) {
+			return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
+		}
+	case signatureEd25519:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) {
+			return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure")
+		}
+	case signaturePKCS1v15:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	case signatureRSAPSS:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}
+		if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	default:
+		return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+const (
+	serverSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00"
+	clientSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00"
+)
+
+var signaturePadding = []byte{
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+}
+
+// signedMessage returns the pre-hashed (if necessary) message to be signed by
+// certificate keys in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
+func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	if sigHash == directSigning {
+		b := &bytes.Buffer{}
+		b.Write(signaturePadding)
+		io.WriteString(b, context)
+		b.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+		return b.Bytes()
+	}
+	h := sigHash.New()
+	h.Write(signaturePadding)
+	io.WriteString(h, context)
+	h.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+	return h.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and
+// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme.
+func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
+	switch signatureAlgorithm {
+	case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
+		sigType = signaturePKCS1v15
+	case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
+		sigType = signatureRSAPSS
+	case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
+		sigType = signatureECDSA
+	case Ed25519:
+		sigType = signatureEd25519
+	default:
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
+	}
+	switch signatureAlgorithm {
+	case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1:
+		hash = crypto.SHA1
+	case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
+		hash = crypto.SHA256
+	case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
+		hash = crypto.SHA384
+	case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
+		hash = crypto.SHA512
+	case Ed25519:
+		hash = directSigning
+	default:
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
+	}
+	return sigType, hash, nil
+}
+
+// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for
+// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of
+// signature algorithm negotiation.
+func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
+	switch pub.(type) {
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		// RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
+		// but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
+		// full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
+		// complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
+	default:
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub)
+	}
+}
+
+var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct {
+	scheme          SignatureScheme
+	minModulusBytes int
+	maxVersion      uint16
+}{
+	// RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires
+	//    emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2
+	{PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
+	{PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
+	{PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
+	// PKCS #1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires
+	//    emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11
+	// TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS #1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS.
+	{PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+	{PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+	{PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+	{PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+}
+
+// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes
+// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version,
+// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms.
+//
+// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
+// FIPS filtering is applied in the caller, selectSignatureScheme.
+func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme {
+	priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme
+	switch pub := priv.Public().(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		if version != VersionTLS13 {
+			// In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not
+			// constrained to a single curve.
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{
+				ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
+				ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
+				ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
+				ECDSAWithSHA1,
+			}
+			break
+		}
+		switch pub.Curve {
+		case elliptic.P256():
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256}
+		case elliptic.P384():
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384}
+		case elliptic.P521():
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512}
+		default:
+			return nil
+		}
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		size := pub.Size()
+		sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes))
+		for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes {
+			if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion {
+				sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme)
+			}
+		}
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519}
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
+		var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme
+		for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs {
+			if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+				filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg)
+			}
+		}
+		return filteredSigAlgs
+	}
+	return sigAlgs
+}
+
+// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list
+// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol
+// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
+func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) {
+	supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c)
+	if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 {
+		return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c)
+	}
+	if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 {
+		// For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we
+		// can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
+		peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1}
+	}
+	// Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our
+	// preference order is not configurable.
+	for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs {
+		if needFIPS() && !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) {
+			return preferredAlg, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms")
+}
+
+// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with
+// an unsupported private key.
+func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error {
+	switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
+	case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T",
+			cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey)
+	case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey")
+	}
+
+	signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer",
+			cert.PrivateKey)
+	}
+
+	switch pub := signer.Public().(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		switch pub.Curve {
+		case elliptic.P256():
+		case elliptic.P384():
+		case elliptic.P521():
+		default:
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name)
+		}
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms")
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub)
+	}
+
+	if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms")
+	}
+
+	return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey)
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/cipher_suites.go

@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/des"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rc4"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+)
+
+// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
+// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
+type CipherSuite struct {
+	ID   uint16
+	Name string
+
+	// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
+	// negotiate this cipher suite.
+	SupportedVersions []uint16
+
+	// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
+	// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
+	Insecure bool
+}
+
+var (
+	supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
+	supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
+	supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
+)
+
+// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
+// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
+// InsecureCipherSuites.
+//
+// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
+// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
+// and might not match those returned by this function.
+func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
+	return []*CipherSuite{
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+
+		{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
+		{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
+		{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
+
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+	}
+}
+
+// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
+// this package and which have security issues.
+//
+// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
+// only use those returned by CipherSuites.
+func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
+	// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
+	// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
+	return []*CipherSuite{
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
+	}
+}
+
+// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
+// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
+// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
+func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
+	for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
+		if c.ID == id {
+			return c.Name
+		}
+	}
+	for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
+		if c.ID == id {
+			return c.Name
+		}
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
+}
+
+const (
+	// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
+	// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
+	// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
+	// that we're happy with.
+	suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
+	// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
+	// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
+	// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
+	// is RSA based.
+	suiteECSign
+	// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
+	// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
+	suiteTLS12
+	// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
+	// handshake hash.
+	suiteSHA384
+)
+
+// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
+// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
+type cipherSuite struct {
+	id uint16
+	// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
+	keyLen int
+	macLen int
+	ivLen  int
+	ka     func(version uint16) keyAgreement
+	// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
+	flags  int
+	cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
+	mac    func(key []byte) hash.Hash
+	aead   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
+}
+
+var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
+}
+
+// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
+// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
+func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
+		if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
+			if id == suppID {
+				return candidate
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
+// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
+type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
+	id     uint16
+	keyLen int
+	aead   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
+	hash   crypto.Hash
+}
+
+type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
+	ID     uint16
+	KeyLen int
+	Hash   crypto.Hash
+	AEAD   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int {
+	return aeadNonceLength
+}
+
+var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
+	{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
+	{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
+	{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
+}
+
+// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
+// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
+//
+// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
+// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
+// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
+// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
+// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
+//
+// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
+// first (most important) applicable one:
+//
+//   - Anything else comes before RC4
+//
+//     RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
+//
+//   - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
+//
+//     SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
+//     countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
+//     https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
+//
+//   - Anything else comes before 3DES
+//
+//     3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
+//     birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
+//
+//   - ECDHE comes before anything else
+//
+//     Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
+//     property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
+//     implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
+//
+//   - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
+//
+//     Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
+//     are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
+//     padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
+//     https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
+//     https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
+//
+//   - AES comes before ChaCha20
+//
+//     When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
+//     than ChaCha20Poly1305.
+//
+//     When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
+//     slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
+//     than ChaCha20Poly1305.
+//
+//     We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
+//     cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
+//
+//   - AES-128 comes before AES-256
+//
+//     The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
+//     margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
+//     TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
+//     contribute to the advantages above).
+//
+//   - ECDSA comes before RSA
+//
+//     The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
+//     as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
+var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
+	// AEADs w/ ECDHE
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+
+	// CBC w/ ECDHE
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+
+	// AEADs w/o ECDHE
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+
+	// CBC w/o ECDHE
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+
+	// 3DES
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+
+	// CBC_SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+
+	// RC4
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+}
+
+var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
+	// ChaCha20Poly1305
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+
+	// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+
+	// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+}
+
+// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
+// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
+var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
+	// CBC_SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+
+	// RC4
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+}
+
+var (
+	defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
+	defaultCipherSuites    = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
+)
+
+// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
+// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
+// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
+var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+}
+
+var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+}
+
+var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
+	// TLS 1.2
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:   true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:   true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
+	// TLS 1.3
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
+}
+
+var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
+	// TLS 1.2
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:   true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
+	// TLS 1.3
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
+}
+
+// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
+// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
+func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
+	for _, cID := range ciphers {
+		if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
+			return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
+		}
+		if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
+			return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
+	cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
+	return cipher
+}
+
+func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
+	block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
+	if isRead {
+		return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
+	}
+	return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
+}
+
+func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
+	block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if isRead {
+		return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
+	}
+	return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
+}
+
+// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
+func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	h := sha1.New
+	h = newConstantTimeHash(h)
+	return hmac.New(h, key)
+}
+
+// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
+// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
+func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
+}
+
+type aead interface {
+	cipher.AEAD
+
+	// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
+	// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
+	// zero for modern ones.
+	explicitNonceLen() int
+}
+
+const (
+	aeadNonceLength   = 12
+	noncePrefixLength = 4
+)
+
+// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
+// each call.
+type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
+	// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
+	nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
+	aead  cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int        { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int         { return f.aead.Overhead() }
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
+
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+	copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
+	return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+}
+
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
+	return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+}
+
+// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
+// before each call.
+type xorNonceAEAD struct {
+	nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
+	aead      cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int        { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int         { return f.aead.Overhead() }
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
+
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+	result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+
+	return result
+}
+
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+	result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+
+	return result, err
+}
+
+func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
+	if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
+		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
+	}
+	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	var aead cipher.AEAD
+	aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
+	copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
+	return ret
+}
+
+// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
+func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
+}
+
+func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
+	if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
+		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
+	}
+	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
+	copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
+	if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
+		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
+	}
+	aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
+	copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
+	return ret
+}
+
+type constantTimeHash interface {
+	hash.Hash
+	ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
+}
+
+// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
+// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
+type cthWrapper struct {
+	h constantTimeHash
+}
+
+func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int                   { return c.h.Size() }
+func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int              { return c.h.BlockSize() }
+func (c *cthWrapper) Reset()                      { c.h.Reset() }
+func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
+func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte         { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
+
+func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
+	return func() hash.Hash {
+		return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
+	}
+}
+
+// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
+func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(seq)
+	h.Write(header)
+	h.Write(data)
+	res := h.Sum(out)
+	if extra != nil {
+		h.Write(extra)
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
+	return rsaKeyAgreement{}
+}
+
+func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
+	return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
+		isRSA:   false,
+		version: version,
+	}
+}
+
+func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
+	return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
+		isRSA:   true,
+		version: version,
+	}
+}
+
+// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
+// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
+func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, id := range have {
+		if id == want {
+			return cipherSuiteByID(id)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
+		if cipherSuite.id == id {
+			return cipherSuite
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
+	for _, id := range have {
+		if id == want {
+			return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
+	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
+		if cipherSuite.id == id {
+			return cipherSuite
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
+// package.
+//
+// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
+const (
+	// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                      uint16 = 0x0005
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA                 uint16 = 0x000a
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                  uint16 = 0x002f
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                  uint16 = 0x0035
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256               uint16 = 0x003c
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               uint16 = 0x009c
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               uint16 = 0x009d
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              uint16 = 0xc007
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xc009
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xc00a
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                uint16 = 0xc011
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xc012
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xc013
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xc014
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0xc023
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xc027
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xc02f
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0xc02b
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xc030
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0xc02c
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256   uint16 = 0xcca8
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
+
+	// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0x1301
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0x1302
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
+
+	// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
+	// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
+	TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
+
+	// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
+	// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305   = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+)

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/cpu.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+//go:build !js
+// +build !js
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"runtime"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
+)
+
+var (
+	hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
+	hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
+	// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
+	hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
+		(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
+
+	hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 ||
+		runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 ||
+		runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X
+)

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/cpu_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+//go:build js
+// +build js
+
+package qtls
+
+var (
+	hasGCMAsmAMD64 = false
+	hasGCMAsmARM64 = false
+	hasGCMAsmS390X = false
+
+	hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = false
+)

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client_tls13.go

@@ -0,0 +1,736 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
+	c           *Conn
+	ctx         context.Context
+	serverHello *serverHelloMsg
+	hello       *clientHelloMsg
+	ecdheParams ecdheParameters
+
+	session     *clientSessionState
+	earlySecret []byte
+	binderKey   []byte
+
+	certReq       *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
+	usingPSK      bool
+	sentDummyCCS  bool
+	suite         *cipherSuiteTLS13
+	transcript    hash.Hash
+	masterSecret  []byte
+	trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
+}
+
+// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheParams, and,
+// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if needFIPS() {
+		return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
+	}
+
+	// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
+	// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
+	if c.handshakes > 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
+	}
+
+	// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
+	if hs.ecdheParams == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+
+	if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
+		if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+
+	c.buffering = true
+	if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
+// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
+		hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
+		hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
+		len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
+		len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
+		len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
+	}
+
+	if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
+	}
+
+	selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
+	if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
+	}
+	if selectedSuite == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
+	}
+	hs.suite = selectedSuite
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
+// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
+	if hs.sentDummyCCS {
+		return nil
+	}
+	hs.sentDummyCCS = true
+
+	_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+	return err
+}
+
+// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
+// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
+	// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
+	// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
+	chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
+	hs.transcript.Reset()
+	hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+	hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+
+	// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
+	// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
+	// in any change in the ClientHello.
+	if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
+		hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
+		return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
+	}
+
+	// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
+	// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
+	// share for it this time.
+	if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
+		curveOK := false
+		for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
+			if id == curveID {
+				curveOK = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if !curveOK {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
+		}
+		if hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() == curveID {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
+		}
+		if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+		}
+		params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), curveID)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return err
+		}
+		hs.ecdheParams = params
+		hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}}
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.raw = nil
+	if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
+		pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
+		if pskSuite == nil {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
+			// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
+			ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
+			hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
+
+			transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
+			transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+			transcript.Write(chHash)
+			transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+			transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
+			pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
+			hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
+		} else {
+			// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
+			hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
+			hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
+		c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
+	}
+	hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
+	}
+	hs.serverHello = serverHello
+
+	if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
+		return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
+	}
+	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
+	}
+
+	if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
+	if pskSuite == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
+	}
+
+	hs.usingPSK = true
+	c.didResume = true
+	c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
+	c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
+	c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
+	c.scts = hs.session.scts
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	sharedKey := hs.ecdheParams.SharedKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
+	if sharedKey == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
+	}
+
+	earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
+	if !hs.usingPSK {
+		earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
+	}
+	handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
+		clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
+		serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
+	}
+	// Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected.
+	if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
+		c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
+	}
+	c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData
+	if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
+		hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
+
+	if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+		return err
+	}
+	c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
+
+	if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection {
+		if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 {
+			// the server didn't select an ALPN
+			c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
+			return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
+		// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
+		// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
+		if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+			if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
+	if ok {
+		hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
+
+		hs.certReq = certReq
+
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+	}
+	if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
+		return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+	c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
+	c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
+
+	if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+	}
+
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
+	if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+	}
+	sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+	}
+	signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+	if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
+		sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
+	}
+
+	expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
+	if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
+
+	// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
+
+	hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if hs.certReq == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{
+		AcceptableCAs:    hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
+		SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
+		Version:          c.vers,
+		ctx:              hs.ctx,
+	}))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
+
+	certMsg.certificate = *cert
+	certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
+	certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
+	if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
+	certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
+
+	certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
+	if err != nil {
+		// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
+		// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+	signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
+	if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
+		signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
+	}
+	sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	finished := &finishedMsg{
+		verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+
+	if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
+		c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+			resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
+	if !c.isClient {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
+	}
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
+	if msg.lifetime == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
+	if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
+	}
+
+	cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
+	if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	// We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order
+	// to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket.
+	// However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to
+	// the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct.
+	// We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice)
+	nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData)
+	copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce)
+
+	var appData []byte
+	if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil {
+		appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState()
+	}
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision
+	b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData)
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(appData)
+	})
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(msg.nonce)
+	})
+
+	// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
+	// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
+	// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
+	// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
+	session := &clientSessionState{
+		sessionTicket:      msg.label,
+		vers:               c.vers,
+		cipherSuite:        c.cipherSuite,
+		masterSecret:       c.resumptionSecret,
+		serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
+		verifiedChains:     c.verifiedChains,
+		receivedAt:         c.config.time(),
+		nonce:              b.BytesOrPanic(),
+		useBy:              c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
+		ageAdd:             msg.ageAdd,
+		ocspResponse:       c.ocspResponse,
+		scts:               c.scts,
+	}
+
+	cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
+	c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session))
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server.go

