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TUN-7934: Update quic-go to a version that queues datagrams for better throughput and drops large datagram 

Remove TestUnregisterUdpSession
This commit is contained in:
chungthuang 2024-01-01 09:43:25 +00:00
parent 00cd7c333c
commit 8e69f41833
69 changed files with 262 additions and 13825 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
go.mod
View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ require (
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1 github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.13.0 github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.13.0
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.2.0 github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.2.0
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20231203135336-87ef8ec48d55 github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20240101045026-22b7f7744eb6
github.com/rs/zerolog v1.20.0 github.com/rs/zerolog v1.20.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4
github.com/urfave/cli/v2 v2.3.0 github.com/urfave/cli/v2 v2.3.0

2
go.sum
View File

@ -324,6 +324,8 @@ github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.4.1 h1:D33340mCNDAIKBqXuAvexTNMUByrYmFYVfKfDN5
github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.4.1/go.mod h1:X9Nh97ZL80Z+bX/gUXMbipO6OxdiDi58b/fMC9mAL+k= github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.4.1/go.mod h1:X9Nh97ZL80Z+bX/gUXMbipO6OxdiDi58b/fMC9mAL+k=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20231203135336-87ef8ec48d55 h1:I4N3ZRnkZPbDN935Tg8QDf8fRpHp3bZ0U0/L42jBgNE= github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20231203135336-87ef8ec48d55 h1:I4N3ZRnkZPbDN935Tg8QDf8fRpHp3bZ0U0/L42jBgNE=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20231203135336-87ef8ec48d55/go.mod h1:PeN7kuVJ4xZbxSv/4OX6S1USOX8MJvydwpTx31vx60c= github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20231203135336-87ef8ec48d55/go.mod h1:PeN7kuVJ4xZbxSv/4OX6S1USOX8MJvydwpTx31vx60c=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20240101045026-22b7f7744eb6 h1:OI4WiysowCcxLtcZMGBZildo12di3ljcMN4vWdUQpoU=
github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20240101045026-22b7f7744eb6/go.mod h1:qCkNjqczPEvgsOnxZ0eCD14lv+B2LHlFAB++CNOh9hA=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M8bDsm7K2OlrFYOpmOWEs/qY81heoFRclV5y23lUDJ4= github