@@ -0,0 +1,905 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
+// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
+type serverHandshakeState struct {
+	c            *Conn
+	ctx          context.Context
+	clientHello  *clientHelloMsg
+	hello        *serverHelloMsg
+	suite        *cipherSuite
+	ecdheOk      bool
+	ecSignOk     bool
+	rsaDecryptOk bool
+	rsaSignOk    bool
+	sessionState *sessionState
+	finishedHash finishedHash
+	masterSecret []byte
+	cert         *Certificate
+}
+
+// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
+func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
+	c.setAlternativeRecordLayer()
+
+	clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
+		hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
+			c:           c,
+			ctx:         ctx,
+			clientHello: clientHello,
+		}
+		return hs.handshake()
+	} else if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
+		// This should already have been caught by the check that the ClientHello doesn't
+		// offer any (supported) versions older than TLS 1.3.
+		// Check again to make sure we can't be tricked into using an older version.
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+		return errors.New("tls: negotiated TLS < 1.3 when using QUIC")
+	}
+
+	hs := serverHandshakeState{
+		c:           c,
+		ctx:         ctx,
+		clientHello: clientHello,
+	}
+	return hs.handshake()
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
+	c.buffering = true
+	if hs.checkForResumption() {
+		// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
+		c.didResume = true
+		if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
+		if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
+		// valid so we do a full handshake.
+		if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
+		c.buffering = true
+		if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
+	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
+func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
+	}
+
+	var configForClient *config
+	originalConfig := c.config
+	if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
+		chi := newClientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello)
+		if cfc, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return nil, err
+		} else if cfc != nil {
+			configForClient = fromConfig(cfc)
+			c.config = configForClient
+		}
+	}
+	c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient)
+
+	clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
+	if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
+		clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
+	}
+	if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
+		// In QUIC, the client MUST NOT offer any old TLS versions.
+		// Here, we can only check that none of the other supported versions of this library
+		// (TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2) is offered. We don't check for any SSL versions here.
+		for _, ver := range clientVersions {
+			if ver == VersionTLS13 {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, v := range supportedVersions {
+				if ver == v {
+					c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+					return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered old TLS version %#x", ver)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		// Make the config we're using allows us to use TLS 1.3.
+		if c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) < VersionTLS13 {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3")
+		}
+	}
+	c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
+	}
+	c.haveVers = true
+	c.in.version = c.vers
+	c.out.version = c.vers
+
+	return clientHello, nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
+	hs.hello.vers = c.vers
+
+	foundCompression := false
+	// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
+	for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
+		if compression == compressionNone {
+			foundCompression = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if !foundCompression {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
+	serverRandom := hs.hello.random
+	// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
+	maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer)
+	if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary {
+		if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
+			copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
+		} else {
+			copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
+		}
+		serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
+	}
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
+	hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
+	if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
+		c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
+	}
+
+	selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
+	c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
+
+	hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == errNoCertificates {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
+		} else {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	if hs.clientHello.scts {
+		hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
+	}
+
+	hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
+
+	if hs.ecdheOk {
+		// Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
+		// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
+		//
+		// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
+		// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
+		hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
+	}
+
+	if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
+		switch priv.Public().(type) {
+		case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+			hs.ecSignOk = true
+		case ed25519.PublicKey:
+			hs.ecSignOk = true
+		case *rsa.PublicKey:
+			hs.rsaSignOk = true
+		default:
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
+		}
+	}
+	if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
+		switch priv.Public().(type) {
+		case *rsa.PublicKey:
+			hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
+		default:
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server
+// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it,
+// it returns "" and no error.
+func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) {
+	if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	var http11fallback bool
+	for _, s := range serverProtos {
+		for _, c := range clientProtos {
+			if s == c {
+				return s, nil
+			}
+			if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" {
+				http11fallback = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they
+	// didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over
+	// time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but
+	// expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310.
+	if http11fallback {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
+}
+
+// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
+// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
+func supportsECDHE(c *config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
+	supportsCurve := false
+	for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
+		if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
+			supportsCurve = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	supportsPointFormat := false
+	for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
+		if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
+			supportsPointFormat = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder
+	if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
+		preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES
+	}
+
+	configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
+	preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites))
+	for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder {
+		for _, id := range configCipherSuites {
+			if id == suiteID {
+				preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id)
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
+	}
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+	for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
+			// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
+			if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
+				c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
+				return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
+			}
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
+	if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
+		if !hs.ecdheOk {
+			return false
+		}
+		if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
+			if !hs.ecSignOk {
+				return false
+			}
+		} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
+			return false
+		}
+	} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
+		return false
+	}
+	if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
+	if plaintext == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
+	ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0)
+	if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
+	if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	cipherSuiteOk := false
+	// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
+	for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
+			cipherSuiteOk = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !cipherSuiteOk {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
+	hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
+		c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
+	needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
+	if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
+		return false
+	}
+	if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
+	// that we're doing a resumption.
+	hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
+	hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
+	hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
+	hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
+		Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
+	}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
+		hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
+	hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+	hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
+	if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+		// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
+		// certificates won't be used.
+		hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+	}
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
+	certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
+		certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
+		certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
+	skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+	if skx != nil {
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
+	if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
+		// Request a client certificate
+		certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
+		certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
+			byte(certTypeRSASign),
+			byte(certTypeECDSASign),
+		}
+		if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
+			certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
+			certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
+		}
+
+		// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
+		// the client that it may send any certificate in response
+		// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
+		// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
+		// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
+		if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
+			certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
+		}
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
+	// certificate message, even if it's empty.
+	if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
+		certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+		}
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+		if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
+			Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
+		}); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
+			pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
+		}
+
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Get client key exchange
+	ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
+	}
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+
+	preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
+	if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
+	// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
+	// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
+	// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
+	// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
+	// possession of the private key of the certificate.
+	if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+		}
+
+		var sigType uint8
+		var sigHash crypto.Hash
+		if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
+			if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+				c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+				return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+			}
+			sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
+			if err != nil {
+				return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			}
+		} else {
+			sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
+			if err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+
+		signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret)
+		if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+			return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+	}
+
+	hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
+		keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
+
+	var clientCipher, serverCipher any
+	var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
+
+	if hs.suite.aead == nil {
+		clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
+		clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
+		serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
+		serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
+	} else {
+		clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
+		serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
+	}
+
+	c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
+	c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
+	}
+
+	verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
+	if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
+	}
+
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
+	copy(out, verify)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
+	// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
+	// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
+	// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
+	if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	c := hs.c
+	m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
+
+	createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix())
+	if hs.sessionState != nil {
+		// If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep
+		// the original time it was created.
+		createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt
+	}
+
+	var certsFromClient [][]byte
+	for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
+		certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
+	}
+	state := sessionState{
+		vers:         c.vers,
+		cipherSuite:  hs.suite.id,
+		createdAt:    createdAt,
+		masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
+		certificates: certsFromClient,
+	}
+	var err error
+	m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	finished := new(finishedMsg)
+	finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	copy(out, finished.verifyData)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
+// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
+// the public key of the leaf certificate.
+func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
+	certificates := certificate.Certificate
+	certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
+	var err error
+	for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
+		if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+		return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
+	}
+
+	if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
+		opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+			Roots:         c.config.ClientCAs,
+			CurrentTime:   c.config.time(),
+			Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
+			KeyUsages:     []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
+		}
+
+		for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
+			opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
+		}
+
+		chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		c.verifiedChains = chains
+	}
+
+	c.peerCertificates = certs
+	c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
+	c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
+
+	if len(certs) > 0 {
+		switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
+		case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
+		default:
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func newClientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
+	supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
+	if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
+		supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
+	}
+
+	return toClientHelloInfo(&clientHelloInfo{
+		CipherSuites:      clientHello.cipherSuites,
+		ServerName:        clientHello.serverName,
+		SupportedCurves:   clientHello.supportedCurves,
+		SupportedPoints:   clientHello.supportedPoints,
+		SignatureSchemes:  clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
+		SupportedProtos:   clientHello.alpnProtocols,
+		SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
+		Conn:              c.conn,
+		config:            toConfig(c.config),
+		ctx:               ctx,
+	})
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -0,0 +1,900 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// maxClientPSKIdentities is the number of client PSK identities the server will
+// attempt to validate. It will ignore the rest not to let cheap ClientHello
+// messages cause too much work in session ticket decryption attempts.
+const maxClientPSKIdentities = 5
+
+type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
+	c                   *Conn
+	ctx                 context.Context
+	clientHello         *clientHelloMsg
+	hello               *serverHelloMsg
+	alpnNegotiationErr  error
+	encryptedExtensions *encryptedExtensionsMsg
+	sentDummyCCS        bool
+	usingPSK            bool
+	suite               *cipherSuiteTLS13
+	cert                *Certificate
+	sigAlg              SignatureScheme
+	earlySecret         []byte
+	sharedKey           []byte
+	handshakeSecret     []byte
+	masterSecret        []byte
+	trafficSecret       []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
+	transcript          hash.Hash
+	clientFinished      []byte
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if needFIPS() {
+		return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
+	}
+
+	// For an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake, see RFC 8446, Section 2.
+	if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.buffering = true
+	if err := hs.sendServerParameters(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendServerCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendServerFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Note that at this point we could start sending application data without
+	// waiting for the client's second flight, but the application might not
+	// expect the lack of replay protection of the ClientHello parameters.
+	if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) processClientHello() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
+	hs.encryptedExtensions = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
+
+	// TLS 1.3 froze the ServerHello.legacy_version field, and uses
+	// supported_versions instead. See RFC 8446, sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1.
+	hs.hello.vers = VersionTLS12
+	hs.hello.supportedVersion = c.vers
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client used the legacy version field to negotiate TLS 1.3")
+	}
+
+	// Abort if the client is doing a fallback and landing lower than what we
+	// support. See RFC 7507, which however does not specify the interaction
+	// with supported_versions. The only difference is that with
+	// supported_versions a client has a chance to attempt a [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.4]
+	// handshake in case TLS 1.3 is broken but 1.2 is not. Alas, in that case,
+	// it will have to drop the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV protection if it falls back to
+	// TLS 1.2, because a TLS 1.3 server would abort here. The situation before
+	// supported_versions was not better because there was just no way to do a
+	// TLS 1.4 handshake without risking the server selecting TLS 1.3.
+	for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
+			// Use c.vers instead of max(supported_versions) because an attacker
+			// could defeat this by adding an arbitrary high version otherwise.
+			if c.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
+				c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
+				return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
+			}
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 ||
+		hs.clientHello.compressionMethods[0] != compressionNone {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: TLS 1.3 client supports illegal compression methods")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
+	hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
+
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		var preferenceList []uint16
+		for _, suiteID := range c.config.CipherSuites {
+			for _, suite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
+				if suite.id == suiteID {
+					preferenceList = append(preferenceList, suiteID)
+					break
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if len(preferenceList) == 0 {
+			preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13
+			if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
+				preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
+			}
+		}
+		for _, suiteID := range preferenceList {
+			hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, suiteID)
+			if hs.suite != nil {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
+	}
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
+
+	// Pick the ECDHE group in server preference order, but give priority to
+	// groups with a key share, to avoid a HelloRetryRequest round-trip.
+	var selectedGroup CurveID
+	var clientKeyShare *keyShare
+GroupSelection:
+	for _, preferredGroup := range c.config.curvePreferences() {
+		for _, ks := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
+			if ks.group == preferredGroup {
+				selectedGroup = ks.group
+				clientKeyShare = &ks
+				break GroupSelection
+			}
+		}
+		if selectedGroup != 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, group := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
+			if group == preferredGroup {
+				selectedGroup = group
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if selectedGroup == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: no ECDHE curve supported by both client and server")
+	}
+	if clientKeyShare == nil {
+		if err := hs.doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		clientKeyShare = &hs.clientHello.keyShares[0]
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := curveForCurveID(selectedGroup); selectedGroup != X25519 && !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+	}
+	params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), selectedGroup)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.hello.serverShare = keyShare{group: selectedGroup, data: params.PublicKey()}
+	hs.sharedKey = params.SharedKey(clientKeyShare.data)
+	if hs.sharedKey == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
+	}
+
+	c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
+
+	if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
+		c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeClientHello, hs.clientHello.additionalExtensions)
+	}
+
+	selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
+	if err != nil {
+		hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err
+	}
+	hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
+	c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	modeOK := false
+	for _, mode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
+		if mode == pskModeDHE {
+			modeOK = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !modeOK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) != len(hs.clientHello.pskBinders) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid or missing PSK binders")
+	}
+	if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	for i, identity := range hs.clientHello.pskIdentities {
+		if i >= maxClientPSKIdentities {
+			break
+		}
+
+		plaintext, _ := c.decryptTicket(identity.label)
+		if plaintext == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		sessionState := new(sessionStateTLS13)
+		if ok := sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext); !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if hs.clientHello.earlyData {
+			if sessionState.maxEarlyData == 0 {
+				c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+				return errors.New("tls: client sent unexpected early data")
+			}
+
+			if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol &&
+				c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData > 0 &&
+				c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) {
+				hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true
+				c.used0RTT = true
+			}
+		}
+
+		createdAt := time.Unix(int64(sessionState.createdAt), 0)
+		if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// We don't check the obfuscated ticket age because it's affected by
+		// clock skew and it's only a freshness signal useful for shrinking the
+		// window for replay attacks, which don't affect us as we don't do 0-RTT.
+
+		pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(sessionState.cipherSuite)
+		if pskSuite == nil || pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// PSK connections don't re-establish client certificates, but carry
+		// them over in the session ticket. Ensure the presence of client certs
+		// in the ticket is consistent with the configured requirements.
+		sessionHasClientCerts := len(sessionState.certificate.Certificate) != 0
+		needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
+		if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
+			continue
+		}
+		if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		psk := hs.suite.expandLabel(sessionState.resumptionSecret, "resumption",
+			nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
+		hs.earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(psk, nil)
+		binderKey := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil)
+		// Clone the transcript in case a HelloRetryRequest was recorded.
+		transcript := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
+		if transcript == nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
+		}
+		transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders())
+		pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
+		if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
+			c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+			return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder")
+		}
+
+		c.didResume = true
+		if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
+		h.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+		if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
+			clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
+			c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret)
+			if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+
+		hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true
+		hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i)
+		hs.usingPSK = true
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// cloneHash uses the encoding.BinaryMarshaler and encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler
+// interfaces implemented by standard library hashes to clone the state of in
+// to a new instance of h. It returns nil if the operation fails.
+func cloneHash(in hash.Hash, h crypto.Hash) hash.Hash {
+	// Recreate the interface to avoid importing encoding.
+	type binaryMarshaler interface {
+		MarshalBinary() (data []byte, err error)
+		UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error
+	}
+	marshaler, ok := in.(binaryMarshaler)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	state, err := marshaler.MarshalBinary()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := h.New()
+	unmarshaler, ok := out.(binaryMarshaler)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := unmarshaler.UnmarshalBinary(state); err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// signature_algorithms is required in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3.
+	if len(hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) == 0 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
+	}
+
+	certificate, err := c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == errNoCertificates {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
+		} else {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.sigAlg, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, certificate, hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
+	if err != nil {
+		// getCertificate returned a certificate that is unsupported or
+		// incompatible with the client's signature algorithms.
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.cert = certificate
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
+// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
+	if hs.sentDummyCCS {
+		return nil
+	}
+	hs.sentDummyCCS = true
+
+	_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+	return err
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
+	// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
+	hs.transcript.Reset()
+	hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+	hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
+
+	helloRetryRequest := &serverHelloMsg{
+		vers:              hs.hello.vers,
+		random:            helloRetryRequestRandom,
+		sessionId:         hs.hello.sessionId,
+		cipherSuite:       hs.hello.cipherSuite,
+		compressionMethod: hs.hello.compressionMethod,
+		supportedVersion:  hs.hello.supportedVersion,
+		selectedGroup:     selectedGroup,
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(helloRetryRequest.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloRetryRequest.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
+	}
+
+	if len(clientHello.keyShares) != 1 || clientHello.keyShares[0].group != selectedGroup {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client sent invalid key share in second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	if clientHello.earlyData {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client indicated early data in second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	if clientHello.earlyData {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client offered 0-RTT data in second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	hs.clientHello = clientHello
+	return nil
+}
+
+// illegalClientHelloChange reports whether the two ClientHello messages are
+// different, with the exception of the changes allowed before and after a
+// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2.
+func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
+	if len(ch.supportedVersions) != len(ch1.supportedVersions) ||
+		len(ch.cipherSuites) != len(ch1.cipherSuites) ||
+		len(ch.supportedCurves) != len(ch1.supportedCurves) ||
+		len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) ||
+		len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) ||
+		len(ch.alpnProtocols) != len(ch1.alpnProtocols) {
+		return true
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedVersions {
+		if ch.supportedVersions[i] != ch1.supportedVersions[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.cipherSuites {
+		if ch.cipherSuites[i] != ch1.cipherSuites[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedCurves {
+		if ch.supportedCurves[i] != ch1.supportedCurves[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+		if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert {
+		if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.alpnProtocols {
+		if ch.alpnProtocols[i] != ch1.alpnProtocols[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return ch.vers != ch1.vers ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.random, ch1.random) ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionId, ch1.sessionId) ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.compressionMethods, ch1.compressionMethods) ||
+		ch.serverName != ch1.serverName ||
+		ch.ocspStapling != ch1.ocspStapling ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.supportedPoints, ch1.supportedPoints) ||
+		ch.ticketSupported != ch1.ticketSupported ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionTicket, ch1.sessionTicket) ||
+		ch.secureRenegotiationSupported != ch1.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.secureRenegotiation, ch1.secureRenegotiation) ||
+		ch.scts != ch1.scts ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.cookie, ch1.cookie) ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.pskModes, ch1.pskModes)
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
+	if earlySecret == nil {
+		earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
+	}
+	hs.handshakeSecret = hs.suite.extract(hs.sharedKey,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
+		clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
+		serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if hs.alpnNegotiationErr != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
+		return hs.alpnNegotiationErr
+	}
+	if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil {
+		hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions)
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) requestClientCert() bool {
+	return hs.c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert && !hs.usingPSK
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if hs.requestClientCert() {
+		// Request a client certificate
+		certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
+		certReq.ocspStapling = true
+		certReq.scts = true
+		certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
+		if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
+			certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
+		}
+
+		hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
+
+	certMsg.certificate = *hs.cert
+	certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
+	certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
+	certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
+	certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm = hs.sigAlg
+
+	sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(hs.sigAlg)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+	signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
+	if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
+		signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
+	}
+	sig, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		public := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Public()
+		if rsaKey, ok := public.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok && sigType == signatureRSAPSS &&
+			rsaKey.N.BitLen()/8 < sigHash.Size()*2+2 { // key too small for RSA-PSS
+			c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		} else {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	finished := &finishedMsg{
+		verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
+
+	hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
+
+	// If we did not request client certificates, at this point we can
+	// precompute the client finished and roll the transcript forward to send
+	// session tickets in our first flight.
+	if !hs.requestClientCert() {
+		if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool {
+	if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
+	for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
+		if pskMode == pskModeDHE {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.clientFinished = hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
+	finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
+		verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(finishedMsg.marshal())
+
+	if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
+
+	// Don't send session tickets when the alternative record layer is set.
+	// Instead, save the resumption secret on the Conn.
+	// Session tickets can then be generated by calling Conn.GetSessionTicket().
+	if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	m, err := hs.c.getSessionTicketMsg(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if !hs.requestClientCert() {
+		// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not
+		// the server requested a client certificate.
+		if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+			if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
+	// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+	if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+		}
+
+		// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
+		if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+		}
+		sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+		}
+		signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+		if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
+			sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+			return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+	}
+
+	// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
+	// are ready to do it now.
+	if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
+	}
+
+	if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientFinished, finished.verifyData) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash")
+	}
+
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/key_agreement.go

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
+// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
+type keyAgreement interface {
+	// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
+
+	// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
+	// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
+	// nil.
+	generateServerKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
+	processClientKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
+
+	// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
+
+	// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
+	// ServerKeyExchange message.
+	processServerKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
+	generateClientKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
+}
+
+var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message")
+var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message")
+
+// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client
+// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key.
+type rsaKeyAgreement struct{}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+	ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1])
+	if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+	ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:]
+
+	priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter")
+	}
+	// Perform constant time RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption
+	preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
+	// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
+	// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
+	// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
+	// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
+	// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
+	return preMasterSecret, nil
+}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
+	return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange")
+}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
+	preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8)
+	preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers)
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	rsaKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: server certificate contains incorrect key type for selected ciphersuite")
+	}
+	encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), rsaKey, preMasterSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2)
+	ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8)
+	ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted))
+	copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted)
+	return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil
+}
+
+// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices.
+func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
+	hsha1 := sha1.New()
+	for _, slice := range slices {
+		hsha1.Write(slice)
+	}
+	return hsha1.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the
+// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
+func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
+	md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
+	hmd5 := md5.New()
+	for _, slice := range slices {
+		hmd5.Write(slice)
+	}
+	copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil))
+	copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices))
+	return md5sha1
+}
+
+// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest
+// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on
+// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't
+// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices.
+func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte {
+	if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
+		var signed []byte
+		for _, slice := range slices {
+			signed = append(signed, slice...)
+		}
+		return signed
+	}
+	if version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		h := hashFunc.New()
+		for _, slice := range slices {
+			h.Write(slice)
+		}
+		digest := h.Sum(nil)
+		return digest
+	}
+	if sigType == signatureECDSA {
+		return sha1Hash(slices)
+	}
+	return md5SHA1Hash(slices)
+}
+
+// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server
+// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The
+// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may
+// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA.
+type ecdheKeyAgreement struct {
+	version uint16
+	isRSA   bool
+	params  ecdheParameters
+
+	// ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange
+	// and returned in generateClientKeyExchange.
+	ckx             *clientKeyExchangeMsg
+	preMasterSecret []byte
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	var curveID CurveID
+	for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves {
+		if config.supportsCurve(c) {
+			curveID = c
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if curveID == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered")
+	}
+	if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+	}
+
+	params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	ka.params = params
+
+	// See RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
+	ecdhePublic := params.PublicKey()
+	serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic))
+	serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve
+	serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8)
+	serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID)
+	serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic))
+	copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic)
+
+	priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey)
+	}
+
+	var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme
+	var sigType uint8
+	var sigHash crypto.Hash
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	} else {
+		sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite")
+	}
+
+	signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams)
+
+	signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
+	if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
+		signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
+	}
+	sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg)
+	sigAndHashLen := 0
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		sigAndHashLen = 2
+	}
+	skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig))
+	copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams)
+	k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):]
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8)
+		k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm)
+		k = k[2:]
+	}
+	k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8)
+	k[1] = byte(len(sig))
+	copy(k[2:], sig)
+
+	return skx, nil
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	preMasterSecret := ka.params.SharedKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:])
+	if preMasterSecret == nil {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	return preMasterSecret, nil
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
+	if len(skx.key) < 4 {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
+	}
+	curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2])
+
+	publicLen := int(skx.key[3])
+	if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen]
+	publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:]
+
+	sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:]
+	if len(sig) < 2 {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
+	}
+
+	params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	ka.params = params
+
+	ka.preMasterSecret = params.SharedKey(publicKey)
+	if ka.preMasterSecret == nil {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	ourPublicKey := params.PublicKey()
+	ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey))
+	ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey))
+	copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey)
+
+	var sigType uint8
+	var sigHash crypto.Hash
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1])
+		sig = sig[2:]
+		if len(sig) < 2 {
+			return errServerKeyExchange
+		}
+
+		if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+			return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+		}
+		sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1])
+	if sigLen+2 != len(sig) {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	sig = sig[2:]
+
+	signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams)
+	if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	if ka.ckx == nil {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message")
+	}
+
+	return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/key_schedule.go

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
+)
+
+// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key
+// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7.
+
+const (
+	resumptionBinderLabel         = "res binder"
+	clientHandshakeTrafficLabel   = "c hs traffic"
+	serverHandshakeTrafficLabel   = "s hs traffic"
+	clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic"
+	serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic"
+	exporterLabel                 = "exp master"
+	resumptionLabel               = "res master"
+	trafficUpdateLabel            = "traffic upd"
+)
+
+// expandLabel implements HKDF-Expand-Label from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []byte, length int) []byte {
+	var hkdfLabel cryptobyte.Builder
+	hkdfLabel.AddUint16(uint16(length))
+	hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes([]byte("tls13 "))
+		b.AddBytes([]byte(label))
+	})
+	hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(context)
+	})
+	out := make([]byte, length)
+	n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel.BytesOrPanic()).Read(out)
+	if err != nil || n != length {
+		panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// deriveSecret implements Derive-Secret from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) deriveSecret(secret []byte, label string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	if transcript == nil {
+		transcript = c.hash.New()
+	}
+	return c.expandLabel(secret, label, transcript.Sum(nil), c.hash.Size())
+}
+
+// extract implements HKDF-Extract with the cipher suite hash.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) extract(newSecret, currentSecret []byte) []byte {
+	if newSecret == nil {
+		newSecret = make([]byte, c.hash.Size())
+	}
+	return hkdf.Extract(c.hash.New, newSecret, currentSecret)
+}
+
+// nextTrafficSecret generates the next traffic secret, given the current one,
+// according to RFC 8446, Section 7.2.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) nextTrafficSecret(trafficSecret []byte) []byte {
+	return c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, trafficUpdateLabel, nil, c.hash.Size())
+}
+
+// trafficKey generates traffic keys according to RFC 8446, Section 7.3.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
+	key = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "key", nil, c.keyLen)
+	iv = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "iv", nil, aeadNonceLength)
+	return
+}
+
+// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according
+// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey
+// selection.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size())
+	verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey)
+	verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+	return verifyData.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to
+// RFC 8446, Section 7.5.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
+	expMasterSecret := c.deriveSecret(masterSecret, exporterLabel, transcript)
+	return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
+		secret := c.deriveSecret(expMasterSecret, label, nil)
+		h := c.hash.New()
+		h.Write(context)
+		return c.expandLabel(secret, "exporter", h.Sum(nil), length), nil
+	}
+}
+
+// ecdheParameters implements Diffie-Hellman with either NIST curves or X25519,
+// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2.
+type ecdheParameters interface {
+	CurveID() CurveID
+	PublicKey() []byte
+	SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte
+}
+
+func generateECDHEParameters(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (ecdheParameters, error) {
+	if curveID == X25519 {
+		privateKey := make([]byte, curve25519.ScalarSize)
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		publicKey, err := curve25519.X25519(privateKey, curve25519.Basepoint)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &x25519Parameters{privateKey: privateKey, publicKey: publicKey}, nil
+	}
+
+	curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve")
+	}
+
+	p := &nistParameters{curveID: curveID}
+	var err error
+	p.privateKey, p.x, p.y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, rand)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return p, nil
+}
+
+func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) {
+	switch id {
+	case CurveP256:
+		return elliptic.P256(), true
+	case CurveP384:
+		return elliptic.P384(), true
+	case CurveP521:
+		return elliptic.P521(), true
+	default:
+		return nil, false
+	}
+}
+
+type nistParameters struct {
+	privateKey []byte
+	x, y       *big.Int // public key
+	curveID    CurveID
+}
+
+func (p *nistParameters) CurveID() CurveID {
+	return p.curveID
+}
+
+func (p *nistParameters) PublicKey() []byte {
+	curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID)
+	return elliptic.Marshal(curve, p.x, p.y)
+}
+
+func (p *nistParameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte {
+	curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID)
+	// Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve.
+	x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, peerPublicKey)
+	if x == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	xShared, _ := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, p.privateKey)
+	sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)/8)
+	return xShared.FillBytes(sharedKey)
+}
+
+type x25519Parameters struct {
+	privateKey []byte
+	publicKey  []byte
+}
+
+func (p *x25519Parameters) CurveID() CurveID {
+	return X25519
+}
+
+func (p *x25519Parameters) PublicKey() []byte {
+	return p.publicKey[:]
+}
+
+func (p *x25519Parameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte {
+	sharedKey, err := curve25519.X25519(p.privateKey, peerPublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return sharedKey
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/notboring.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+func needFIPS() bool { return false }
+
+func supportedSignatureAlgorithms() []SignatureScheme {
+	return defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms
+}
+
+func fipsMinVersion(c *config) uint16          { panic("fipsMinVersion") }
+func fipsMaxVersion(c *config) uint16          { panic("fipsMaxVersion") }
+func fipsCurvePreferences(c *config) []CurveID { panic("fipsCurvePreferences") }
+func fipsCipherSuites(c *config) []uint16      { panic("fipsCipherSuites") }
+
+var fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/prf.go

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+)
+
+// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5.
+func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) {
+	s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2]
+	s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:]
+	return
+}
+
+// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5.
+func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) {
+	h := hmac.New(hash, secret)
+	h.Write(seed)
+	a := h.Sum(nil)
+
+	j := 0
+	for j < len(result) {
+		h.Reset()
+		h.Write(a)
+		h.Write(seed)
+		b := h.Sum(nil)
+		copy(result[j:], b)
+		j += len(b)
+
+		h.Reset()
+		h.Write(a)
+		a = h.Sum(nil)
+	}
+}
+
+// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5.
+func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+	hashSHA1 := sha1.New
+	hashMD5 := md5.New
+
+	labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
+	copy(labelAndSeed, label)
+	copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
+
+	s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret)
+	pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5)
+	result2 := make([]byte, len(result))
+	pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1)
+
+	for i, b := range result2 {
+		result[i] ^= b
+	}
+}
+
+// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5.
+func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+	return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+		labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
+		copy(labelAndSeed, label)
+		copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
+
+		pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc)
+	}
+}
+
+const (
+	masterSecretLength   = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1.
+	finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message.
+)
+
+var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret")
+var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion")
+var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished")
+var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished")
+
+func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) {
+	switch version {
+	case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11:
+		return prf10, crypto.Hash(0)
+	case VersionTLS12:
+		if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 {
+			return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384
+		}
+		return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256
+	default:
+		panic("unknown version")
+	}
+}
+
+func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+	prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite)
+	return prf
+}
+
+// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master
+// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1.
+func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte {
+	seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom))
+	seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
+	seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
+
+	masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
+	prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed)
+	return masterSecret
+}
+
+// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master
+// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in
+// RFC 2246, Section 6.3.
+func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) {
+	seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom))
+	seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
+	seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
+
+	n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen
+	keyMaterial := make([]byte, n)
+	prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed)
+	clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
+	serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
+	clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
+	serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
+	clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
+	serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
+	return
+}
+
+func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash {
+	var buffer []byte
+	if version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		buffer = []byte{}
+	}
+
+	prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite)
+	if hash != 0 {
+		return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf}
+	}
+
+	return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf}
+}
+
+// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable
+// for including in a Finished message.
+type finishedHash struct {
+	client hash.Hash
+	server hash.Hash
+
+	// Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required.
+	clientMD5 hash.Hash
+	serverMD5 hash.Hash
+
+	// In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required.
+	buffer []byte
+
+	version uint16
+	prf     func(result, secret, label, seed []byte)
+}
+
+func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	h.client.Write(msg)
+	h.server.Write(msg)
+
+	if h.version < VersionTLS12 {
+		h.clientMD5.Write(msg)
+		h.serverMD5.Write(msg)
+	}
+
+	if h.buffer != nil {
+		h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...)
+	}
+
+	return len(msg), nil
+}
+
+func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte {
+	if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		return h.client.Sum(nil)
+	}
+
+	out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
+	out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out)
+	return h.client.Sum(out)
+}
+
+// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's
+// Finished message.
+func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
+	h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
+	return out
+}
+
+// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's
+// Finished message.
+func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
+	h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
+	return out
+}
+
+// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if
+// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate.
+func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash, masterSecret []byte) []byte {
+	if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil {
+		panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer")
+	}
+
+	if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
+		return h.buffer
+	}
+
+	if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		hash := hashAlg.New()
+		hash.Write(h.buffer)
+		return hash.Sum(nil)
+	}
+
+	if sigType == signatureECDSA {
+		return h.server.Sum(nil)
+	}
+
+	return h.Sum()
+}
+
+// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to
+// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages.
+func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
+	h.buffer = nil
+}
+
+// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of
+// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus
+// we wish to fail all key-material export requests.
+func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled")
+}
+
+// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705.
+func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
+	return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
+		switch label {
+		case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion":
+			// These values are reserved and may not be used.
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label)
+		}
+
+		seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom)
+		if context != nil {
+			seedLen += 2 + len(context)
+		}
+		seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen)
+
+		seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
+		seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
+
+		if context != nil {
+			if len(context) >= 1<<16 {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long")
+			}
+			seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context)))
+			seed = append(seed, context...)
+		}
+
+		keyMaterial := make([]byte, length)
+		prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed)
+		return keyMaterial, nil
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/ticket.go

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session
+// ticket in order to later resume a connection.
+type sessionState struct {
+	vers         uint16
+	cipherSuite  uint16
+	createdAt    uint64
+	masterSecret []byte // opaque master_secret<1..2^16-1>;
+	// struct { opaque certificate<1..2^24-1> } Certificate;
+	certificates [][]byte // Certificate certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+
+	// usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from
+	// was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed.
+	usedOldKey bool
+}
+
+func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(m.vers)
+	b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
+	addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(m.masterSecret)
+	})
+	b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		for _, cert := range m.certificates {
+			b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+				b.AddBytes(cert)
+			})
+		}
+	})
+	return b.BytesOrPanic()
+}
+
+func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
+	*m = sessionState{usedOldKey: m.usedOldKey}
+	s := cryptobyte.String(data)
+	if ok := s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) &&
+		s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
+		readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
+		readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.masterSecret) &&
+		len(m.masterSecret) != 0; !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	var certList cryptobyte.String
+	if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for !certList.Empty() {
+		var cert []byte
+		if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) {
+			return false
+		}
+		m.certificates = append(m.certificates, cert)
+	}
+	return s.Empty()
+}
+
+// sessionStateTLS13 is the content of a TLS 1.3 session ticket. Its first
+// version (revision = 0) doesn't carry any of the information needed for 0-RTT
+// validation and the nonce is always empty.
+// version (revision = 1) carries the max_early_data_size sent in the ticket.
+// version (revision = 2) carries the ALPN sent in the ticket.
+type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
+	// uint8 version  = 0x0304;
+	// uint8 revision = 2;
+	cipherSuite      uint16
+	createdAt        uint64
+	resumptionSecret []byte      // opaque resumption_master_secret<1..2^8-1>;
+	certificate      Certificate // CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+	maxEarlyData     uint32
+	alpn             string
+
+	appData []byte
+}
+
+func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
+	b.AddUint8(2) // revision
+	b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
+	addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
+	b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(m.resumptionSecret)
+	})
+	marshalCertificate(&b, m.certificate)
+	b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData)
+	b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpn))
+	})
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(m.appData)
+	})
+	return b.BytesOrPanic()
+}
+
+func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
+	*m = sessionStateTLS13{}
+	s := cryptobyte.String(data)
+	var version uint16
+	var revision uint8
+	var alpn []byte
+	ret := s.ReadUint16(&version) &&
+		version == VersionTLS13 &&
+		s.ReadUint8(&revision) &&
+		revision == 2 &&
+		s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
+		readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
+		readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.resumptionSecret) &&
+		len(m.resumptionSecret) != 0 &&
+		unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) &&
+		s.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) &&
+		readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &alpn) &&
+		readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.appData) &&
+		s.Empty()
+	m.alpn = string(alpn)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(c.ticketKeys) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: session ticket keys unavailable")
+	}
+
+	encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size)
+	keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
+	iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
+	macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
+
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	key := c.ticketKeys[0]
+	copy(keyName, key.keyName[:])
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
+	mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
+	mac.Sum(macBytes[:0])
+
+	return encrypted, nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) {
+	if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
+	iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
+	macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
+	ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]
+
+	keyIndex := -1
+	for i, candidateKey := range c.ticketKeys {
+		if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) {
+			keyIndex = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if keyIndex == -1 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	key := &c.ticketKeys[keyIndex]
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
+	mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
+	expected := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
+	cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
+
+	return plaintext, keyIndex > 0
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, error) {
+	m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13)
+
+	var certsFromClient [][]byte
+	for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
+		certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
+	}
+	state := sessionStateTLS13{
+		cipherSuite:      c.cipherSuite,
+		createdAt:        uint64(c.config.time().Unix()),
+		resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
+		certificate: Certificate{
+			Certificate:                 certsFromClient,
+			OCSPStaple:                  c.ocspResponse,
+			SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts,
+		},
+		appData: appData,
+		alpn:    c.clientProtocol,
+	}
+	if c.extraConfig != nil {
+		state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
+	}
+	var err error
+	m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
+
+	// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
+	// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
+	// because 0-RTT is not supported.
+	ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
+	_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd)
+
+	// ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at
+	// zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection.
+
+	if c.extraConfig != nil {
+		m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket.
+// It should only be called after the handshake completes.
+// It can only be used for servers, and only if the alternative record layer is set.
+// The ticket may be nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled is set,
+// or if the client isn't able to receive session tickets.
+func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if c.isClient || !c.handshakeComplete() || c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("GetSessionTicket is only valid for servers after completion of the handshake, and if an alternative record layer is set.")
+	}
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	m, err := c.getSessionTicketMsg(appData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return m.marshal(), nil
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/tls.go

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// package qtls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246,
+// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446.
+package qtls
+
+// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures
+// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1
+// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and
+// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Server returns a new TLS server side connection
+// using conn as the underlying transport.
+// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
+// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
+func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
+	c := &Conn{
+		conn:        conn,
+		config:      fromConfig(config),
+		extraConfig: extraConfig,
+	}
+	c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake
+	return c
+}
+
+// Client returns a new TLS client side connection
+// using conn as the underlying transport.
+// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or
+// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
+func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
+	c := &Conn{
+		conn:        conn,
+		config:      fromConfig(config),
+		extraConfig: extraConfig,
+		isClient:    true,
+	}
+	c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake
+	return c
+}
+
+// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections.
+type listener struct {
+	net.Listener
+	config      *Config
+	extraConfig *ExtraConfig
+}
+
+// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection.
+// The returned connection is of type *Conn.
+func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
+	c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return Server(c, l.config, l.extraConfig), nil
+}
+
+// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner
+// Listener and wraps each connection with Server.
+// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
+// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
+func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) net.Listener {
+	l := new(listener)
+	l.Listener = inner
+	l.config = config
+	l.extraConfig = extraConfig
+	return l
+}
+
+// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the
+// given network address using net.Listen.
+// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
+// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
+func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (net.Listener, error) {
+	if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 &&
+		config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config")
+	}
+	l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return NewListener(l, config, extraConfig), nil
+}
+
+type timeoutError struct{}
+
+func (timeoutError) Error() string   { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" }
+func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool   { return true }
+func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
+
+// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and
+// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any
+// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS
+// handshake as a whole.
+//
+// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero
+// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults.
+//
+// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
+// use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer.
+func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
+	return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config, extraConfig)
+}
+
+func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
+	if netDialer.Timeout != 0 {
+		var cancel context.CancelFunc
+		ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout)
+		defer cancel()
+	}
+
+	if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
+		var cancel context.CancelFunc
+		ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline)
+		defer cancel()
+	}
+
+	rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
+	if colonPos == -1 {
+		colonPos = len(addr)
+	}
+	hostname := addr[:colonPos]
+
+	if config == nil {
+		config = defaultConfig()
+	}
+	// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
+	// from the hostname we're connecting to.
+	if config.ServerName == "" {
+		// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
+		c := config.Clone()
+		c.ServerName = hostname
+		config = c
+	}
+
+	conn := Client(rawConn, config, extraConfig)
+	if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
+		rawConn.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return conn, nil
+}
+
+// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial
+// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting
+// TLS connection.
+// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to
+// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config
+// for the defaults.
+func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
+	return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config, extraConfig)
+}
+
+// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the
+// underlying connection.
+type Dialer struct {
+	// NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections'
+	// underlying TCP connections.
+	// A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value.
+	NetDialer *net.Dialer
+
+	// Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections.
+	// A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero
+	// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the
+	// defaults.
+	Config *Config
+
+	ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig
+}
+
+// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
+// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
+//
+// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
+//
+// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
+// use DialContext.
+func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr)
+}
+
+func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer {
+	if d.NetDialer != nil {
+		return d.NetDialer
+	}
+	return new(net.Dialer)
+}
+
+// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
+// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
+//
+// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before
+// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully
+// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the
+// connection.
+//
+// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
+func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config, d.ExtraConfig)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface.
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair
+// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file
+// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to
+// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will
+// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
+func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) {
+	certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Certificate{}, err
+	}
+	keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Certificate{}, err
+	}
+	return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock)
+}
+
+// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
+// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because
+// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
+func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) {
+	fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err }
+
+	var cert Certificate
+	var skippedBlockTypes []string
+	for {
+		var certDERBlock *pem.Block
+		certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock)
+		if certDERBlock == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
+			cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes)
+		} else {
+			skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
+		if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input"))
+		}
+		if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched"))
+		}
+		return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
+	}
+
+	skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0]
+	var keyDERBlock *pem.Block
+	for {
+		keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock)
+		if keyDERBlock == nil {
+			if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
+				return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input"))
+			}
+			if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" {
+				return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key"))
+			}
+			return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
+		}
+		if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
+			break
+		}
+		skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type)
+	}
+
+	// We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway
+	// to check that it looks sane and matches the private key.
+	x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return fail(err)
+	}
+
+	cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fail(err)
+	}
+
+	switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) {
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
+		}
+		if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
+		}
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
+		}
+		if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
+		}
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), pub) {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
+		}
+	default:
+		return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm"))
+	}
+
+	return cert, nil
+}
+
+// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
+// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys.
+// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
+func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+		return key, nil
+	}
+	if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+		switch key := key.(type) {
+		case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey:
+			return key, nil
+		default:
+			return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
+		}
+	}
+	if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+		return key, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key")
+}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/unsafe.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"reflect"
+	"unsafe"
+)
+
+func init() {
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.ConnectionState{}, &connectionState{}) {
+		panic("qtls.ConnectionState doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientSessionState{}, &clientSessionState{}) {
+		panic("qtls.ClientSessionState doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.CertificateRequestInfo{}, &certificateRequestInfo{}) {
+		panic("qtls.CertificateRequestInfo doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.Config{}, &config{}) {
+		panic("qtls.Config doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientHelloInfo{}, &clientHelloInfo{}) {
+		panic("qtls.ClientHelloInfo doesn't match")
+	}
+}
+
+func toConnectionState(c connectionState) ConnectionState {
+	return *(*ConnectionState)(unsafe.Pointer(&c))
+}
+
+func toClientSessionState(s *clientSessionState) *ClientSessionState {
+	return (*ClientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
+}
+
+func fromClientSessionState(s *ClientSessionState) *clientSessionState {
+	return (*clientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
+}
+
+func toCertificateRequestInfo(i *certificateRequestInfo) *CertificateRequestInfo {
+	return (*CertificateRequestInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(i))
+}
+
+func toConfig(c *config) *Config {
+	return (*Config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
+}
+
+func fromConfig(c *Config) *config {
+	return (*config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
+}
+
+func toClientHelloInfo(chi *clientHelloInfo) *ClientHelloInfo {
+	return (*ClientHelloInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(chi))
+}
+
+func structsEqual(a, b interface{}) bool {
+	return compare(reflect.ValueOf(a), reflect.ValueOf(b))
+}
+
+func compare(a, b reflect.Value) bool {
+	sa := a.Elem()
+	sb := b.Elem()
+	if sa.NumField() != sb.NumField() {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < sa.NumField(); i++ {
+		fa := sa.Type().Field(i)
+		fb := sb.Type().Field(i)
+		if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
+			if fa.Type.Kind() != fb.Type.Kind() {
+				return false
+			}
+			if fa.Type.Kind() == reflect.Slice {
+				if !compareStruct(fa.Type.Elem(), fb.Type.Elem()) {
+					return false
+				}
+				continue
+			}
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool {
+	if a.NumField() != b.NumField() {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < a.NumField(); i++ {
+		fa := a.Field(i)
+		fb := b.Field(i)
+		if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/bpf/doc.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
 /*
-
 Package bpf implements marshaling and unmarshaling of programs for the
 Berkeley Packet Filter virtual machine, and provides a Go implementation
 of the virtual machine.
@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ access to kernel functions, and while conditional branches are
 allowed, they can only jump forwards, to guarantee that there are no
 infinite loops.
 
-The virtual machine
+# The virtual machine
 
 The BPF VM is an accumulator machine. Its main register, called
 register A, is an implicit source and destination in all arithmetic
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ to extensions, which are essentially calls to kernel utility
 functions. Currently, the only extensions supported by this package
 are the Linux packet filter extensions.
 
-Examples
+# Examples
 
 This packet filter selects all ARP packets.
 
@@ -77,6 +76,5 @@ This packet filter captures a random 1% sample of traffic.
 		// Ignore.
 		bpf.RetConstant{Val: 0},
 	})
-
 */
 package bpf // import "golang.org/x/net/bpf"

vendor/golang.org/x/net/context/context.go

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
 // explicitly to each function that needs it. The Context should be the first
 // parameter, typically named ctx:
 //
-// 	func DoSomething(ctx context.Context, arg Arg) error {
+//	func DoSomething(ctx context.Context, arg Arg) error {
-// 		// ... use ctx ...
+//		// ... use ctx ...
-// 	}
+//	}
 //
 // Do not pass a nil Context, even if a function permits it. Pass context.TODO
 // if you are unsure about which Context to use.

vendor/golang.org/x/net/context/go17.go

@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ func WithDeadline(parent Context, deadline time.Time) (Context, CancelFunc) {
 // Canceling this context releases resources associated with it, so code should
 // call cancel as soon as the operations running in this Context complete:
 //
-// 	func slowOperationWithTimeout(ctx context.Context) (Result, error) {
+//	func slowOperationWithTimeout(ctx context.Context) (Result, error) {
-// 		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 100*time.Millisecond)
+//		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 100*time.Millisecond)
-// 		defer cancel()  // releases resources if slowOperation completes before timeout elapses
+//		defer cancel()  // releases resources if slowOperation completes before timeout elapses
-// 		return slowOperation(ctx)
+//		return slowOperation(ctx)
-// 	}
+//	}
 func WithTimeout(parent Context, timeout time.Duration) (Context, CancelFunc) {
 	return WithDeadline(parent, time.Now().Add(timeout))
 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/context/pre_go17.go

@@ -264,11 +264,11 @@ func (c *timerCtx) cancel(removeFromParent bool, err error) {
 // Canceling this context releases resources associated with it, so code should
 // call cancel as soon as the operations running in this Context complete:
 //
-// 	func slowOperationWithTimeout(ctx context.Context) (Result, error) {
+//	func slowOperationWithTimeout(ctx context.Context) (Result, error) {
-// 		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 100*time.Millisecond)
+//		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 100*time.Millisecond)
-// 		defer cancel()  // releases resources if slowOperation completes before timeout elapses
+//		defer cancel()  // releases resources if slowOperation completes before timeout elapses
-// 		return slowOperation(ctx)
+//		return slowOperation(ctx)
-// 	}
+//	}
 func WithTimeout(parent Context, timeout time.Duration) (Context, CancelFunc) {
 	return WithDeadline(parent, time.Now().Add(timeout))
 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts/httplex.go

@@ -173,13 +173,15 @@ func tokenEqual(t1, t2 string) bool {
 
 // isLWS reports whether b is linear white space, according
 // to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
-//      LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
+//
+//	LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
 func isLWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
 
 // isCTL reports whether b is a control byte, according
 // to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
-//      CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
+//
-//                       (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
+//	CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
+//	                 (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
 func isCTL(b byte) bool {
 	const del = 0x7f // a CTL
 	return b < ' ' || b == del
@@ -189,12 +191,13 @@ func isCTL(b byte) bool {
 // HTTP/2 imposes the additional restriction that uppercase ASCII
 // letters are not allowed.
 //
-//  RFC 7230 says:
+// RFC 7230 says:
-//   header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
+//
-//   field-name     = token
+//	header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
-//   token          = 1*tchar
+//	field-name     = token
-//   tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
+//	token          = 1*tchar
-//           "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
+//	tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
+//	        "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
 func ValidHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
 	if len(v) == 0 {
 		return false
@@ -267,27 +270,28 @@ var validHostByte = [256]bool{
 // ValidHeaderFieldValue reports whether v is a valid "field-value" according to
 // http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2 :
 //
-//        message-header = field-name ":" [ field-value ]
+//	message-header = field-name ":" [ field-value ]
-//        field-value    = *( field-content | LWS )
+//	field-value    = *( field-content | LWS )
-//        field-content  = <the OCTETs making up the field-value
+//	field-content  = <the OCTETs making up the field-value
-//                         and consisting of either *TEXT or combinations
+//	                 and consisting of either *TEXT or combinations
-//                         of token, separators, and quoted-string>
+//	                 of token, separators, and quoted-string>
 //
 // http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2 :
 //
-//        TEXT           = <any OCTET except CTLs,
+//	TEXT           = <any OCTET except CTLs,
-//                          but including LWS>
+//	                  but including LWS>
-//        LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
+//	LWS            = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
-//        CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
+//	CTL            = <any US-ASCII control character
-//                         (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
+//	                 (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
 //
 // RFC 7230 says:
-//  field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
+//
-//  obj-fold       =  N/A to http2, and deprecated
+//	field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
-//  field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
+//	obj-fold       =  N/A to http2, and deprecated
-//  field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text
+//	field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
-//  obs-text       = %x80-FF
+//	field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text
-//  VCHAR          = "any visible [USASCII] character"
+//	obs-text       = %x80-FF
+//	VCHAR          = "any visible [USASCII] character"
 //
 // http2 further says: "Similarly, HTTP/2 allows header field values
 // that are not valid. While most of the values that can be encoded

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/client_conn_pool.go

@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ func (p *clientConnPool) getStartDialLocked(ctx context.Context, addr string) *d
 func (c *dialCall) dial(ctx context.Context, addr string) {
 	const singleUse = false // shared conn
 	c.res, c.err = c.p.t.dialClientConn(ctx, addr, singleUse)
-	close(c.done)
 
 	c.p.mu.Lock()
 	delete(c.p.dialing, addr)
@@ -147,6 +146,8 @@ func (c *dialCall) dial(ctx context.Context, addr string) {
 		c.p.addConnLocked(addr, c.res)
 	}
 	c.p.mu.Unlock()
+
+	close(c.done)
 }
 
 // addConnIfNeeded makes a NewClientConn out of c if a connection for key doesn't

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/errors.go

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ func (e headerFieldNameError) Error() string {
 type headerFieldValueError string
 
 func (e headerFieldValueError) Error() string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf("invalid header field value %q", string(e))
+	return fmt.Sprintf("invalid header field value for %q", string(e))
 }
 
 var (

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go

@@ -1532,7 +1532,8 @@ func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
 			fr.debugReadLoggerf("http2: decoded hpack field %+v", hf)
 		}
 		if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(hf.Value) {
-			invalid = headerFieldValueError(hf.Value)
+			// Don't include the value in the error, because it may be sensitive.
+			invalid = headerFieldValueError(hf.Name)
 		}
 		isPseudo := strings.HasPrefix(hf.Name, ":")
 		if isPseudo {

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go118.go

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build go1.18
+// +build go1.18
+
+package http2
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"net"
+)
+
+func tlsUnderlyingConn(tc *tls.Conn) net.Conn {
+	return tc.NetConn()
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack/huffman.go

@@ -169,25 +169,50 @@ func buildRootHuffmanNode() {
 // AppendHuffmanString appends s, as encoded in Huffman codes, to dst
 // and returns the extended buffer.
 func AppendHuffmanString(dst []byte, s string) []byte {
-	rembits := uint8(8)
+	// This relies on the maximum huffman code length being 30 (See tables.go huffmanCodeLen array)
-
+	// So if a uint64 buffer has less than 32 valid bits can always accommodate another huffmanCode.
+	var (
+		x uint64 // buffer
+		n uint   // number valid of bits present in x
+	)
 	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
-		if rembits == 8 {
+		c := s[i]
-			dst = append(dst, 0)
+		n += uint(huffmanCodeLen[c])
+		x <<= huffmanCodeLen[c] % 64
+		x |= uint64(huffmanCodes[c])
+		if n >= 32 {
+			n %= 32             // Normally would be -= 32 but %= 32 informs compiler 0 <= n <= 31 for upcoming shift
+			y := uint32(x >> n) // Compiler doesn't combine memory writes if y isn't uint32
+			dst = append(dst, byte(y>>24), byte(y>>16), byte(y>>8), byte(y))
 		}
-		dst, rembits = appendByteToHuffmanCode(dst, rembits, s[i])
 	}
-
+	// Add padding bits if necessary
-	if rembits < 8 {
+	if over := n % 8; over > 0 {
-		// special EOS symbol
+		const (
-		code := uint32(0x3fffffff)
+			eosCode    = 0x3fffffff
-		nbits := uint8(30)
+			eosNBits   = 30
-
+			eosPadByte = eosCode >> (eosNBits - 8)
-		t := uint8(code >> (nbits - rembits))
+		)
-		dst[len(dst)-1] |= t
+		pad := 8 - over
+		x = (x << pad) | (eosPadByte >> over)
+		n += pad // 8 now divides into n exactly
 	}
-
+	// n in (0, 8, 16, 24, 32)
-	return dst
+	switch n / 8 {
+	case 0:
+		return dst
+	case 1:
+		return append(dst, byte(x))
+	case 2:
+		y := uint16(x)
+		return append(dst, byte(y>>8), byte(y))
+	case 3:
+		y := uint16(x >> 8)
+		return append(dst, byte(y>>8), byte(y), byte(x))
+	}
+	//	case 4:
+	y := uint32(x)
+	return append(dst, byte(y>>24), byte(y>>16), byte(y>>8), byte(y))
 }
 
 // HuffmanEncodeLength returns the number of bytes required to encode
@@ -199,35 +224,3 @@ func HuffmanEncodeLength(s string) uint64 {
 	}
 	return (n + 7) / 8
 }
-
-// appendByteToHuffmanCode appends Huffman code for c to dst and
-// returns the extended buffer and the remaining bits in the last
-// element. The appending is not byte aligned and the remaining bits
-// in the last element of dst is given in rembits.
-func appendByteToHuffmanCode(dst []byte, rembits uint8, c byte) ([]byte, uint8) {
-	code := huffmanCodes[c]
-	nbits := huffmanCodeLen[c]
-
-	for {
-		if rembits > nbits {
-			t := uint8(code << (rembits - nbits))
-			dst[len(dst)-1] |= t
-			rembits -= nbits
-			break
-		}
-
-		t := uint8(code >> (nbits - rembits))
-		dst[len(dst)-1] |= t
-
-		nbits -= rembits
-		rembits = 8
-
-		if nbits == 0 {
-			break
-		}
-
-		dst = append(dst, 0)
-	}
-
-	return dst, rembits
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/http2.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 // See https://http2.github.io/ for more information on HTTP/2.
 //
 // See https://http2.golang.org/ for a test server running this code.
-//
 package http2 // import "golang.org/x/net/http2"
 
 import (
@@ -176,10 +175,11 @@ func (s SettingID) String() string {
 // name (key). See httpguts.ValidHeaderName for the base rules.
 //
 // Further, http2 says:
-//   "Just as in HTTP/1.x, header field names are strings of ASCII
+//
-//   characters that are compared in a case-insensitive
+//	"Just as in HTTP/1.x, header field names are strings of ASCII
-//   fashion. However, header field names MUST be converted to
+//	characters that are compared in a case-insensitive
-//   lowercase prior to their encoding in HTTP/2. "
+//	fashion. However, header field names MUST be converted to
+//	lowercase prior to their encoding in HTTP/2. "
 func validWireHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
 	if len(v) == 0 {
 		return false
@@ -365,8 +365,8 @@ func (s *sorter) SortStrings(ss []string) {
 // validPseudoPath reports whether v is a valid :path pseudo-header
 // value. It must be either:
 //
-//     *) a non-empty string starting with '/'
+//   - a non-empty string starting with '/'
-//     *) the string '*', for OPTIONS requests.
+//   - the string '*', for OPTIONS requests.
 //
 // For now this is only used a quick check for deciding when to clean
 // up Opaque URLs before sending requests from the Transport.

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go118.go

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !go1.18
+// +build !go1.18
+
+package http2
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"net"
+)
+
+func tlsUnderlyingConn(tc *tls.Conn) net.Conn {
+	return nil
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/server.go

@@ -315,6 +315,20 @@ type ServeConnOpts struct {
 	// requests. If nil, BaseConfig.Handler is used. If BaseConfig
 	// or BaseConfig.Handler is nil, http.DefaultServeMux is used.
 	Handler http.Handler
+
+	// UpgradeRequest is an initial request received on a connection
+	// undergoing an h2c upgrade. The request body must have been
+	// completely read from the connection before calling ServeConn,
+	// and the 101 Switching Protocols response written.
+	UpgradeRequest *http.Request
+
+	// Settings is the decoded contents of the HTTP2-Settings header
+	// in an h2c upgrade request.
+	Settings []byte
+
+	// SawClientPreface is set if the HTTP/2 connection preface
+	// has already been read from the connection.
+	SawClientPreface bool
 }
 
 func (o *ServeConnOpts) context() context.Context {
@@ -383,6 +397,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 		headerTableSize:             initialHeaderTableSize,
 		serveG:                      newGoroutineLock(),
 		pushEnabled:                 true,
+		sawClientPreface:            opts.SawClientPreface,
 	}
 
 	s.state.registerConn(sc)
@@ -400,7 +415,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 	if s.NewWriteScheduler != nil {
 		sc.writeSched = s.NewWriteScheduler()
 	} else {
-		sc.writeSched = NewRandomWriteScheduler()
+		sc.writeSched = NewPriorityWriteScheduler(nil)
 	}
 
 	// These start at the RFC-specified defaults. If there is a higher
@@ -465,9 +480,27 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
 		}
 	}
 
+	if opts.Settings != nil {
+		fr := &SettingsFrame{
+			FrameHeader: FrameHeader{valid: true},
+			p:           opts.Settings,
+		}
+		if err := fr.ForeachSetting(sc.processSetting); err != nil {
+			sc.rejectConn(ErrCodeProtocol, "invalid settings")
+			return
+		}
+		opts.Settings = nil
+	}
+
 	if hook := testHookGetServerConn; hook != nil {
 		hook(sc)
 	}
+
+	if opts.UpgradeRequest != nil {
+		sc.upgradeRequest(opts.UpgradeRequest)
+		opts.UpgradeRequest = nil
+	}
+
 	sc.serve()
 }
 
@@ -512,6 +545,7 @@ type serverConn struct {
 	// Everything following is owned by the serve loop; use serveG.check():
 	serveG                      goroutineLock // used to verify funcs are on serve()
 	pushEnabled                 bool
+	sawClientPreface            bool // preface has already been read, used in h2c upgrade
 	sawFirstSettings            bool // got the initial SETTINGS frame after the preface
 	needToSendSettingsAck       bool
 	unackedSettings             int    // how many SETTINGS have we sent without ACKs?
@@ -974,6 +1008,9 @@ var errPrefaceTimeout = errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
 // returns errPrefaceTimeout on timeout, or an error if the greeting
 // is invalid.
 func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
+	if sc.sawClientPreface {
+		return nil
+	}
 	errc := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
 		// Read the client preface
@@ -1915,6 +1952,26 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func (sc *serverConn) upgradeRequest(req *http.Request) {
+	sc.serveG.check()
+	id := uint32(1)
+	sc.maxClientStreamID = id
+	st := sc.newStream(id, 0, stateHalfClosedRemote)
+	st.reqTrailer = req.Trailer
+	if st.reqTrailer != nil {
+		st.trailer = make(http.Header)
+	}
+	rw := sc.newResponseWriter(st, req)
+
+	// Disable any read deadline set by the net/http package
+	// prior to the upgrade.
+	if sc.hs.ReadTimeout != 0 {
+		sc.conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})
+	}
+
+	go sc.runHandler(rw, req, sc.handler.ServeHTTP)
+}
+
 func (st *stream) processTrailerHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
 	sc := st.sc
 	sc.serveG.check()
@@ -2145,6 +2202,11 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequestNoBody(st *stream, rp requestParam) (*r
 	}
 	req = req.WithContext(st.ctx)
 
+	rw := sc.newResponseWriter(st, req)
+	return rw, req, nil
+}
+
+func (sc *serverConn) newResponseWriter(st *stream, req *http.Request) *responseWriter {
 	rws := responseWriterStatePool.Get().(*responseWriterState)
 	bwSave := rws.bw
 	*rws = responseWriterState{} // zero all the fields
@@ -2153,10 +2215,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequestNoBody(st *stream, rp requestParam) (*r
 	rws.bw.Reset(chunkWriter{rws})
 	rws.stream = st
 	rws.req = req
-	rws.body = body
+	return &responseWriter{rws: rws}
-
-	rw := &responseWriter{rws: rws}
-	return rw, req, nil
 }
 
 // Run on its own goroutine.
@@ -2316,17 +2375,18 @@ type requestBody struct {
 	_             incomparable
 	stream        *stream
 	conn          *serverConn
-	closed        bool  // for use by Close only
+	closeOnce     sync.Once // for use by Close only
-	sawEOF        bool  // for use by Read only
+	sawEOF        bool      // for use by Read only
-	pipe          *pipe // non-nil if we have a HTTP entity message body
+	pipe          *pipe     // non-nil if we have a HTTP entity message body
-	needsContinue bool  // need to send a 100-continue
+	needsContinue bool      // need to send a 100-continue
 }
 
 func (b *requestBody) Close() error {
-	if b.pipe != nil && !b.closed {
+	b.closeOnce.Do(func() {
-		b.pipe.BreakWithError(errClosedBody)
+		if b.pipe != nil {
-	}
+			b.pipe.BreakWithError(errClosedBody)
-	b.closed = true
+		}
+	})
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -2370,7 +2430,6 @@ type responseWriterState struct {
 	// immutable within a request:
 	stream *stream
 	req    *http.Request
-	body   *requestBody // to close at end of request, if DATA frames didn't
 	conn   *serverConn
 
 	// TODO: adjust buffer writing sizes based on server config, frame size updates from peer, etc
@@ -2546,8 +2605,9 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 // prior to the headers being written. If the set of trailers is fixed
 // or known before the header is written, the normal Go trailers mechanism
 // is preferred:
-//    https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ResponseWriter
+//
-//    https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#example_ResponseWriter_trailers
+//	https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ResponseWriter
+//	https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#example_ResponseWriter_trailers
 const TrailerPrefix = "Trailer:"
 
 // promoteUndeclaredTrailers permits http.Handlers to set trailers
@@ -2643,8 +2703,7 @@ func checkWriteHeaderCode(code int) {
 	// Issue 22880: require valid WriteHeader status codes.
 	// For now we only enforce that it's three digits.
 	// In the future we might block things over 599 (600 and above aren't defined
-	// at http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#status.codes)
+	// at http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#status.codes).
-	// and we might block under 200 (once we have more mature 1xx support).
 	// But for now any three digits.
 	//
 	// We used to send "HTTP/1.1 000 0" on the wire in responses but there's
@@ -2665,13 +2724,41 @@ func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
 }
 
 func (rws *responseWriterState) writeHeader(code int) {
-	if !rws.wroteHeader {
+	if rws.wroteHeader {
-		checkWriteHeaderCode(code)
+		return
-		rws.wroteHeader = true
+	}
-		rws.status = code
+
-		if len(rws.handlerHeader) > 0 {
+	checkWriteHeaderCode(code)
-			rws.snapHeader = cloneHeader(rws.handlerHeader)
+
+	// Handle informational headers
+	if code >= 100 && code <= 199 {
+		// Per RFC 8297 we must not clear the current header map
+		h := rws.handlerHeader
+
+		_, cl := h["Content-Length"]
+		_, te := h["Transfer-Encoding"]
+		if cl || te {
+			h = h.Clone()
+			h.Del("Content-Length")
+			h.Del("Transfer-Encoding")
 		}
+
+		if rws.conn.writeHeaders(rws.stream, &writeResHeaders{
+			streamID:    rws.stream.id,
+			httpResCode: code,
+			h:           h,
+			endStream:   rws.handlerDone && !rws.hasTrailers(),
+		}) != nil {
+			rws.dirty = true
+		}
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	rws.wroteHeader = true
+	rws.status = code
+	if len(rws.handlerHeader) > 0 {
+		rws.snapHeader = cloneHeader(rws.handlerHeader)
 	}
 }
 

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/transport.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"io/ioutil"
 	"log"
 	"math"
 	mathrand "math/rand"
@@ -501,12 +500,14 @@ func (t *Transport) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Res
 			if req, err = shouldRetryRequest(req, err); err == nil {
 				// After the first retry, do exponential backoff with 10% jitter.
 				if retry == 0 {
+					t.vlogf("RoundTrip retrying after failure: %v", err)
 					continue
 				}
 				backoff := float64(uint(1) << (uint(retry) - 1))
 				backoff += backoff * (0.1 * mathrand.Float64())
 				select {
 				case <-time.After(time.Second * time.Duration(backoff)):
+					t.vlogf("RoundTrip retrying after failure: %v", err)
 					continue
 				case <-req.Context().Done():
 					err = req.Context().Err()
@@ -732,11 +733,13 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) healthCheck() {
 	// trigger the healthCheck again if there is no frame received.
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), pingTimeout)
 	defer cancel()
+	cc.vlogf("http2: Transport sending health check")
 	err := cc.Ping(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
+		cc.vlogf("http2: Transport health check failure: %v", err)
 		cc.closeForLostPing()
-		cc.t.connPool().MarkDead(cc)
+	} else {
-		return
+		cc.vlogf("http2: Transport health check success")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -907,6 +910,24 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) onIdleTimeout() {
 	cc.closeIfIdle()
 }
 
+func (cc *ClientConn) closeConn() error {
+	t := time.AfterFunc(250*time.Millisecond, cc.forceCloseConn)
+	defer t.Stop()
+	return cc.tconn.Close()
+}
+
+// A tls.Conn.Close can hang for a long time if the peer is unresponsive.
+// Try to shut it down more aggressively.
+func (cc *ClientConn) forceCloseConn() {
+	tc, ok := cc.tconn.(*tls.Conn)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if nc := tlsUnderlyingConn(tc); nc != nil {
+		nc.Close()
+	}
+}
+
 func (cc *ClientConn) closeIfIdle() {
 	cc.mu.Lock()
 	if len(cc.streams) > 0 || cc.streamsReserved > 0 {
@@ -921,7 +942,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) closeIfIdle() {
 	if VerboseLogs {
 		cc.vlogf("http2: Transport closing idle conn %p (forSingleUse=%v, maxStream=%v)", cc, cc.singleUse, nextID-2)
 	}
-	cc.tconn.Close()
+	cc.closeConn()
 }
 
 func (cc *ClientConn) isDoNotReuseAndIdle() bool {
@@ -938,7 +959,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
 		return err
 	}
 	// Wait for all in-flight streams to complete or connection to close
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	done := make(chan struct{})
 	cancelled := false // guarded by cc.mu
 	go func() {
 		cc.mu.Lock()
@@ -946,7 +967,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
 		for {
 			if len(cc.streams) == 0 || cc.closed {
 				cc.closed = true
-				done <- cc.tconn.Close()
+				close(done)
 				break
 			}
 			if cancelled {
@@ -957,8 +978,8 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}()
 	shutdownEnterWaitStateHook()
 	select {
-	case err := <-done:
+	case <-done:
-		return err
+		return cc.closeConn()
 	case <-ctx.Done():
 		cc.mu.Lock()
 		// Free the goroutine above
@@ -1001,9 +1022,9 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) closeForError(err error) error {
 	for _, cs := range cc.streams {
 		cs.abortStreamLocked(err)
 	}
-	defer cc.cond.Broadcast()
+	cc.cond.Broadcast()
-	defer cc.mu.Unlock()
+	cc.mu.Unlock()
-	return cc.tconn.Close()
+	return cc.closeConn()
 }
 
 // Close closes the client connection immediately.
@@ -1748,7 +1769,8 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) encodeHeaders(req *http.Request, addGzipHeader bool, trail
 		}
 		for _, v := range vv {
 			if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(v) {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTP header value %q for header %q", v, k)
+				// Don't include the value in the error, because it may be sensitive.
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTP header value for header %q", k)
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -1978,7 +2000,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) forgetStreamID(id uint32) {
 			cc.vlogf("http2: Transport closing idle conn %p (forSingleUse=%v, maxStream=%v)", cc, cc.singleUse, cc.nextStreamID-2)
 		}
 		cc.closed = true
-		defer cc.tconn.Close()
+		defer cc.closeConn()
 	}
 
 	cc.mu.Unlock()
@@ -2025,8 +2047,8 @@ func isEOFOrNetReadError(err error) bool {
 
 func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) cleanup() {
 	cc := rl.cc
-	defer cc.tconn.Close()
+	cc.t.connPool().MarkDead(cc)
-	defer cc.t.connPool().MarkDead(cc)
+	defer cc.closeConn()
 	defer close(cc.readerDone)
 
 	if cc.idleTimer != nil {
@@ -2881,7 +2903,12 @@ func (t *Transport) logf(format string, args ...interface{}) {
 	log.Printf(format, args...)
 }
 
-var noBody io.ReadCloser = ioutil.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(nil))
+var noBody io.ReadCloser = noBodyReader{}
+
+type noBodyReader struct{}
+
+func (noBodyReader) Close() error             { return nil }
+func (noBodyReader) Read([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, io.EOF }
 
 type missingBody struct{}
 

vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/writesched_priority.go

@@ -383,16 +383,15 @@ func (ws *priorityWriteScheduler) AdjustStream(streamID uint32, priority Priorit
 
 func (ws *priorityWriteScheduler) Push(wr FrameWriteRequest) {
 	var n *priorityNode
-	if id := wr.StreamID(); id == 0 {
+	if wr.isControl() {
 		n = &ws.root
 	} else {
+		id := wr.StreamID()
 		n = ws.nodes[id]
 		if n == nil {
 			// id is an idle or closed stream. wr should not be a HEADERS or
-			// DATA frame. However, wr can be a RST_STREAM. In this case, we
+			// DATA frame. In other case, we push wr onto the root, rather
-			// push wr onto the root, rather than creating a new priorityNode,
+			// than creating a new priorityNode.
-			// since RST_STREAM is tiny and the stream's priority is unknown
-			// anyway. See issue #17919.
 			if wr.DataSize() > 0 {
 				panic("add DATA on non-open stream")
 			}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/trieval.go

@@ -17,23 +17,23 @@ package idna
 //
 // The per-rune values have the following format:
 //
-//   if mapped {
+//	if mapped {
-//     if inlinedXOR {
+//	  if inlinedXOR {
-//       15..13 inline XOR marker
+//	    15..13 inline XOR marker
-//       12..11 unused
+//	    12..11 unused
-//       10..3  inline XOR mask
+//	    10..3  inline XOR mask
-//     } else {
+//	  } else {
-//       15..3  index into xor or mapping table
+//	    15..3  index into xor or mapping table
-//     }
+//	  }
-//   } else {
+//	} else {
-//       15..14 unused
+//	    15..14 unused
-//       13     mayNeedNorm
+//	    13     mayNeedNorm
-//       12..11 attributes
+//	    12..11 attributes
-//       10..8  joining type
+//	    10..8  joining type
-//        7..3  category type
+//	     7..3  category type
-//   }
+//	}
-//      2  use xor pattern
+//	   2  use xor pattern
-//   1..0  mapped category
+//	1..0  mapped category
 //
 // See the definitions below for a more detailed description of the various
 // bits.

vendor/golang.org/x/net/internal/socket/cmsghdr_unix.go

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-//go:build aix || darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || linux || netbsd || openbsd || solaris
+//go:build aix || darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || linux || netbsd || openbsd || solaris || zos
-// +build aix darwin dragonfly freebsd linux netbsd openbsd solaris
+// +build aix darwin dragonfly freebsd linux netbsd openbsd solaris zos
 
 package socket
 

vendor/golang.org/x/net/internal/socket/cmsghdr_zos_s390x.go

@@ -4,22 +4,8 @@
 
 package socket
 
-import "syscall"
-
 func (h *cmsghdr) set(l, lvl, typ int) {
 	h.Len = int32(l)
 	h.Level = int32(lvl)
 	h.Type = int32(typ)
 }
-
-func controlHeaderLen() int {
-	return syscall.CmsgLen(0)
-}
-
-func controlMessageLen(dataLen int) int {
-	return syscall.CmsgLen(dataLen)
-}
-
-func controlMessageSpace(dataLen int) int {
-	return syscall.CmsgSpace(dataLen)
-}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/internal/socket/mmsghdr_unix.go

@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ package socket
 
 import (
 	"net"
+	"os"
 	"sync"
+	"syscall"
 )
 
 type mmsghdrs []mmsghdr
@@ -93,22 +95,86 @@ func (p *mmsghdrsPacker) pack(ms []Message, parseFn func([]byte, string) (net.Ad
 	return hs
 }
 
-var defaultMmsghdrsPool = mmsghdrsPool{
+// syscaller is a helper to invoke recvmmsg and sendmmsg via the RawConn.Read/Write interface.
+// It is reusable, to amortize the overhead of allocating a closure for the function passed to
+// RawConn.Read/Write.
+type syscaller struct {
+	n     int
+	operr error
+	hs    mmsghdrs
+	flags int
+
+	boundRecvmmsgF func(uintptr) bool
+	boundSendmmsgF func(uintptr) bool
+}
+
+func (r *syscaller) init() {
+	r.boundRecvmmsgF = r.recvmmsgF
+	r.boundSendmmsgF = r.sendmmsgF
+}
+
+func (r *syscaller) recvmmsg(c syscall.RawConn, hs mmsghdrs, flags int) (int, error) {
+	r.n = 0
+	r.operr = nil
+	r.hs = hs
+	r.flags = flags
+	if err := c.Read(r.boundRecvmmsgF); err != nil {
+		return r.n, err
+	}
+	if r.operr != nil {
+		return r.n, os.NewSyscallError("recvmmsg", r.operr)
+	}
+	return r.n, nil
+}
+
+func (r *syscaller) recvmmsgF(s uintptr) bool {
+	r.n, r.operr = recvmmsg(s, r.hs, r.flags)
+	return ioComplete(r.flags, r.operr)
+}
+
+func (r *syscaller) sendmmsg(c syscall.RawConn, hs mmsghdrs, flags int) (int, error) {
+	r.n = 0
+	r.operr = nil
+	r.hs = hs
+	r.flags = flags
+	if err := c.Write(r.boundSendmmsgF); err != nil {
+		return r.n, err
+	}
+	if r.operr != nil {
+		return r.n, os.NewSyscallError("sendmmsg", r.operr)
+	}
+	return r.n, nil
+}
+
+func (r *syscaller) sendmmsgF(s uintptr) bool {
+	r.n, r.operr = sendmmsg(s, r.hs, r.flags)
+	return ioComplete(r.flags, r.operr)
+}
+
+// mmsgTmps holds reusable temporary helpers for recvmmsg and sendmmsg.
+type mmsgTmps struct {
+	packer    mmsghdrsPacker
+	syscaller syscaller
+}
+
+var defaultMmsgTmpsPool = mmsgTmpsPool{
 	p: sync.Pool{
 		New: func() interface{} {
-			return new(mmsghdrsPacker)
+			tmps := new(mmsgTmps)
+			tmps.syscaller.init()
+			return tmps
 		},
 	},
 }
 
-type mmsghdrsPool struct {
+type mmsgTmpsPool struct {
 	p sync.Pool
 }
 
-func (p *mmsghdrsPool) Get() *mmsghdrsPacker {
+func (p *mmsgTmpsPool) Get() *mmsgTmps {
-	return p.p.Get().(*mmsghdrsPacker)
+	return p.p.Get().(*mmsgTmps)
 }
 
-func (p *mmsghdrsPool) Put(packer *mmsghdrsPacker) {
+func (p *mmsgTmpsPool) Put(tmps *mmsgTmps) {
-	p.p.Put(packer)
+	p.p.Put(tmps)
 }

vendor/golang.org/x/net/internal/socket/rawconn_mmsg.go

@@ -9,32 +9,23 @@ package socket
 
 import (
 	"net"
-	"os"
 )
 
 func (c *Conn) recvMsgs(ms []Message, flags int) (int, error) {
 	for i := range ms {
 		ms[i].raceWrite()
 	}
-	packer := defaultMmsghdrsPool.Get()
+	tmps := defaultMmsgTmpsPool.Get()
-	defer defaultMmsghdrsPool.Put(packer)
+	defer defaultMmsgTmpsPool.Put(tmps)
 	var parseFn func([]byte, string) (net.Addr, error)
 	if c.network != "tcp" {
 		parseFn = parseInetAddr
 	}
-	hs := packer.pack(ms, parseFn, nil)
+	hs := tmps.packer.pack(ms, parseFn, nil)
-	var operr error
+	n, err := tmps.syscaller.recvmmsg(c.c, hs, flags)
-	var n int
+	if err != nil {
-	fn := func(s uintptr) bool {
-		n, operr = recvmmsg(s, hs, flags)
-		return ioComplete(flags, operr)
-	}
-	if err := c.c.Read(fn); err != nil {
 		return n, err
 	}
-	if operr != nil {
-		return n, os.NewSyscallError("recvmmsg", operr)
-	}
 	if err := hs[:n].unpack(ms[:n], parseFn, c.network); err != nil {
 		return n, err
 	}
@@ -45,25 +36,17 @@ func (c *Conn) sendMsgs(ms []Message, flags int) (int, error) {
 	for i := range ms {
 		ms[i].raceRead()
 	}
-	packer := defaultMmsghdrsPool.Get()
+	tmps := defaultMmsgTmpsPool.Get()
-	defer defaultMmsghdrsPool.Put(packer)
+	defer defaultMmsgTmpsPool.Put(tmps)
 	var marshalFn func(net.Addr, []byte) int
 	if c.network != "tcp" {
 		marshalFn = marshalInetAddr
 	}
-	hs := packer.pack(ms, nil, marshalFn)
+	hs := tmps.packer.pack(ms, nil, marshalFn)
-	var operr error
+	n, err := tmps.syscaller.sendmmsg(c.c, hs, flags)
-	var n int
+	if err != nil {
-	fn := func(s uintptr) bool {
-		n, operr = sendmmsg(s, hs, flags)
-		return ioComplete(flags, operr)
-	}
-	if err := c.c.Write(fn); err != nil {
 		return n, err
 	}
-	if operr != nil {
-		return n, os.NewSyscallError("sendmmsg", operr)
-	}
 	if err := hs[:n].unpack(ms[:n], nil, ""); err != nil {
 		return n, err
 	}

vendor/golang.org/x/net/internal/socket/zsys_linux_ppc.go

@@ -4,32 +4,32 @@
 package socket
 
 type iovec struct {
-	Base	*byte
+	Base *byte
-	Len	uint32
+	Len  uint32
 }
 
 type msghdr struct {
-	Name		*byte
+	Name       *byte
-	Namelen		uint32
+	Namelen    uint32
-	Iov		*iovec
+	Iov        *iovec
-	Iovlen		uint32
+	Iovlen     uint32
-	Control		*byte
+	Control    *byte
-	Controllen	uint32
+	Controllen uint32
-	Flags		int32
+	Flags      int32
 }
 
 type mmsghdr struct {
-	Hdr	msghdr
+	Hdr msghdr
-	Len	uint32
+	Len uint32
 }
 
 type cmsghdr struct {
-	Len	uint32
+	Len   uint32
-	Level	int32
+	Level int32
-	Type	int32
+	Type  int32
 }
 
 const (
-	sizeofIovec	= 0x8
+	sizeofIovec  = 0x8
-	sizeofMsghdr	= 0x1c
+	sizeofMsghdr = 0x1c
 )

vendor/golang.org/x/net/ipv4/doc.go

@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
 // 3376.
 // Source-specific multicast is defined in RFC 4607.
 //
-//
+// # Unicasting
-// Unicasting
 //
 // The options for unicasting are available for net.TCPConn,
 // net.UDPConn and net.IPConn which are created as network connections
@@ -51,8 +50,7 @@
 //		}(c)
 //	}
 //
-//
+// # Multicasting
-// Multicasting
 //
 // The options for multicasting are available for net.UDPConn and
 // net.IPConn which are created as network connections that use the
@@ -141,8 +139,7 @@
 //		}
 //	}
 //
-//
+// # More multicasting
-// More multicasting
 //
 // An application that uses PacketConn or RawConn may join multiple
 // multicast groups. For example, a UDP listener with port 1024 might
@@ -200,8 +197,7 @@
 //		// error handling
 //	}
 //
-//
+// # Source-specific multicasting
-// Source-specific multicasting
 //
 // An application that uses PacketConn or RawConn on IGMPv3 supported
 // platform is able to join source-specific multicast groups.

vendor/golang.org/x/net/ipv6/doc.go

@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@
 // On Darwin, this package requires OS X Mavericks version 10.9 or
 // above, or equivalent.
 //
-//
+// # Unicasting
-// Unicasting
 //
 // The options for unicasting are available for net.TCPConn,
 // net.UDPConn and net.IPConn which are created as network connections
@@ -52,8 +51,7 @@
 //		}(c)
 //	}
 //
-//
+// # Multicasting
-// Multicasting
 //
 // The options for multicasting are available for net.UDPConn and
 // net.IPConn which are created as network connections that use the
@@ -140,8 +138,7 @@
 //		}
 //	}
 //
-//
+// # More multicasting
-// More multicasting
 //
 // An application that uses PacketConn may join multiple multicast
 // groups. For example, a UDP listener with port 1024 might join two
@@ -199,8 +196,7 @@
 //		// error handling
 //	}
 //
-//
+// # Source-specific multicasting
-// Source-specific multicasting
 //
 // An application that uses PacketConn on MLDv2 supported platform is
 // able to join source-specific multicast groups.

vendor/golang.org/x/net/websocket/websocket.go

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 // This package currently lacks some features found in alternative
 // and more actively maintained WebSocket packages:
 //
-//     https://godoc.org/github.com/gorilla/websocket
+//	https://godoc.org/github.com/gorilla/websocket
-//     https://godoc.org/nhooyr.io/websocket
+//	https://godoc.org/nhooyr.io/websocket
 package websocket // import "golang.org/x/net/websocket"
 
 import (
@@ -416,7 +416,6 @@ Trivial usage:
 	// send binary frame
 	data = []byte{0, 1, 2}
 	websocket.Message.Send(ws, data)
-
 */
 var Message = Codec{marshal, unmarshal}
 

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ func hostByteOrder() byteOrder {
 	case "386", "amd64", "amd64p32",
 		"alpha",
 		"arm", "arm64",
+		"loong64",
 		"mipsle", "mips64le", "mips64p32le",
 		"nios2",
 		"ppc64le",

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go

@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ var ARM64 struct {
 
 // ARM contains the supported CPU features of the current ARM (32-bit) platform.
 // All feature flags are false if:
-//   1. the current platform is not arm, or
+//  1. the current platform is not arm, or
-//   2. the current operating system is not Linux.
+//  2. the current operating system is not Linux.
 var ARM struct {
 	_           CacheLinePad
 	HasSWP      bool // SWP instruction support

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_loong64.go

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build loong64
+// +build loong64
+
+package cpu
+
+const cacheLineSize = 64
+
+func initOptions() {
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_gccgo.go

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 // Recreate a getsystemcfg syscall handler instead of
 // using the one provided by x/sys/unix to avoid having
 // the dependency between them. (See golang.org/issue/32102)
-// Morever, this file will be used during the building of
+// Moreover, this file will be used during the building of
 // gccgo's libgo and thus must not used a CGo method.
 
 //go:build aix && gccgo

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/execabs/execabs.go

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func relError(file, path string) error {
 // LookPath instead returns an error.
 func LookPath(file string) (string, error) {
 	path, err := exec.LookPath(file)
-	if err != nil {
+	if err != nil && !isGo119ErrDot(err) {
 		return "", err
 	}
 	if filepath.Base(file) == file && !filepath.IsAbs(path) {

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/execabs/execabs_go118.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build !go1.19
+// +build !go1.19
+
+package execabs
+
+func isGo119ErrDot(err error) bool {
+	return false
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/execabs/execabs_go119.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build go1.19
+// +build go1.19
+
+package execabs
+
+import "strings"
+
+func isGo119ErrDot(err error) bool {
+	// TODO: return errors.Is(err, exec.ErrDot)
+	return strings.Contains(err.Error(), "current directory")
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/plan9/syscall.go

@@ -113,5 +113,6 @@ func (tv *Timeval) Nano() int64 {
 
 // use is a no-op, but the compiler cannot see that it is.
 // Calling use(p) ensures that p is kept live until that point.
+//
 //go:noescape
 func use(p unsafe.Pointer)

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/plan9/syscall_plan9.go

@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ func Write(fd int, p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 var ioSync int64
 
 //sys	fd2path(fd int, buf []byte) (err error)
+
 func Fd2path(fd int) (path string, err error) {
 	var buf [512]byte
 
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ func Fd2path(fd int) (path string, err error) {
 }
 
 //sys	pipe(p *[2]int32) (err error)
+
 func Pipe(p []int) (err error) {
 	if len(p) != 2 {
 		return syscall.ErrorString("bad arg in system call")
@@ -180,6 +182,7 @@ func (w Waitmsg) ExitStatus() int {
 }
 
 //sys	await(s []byte) (n int, err error)
+
 func Await(w *Waitmsg) (err error) {
 	var buf [512]byte
 	var f [5][]byte
@@ -301,42 +304,49 @@ func Getgroups() (gids []int, err error) {
 }
 
 //sys	open(path string, mode int) (fd int, err error)
+
 func Open(path string, mode int) (fd int, err error) {
 	fixwd()
 	return open(path, mode)
 }
 
 //sys	create(path string, mode int, perm uint32) (fd int, err error)
+
 func Create(path string, mode int, perm uint32) (fd int, err error) {
 	fixwd()
 	return create(path, mode, perm)
 }
 
 //sys	remove(path string) (err error)
+
 func Remove(path string) error {
 	fixwd()
 	return remove(path)
 }
 
 //sys	stat(path string, edir []byte) (n int, err error)
+
 func Stat(path string, edir []byte) (n int, err error) {
 	fixwd()
 	return stat(path, edir)
 }
 
 //sys	bind(name string, old string, flag int) (err error)
+
 func Bind(name string, old string, flag int) (err error) {
 	fixwd()
 	return bind(name, old, flag)
 }
 
 //sys	mount(fd int, afd int, old string, flag int, aname string) (err error)
+
 func Mount(fd int, afd int, old string, flag int, aname string) (err error) {
 	fixwd()
 	return mount(fd, afd, old, flag, aname)
 }
 
 //sys	wstat(path string, edir []byte) (err error)
+
 func Wstat(path string, edir []byte) (err error) {
 	fixwd()
 	return wstat(path, edir)

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/asm_linux_loong64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build linux && loong64 && gc
+// +build linux
+// +build loong64
+// +build gc
+
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+
+// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
+// The runtime may know about them.
+
+TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
+	JMP	syscall·Syscall(SB)
+
+TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
+	JMP	syscall·Syscall6(SB)
+
+TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
+	JAL	runtime·entersyscall(SB)
+	MOVV	a1+8(FP), R4
+	MOVV	a2+16(FP), R5
+	MOVV	a3+24(FP), R6
+	MOVV	R0, R7
+	MOVV	R0, R8
+	MOVV	R0, R9
+	MOVV	trap+0(FP), R11	// syscall entry
+	SYSCALL
+	MOVV	R4, r1+32(FP)
+	MOVV	R5, r2+40(FP)
+	JAL	runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
+	RET
+
+TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
+	JMP	syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
+
+TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
+	JMP	syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
+
+TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
+	MOVV	a1+8(FP), R4
+	MOVV	a2+16(FP), R5
+	MOVV	a3+24(FP), R6
+	MOVV	R0, R7
+	MOVV	R0, R8
+	MOVV	R0, R9
+	MOVV	trap+0(FP), R11	// syscall entry
+	SYSCALL
+	MOVV	R4, r1+32(FP)
+	MOVV	R5, r2+40(FP)
+	RET

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/endian_little.go

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 //
-//go:build 386 || amd64 || amd64p32 || alpha || arm || arm64 || mipsle || mips64le || mips64p32le || nios2 || ppc64le || riscv || riscv64 || sh
+//go:build 386 || amd64 || amd64p32 || alpha || arm || arm64 || loong64 || mipsle || mips64le || mips64p32le || nios2 || ppc64le || riscv || riscv64 || sh
-// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 alpha arm arm64 mipsle mips64le mips64p32le nios2 ppc64le riscv riscv64 sh
+// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 alpha arm arm64 loong64 mipsle mips64le mips64p32le nios2 ppc64le riscv riscv64 sh
 
 package unix
 

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ifreq_linux.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 package unix
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"unsafe"
 )
 
@@ -45,13 +44,7 @@ func NewIfreq(name string) (*Ifreq, error) {
 
 // Name returns the interface name associated with the Ifreq.
 func (ifr *Ifreq) Name() string {
-	// BytePtrToString requires a NULL terminator or the program may crash. If
+	return ByteSliceToString(ifr.raw.Ifrn[:])
-	// one is not present, just return the empty string.
-	if !bytes.Contains(ifr.raw.Ifrn[:], []byte{0x00}) {
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	return BytePtrToString(&ifr.raw.Ifrn[0])
 }
 
 // According to netdevice(7), only AF_INET addresses are returned for numerous

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ioctl_linux.go

@@ -194,3 +194,26 @@ func ioctlIfreqData(fd int, req uint, value *ifreqData) error {
 	// identical so pass *IfreqData directly.
 	return ioctlPtr(fd, req, unsafe.Pointer(value))
 }
+
+// IoctlKCMClone attaches a new file descriptor to a multiplexor by cloning an
+// existing KCM socket, returning a structure containing the file descriptor of
+// the new socket.
+func IoctlKCMClone(fd int) (*KCMClone, error) {
+	var info KCMClone
+	if err := ioctlPtr(fd, SIOCKCMCLONE, unsafe.Pointer(&info)); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &info, nil
+}
+
+// IoctlKCMAttach attaches a TCP socket and associated BPF program file
+// descriptor to a multiplexor.
+func IoctlKCMAttach(fd int, info KCMAttach) error {
+	return ioctlPtr(fd, SIOCKCMATTACH, unsafe.Pointer(&info))
+}
+
+// IoctlKCMUnattach unattaches a TCP socket file descriptor from a multiplexor.
+func IoctlKCMUnattach(fd int, info KCMUnattach) error {
+	return ioctlPtr(fd, SIOCKCMUNATTACH, unsafe.Pointer(&info))
+}

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/mkerrors.sh

@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ struct ltchars {
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/can.h>
 #include <linux/can/error.h>
+#include <linux/can/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/can/raw.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/cryptouser.h>
@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ struct ltchars {
 #include <linux/ethtool_netlink.h>
 #include <linux/falloc.h>
 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/fib_rules.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/fscrypt.h>
@@ -231,6 +233,7 @@ struct ltchars {
 #include <linux/if_packet.h>
 #include <linux/if_xdp.h>
 #include <linux/input.h>
+#include <linux/kcm.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/landlock.h>
@@ -503,6 +506,7 @@ ccflags="$@"
 		$2 ~ /^O?XTABS$/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^TC[IO](ON|OFF)$/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^IN_/ ||
+		$2 ~ /^KCM/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^LANDLOCK_/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^LOCK_(SH|EX|NB|UN)$/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^LO_(KEY|NAME)_SIZE$/ ||
@@ -597,8 +601,10 @@ ccflags="$@"
 		$2 ~ /^DEVLINK_/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^ETHTOOL_/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^LWTUNNEL_IP/ ||
+		$2 ~ /^ITIMER_/ ||
 		$2 !~ "WMESGLEN" &&
 		$2 ~ /^W[A-Z0-9]+$/ ||
+		$2 ~ /^P_/ ||
 		$2 ~/^PPPIOC/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^FAN_|FANOTIFY_/ ||
 		$2 == "HID_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE" ||
@@ -608,6 +614,7 @@ ccflags="$@"
 		$2 ~ /^OTP/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^MEM/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^WG/ ||
+		$2 ~ /^FIB_RULE_/ ||
 		$2 ~ /^BLK[A-Z]*(GET$|SET$|BUF$|PART$|SIZE)/ {printf("\t%s = C.%s\n", $2, $2)}
 		$2 ~ /^__WCOREFLAG$/ {next}
 		$2 ~ /^__W[A-Z0-9]+$/ {printf("\t%s = C.%s\n", substr($2,3), $2)}

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/syscall_aix.go

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ func Creat(path string, mode uint32) (fd int, err error) {
 }
 
 //sys	utimes(path string, times *[2]Timeval) (err error)
+
 func Utimes(path string, tv []Timeval) error {
 	if len(tv) != 2 {
 		return EINVAL
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ func Utimes(path string, tv []Timeval) error {
 }
 
 //sys	utimensat(dirfd int, path string, times *[2]Timespec, flag int) (err error)
+
 func UtimesNano(path string, ts []Timespec) error {
 	if len(ts) != 2 {
 		return EINVAL
@@ -215,18 +217,12 @@ func Accept(fd int) (nfd int, sa Sockaddr, err error) {
 	return
 }
 
-func Recvmsg(fd int, p, oob []byte, flags int) (n, oobn int, recvflags int, from Sockaddr, err error) {
+func recvmsgRaw(fd int, p, oob []byte, flags int, rsa *RawSockaddrAny) (n, oobn int, recvflags int, err error) {
 	// Recvmsg not implemented on AIX
-	sa := new(SockaddrUnix)
+	return -1, -1, -1, ENOSYS
-	return -1, -1, -1, sa, ENOSYS
 }
 
-func Sendmsg(fd int, p, oob []byte, to Sockaddr, flags int) (err error) {
+func sendmsgN(fd int, p, oob []byte, ptr unsafe.Pointer, salen _Socklen, flags int) (n int, err error) {
-	_, err = SendmsgN(fd, p, oob, to, flags)
-	return
-}
-
-func SendmsgN(fd int, p, oob []byte, to Sockaddr, flags int) (n int, err error) {
 	// SendmsgN not implemented on AIX
 	return -1, ENOSYS
 }
@@ -306,11 +302,13 @@ func direntNamlen(buf []byte) (uint64, bool) {
 }
 
 //sys	getdirent(fd int, buf []byte) (n int, err error)
+
 func Getdents(fd int, buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
 	return getdirent(fd, buf)
 }
 
 //sys	wait4(pid Pid_t, status *_C_int, options int, rusage *Rusage) (wpid Pid_t, err error)
+
 func Wait4(pid int, wstatus *WaitStatus, options int, rusage *Rusage) (wpid int, err error) {
 	var status _C_int
 	var r Pid_t
@@ -378,6 +376,7 @@ func (w WaitStatus) TrapCause() int { return -1 }
 //sys	fcntl(fd int, cmd int, arg int) (val int, err error)
 
 //sys	fsyncRange(fd int, how int, start int64, length int64) (err error) = fsync_range
+
 func Fsync(fd int) error {
 	return fsyncRange(fd, O_SYNC, 0, 0)
 }
@@ -458,8 +457,8 @@ func Fsync(fd int) error {
 //sys	Listen(s int, n int) (err error)
 //sys	lstat(path string, stat *Stat_t) (err error)
 //sys	Pause() (err error)
-//sys	Pread(fd int, p []byte, offset int64) (n int, err error) = pread64
+//sys	pread(fd int, p []byte, offset int64) (n int, err error) = pread64
-//sys	Pwrite(fd int, p []byte, offset int64) (n int, err error) = pwrite64
+//sys	pwrite(fd int, p []byte, offset int64) (n int, err error) = pwrite64
 //sys	Select(nfd int, r *FdSet, w *FdSet, e *FdSet, timeout *Timeval) (n int, err error)
 //sys	Pselect(nfd int, r *FdSet, w *FdSet, e *FdSet, timeout *Timespec, sigmask *Sigset_t) (n int, err error)
 //sysnb	Setregid(rgid int, egid int) (err error)
@@ -542,6 +541,7 @@ func Poll(fds []PollFd, timeout int) (n int, err error) {
 //sys	Getsystemcfg(label int) (n uint64)
 
 //sys	umount(target string) (err error)
+
 func Unmount(target string, flags int) (err error) {
 	if flags != 0 {
 		// AIX doesn't have any flags for umount.

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/syscall_bsd.go

@@ -325,10 +325,9 @@ func GetsockoptString(fd, level, opt int) (string, error) {
 //sys	sendto(s int, buf []byte, flags int, to unsafe.Pointer, addrlen _Socklen) (err error)
 //sys	recvmsg(s int, msg *Msghdr, flags int) (n int, err error)
 
-func Recvmsg(fd int, p, oob []byte, flags int) (n, oobn int, recvflags int, from Sockaddr, err error) {
+func recvmsgRaw(fd int, p, oob []byte, flags int, rsa *RawSockaddrAny) (n, oobn int, recvflags int, err error) {
 	var msg Msghdr
-	var rsa RawSockaddrAny
+	msg.Name = (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(rsa))
-	msg.Name = (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&rsa))
 	msg.Namelen = uint32(SizeofSockaddrAny)
 	var iov Iovec
 	if len(p) > 0 {
@@ -352,29 +351,12 @@ func Recvmsg(fd int, p, oob []byte, flags int) (n, oobn int, recvflags int, from
 	}
 	oobn = int(msg.Controllen)
 	recvflags = int(msg.Flags)
-	// source address is only specified if the socket is unconnected
-	if rsa.Addr.Family != AF_UNSPEC {
-		from, err = anyToSockaddr(fd, &rsa)
-	}
 	return
 }
 
 //sys	sendmsg(s int, msg *Msghdr, flags int) (n int, err error)
 
-func Sendmsg(fd int, p, oob []byte, to Sockaddr, flags int) (err error) {
+func sendmsgN(fd int, p, oob []byte, ptr unsafe.Pointer, salen _Socklen, flags int) (n int, err error) {
-	_, err = SendmsgN(fd, p, oob, to, flags)
-	return
-}
-
-func SendmsgN(fd int, p, oob []byte, to Sockaddr, flags int) (n int, err error) {
-	var ptr unsafe.Pointer
-	var salen _Socklen
-	if to != nil {
-		ptr, salen, err = to.sockaddr()
-		if err != nil {
-			return 0, err
-		}
-	}
 	var msg Msghdr
 	msg.Name = (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(ptr))
 	msg.Namelen = uint32(salen)
@@ -571,12 +553,7 @@ func UtimesNano(path string, ts []Timespec) error {
 	if len(ts) != 2 {
 		return EINVAL
 	}
-	// Darwin setattrlist can set nanosecond timestamps
+	err := utimensat(AT_FDCWD, path, (*[2]Timespec)(unsafe.Pointer(&ts[0])), 0)
-	err := setattrlistTimes(path, ts, 0)
-	if err != ENOSYS {
-		return err
-	}
-	err = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, path, (*[2]Timespec)(unsafe.Pointer(&ts[0])), 0)
 	if err != ENOSYS {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -596,10 +573,6 @@ func UtimesNanoAt(dirfd int, path string, ts []Timespec, flags int) error {
 	if len(ts) != 2 {
 		return EINVAL
 	}
-	err := setattrlistTimes(path, ts, flags)
-	if err != ENOSYS {
-		return err
-	}
 	return utimensat(dirfd, path, (*[2]Timespec)(unsafe.Pointer(&ts[0])), flags)
 }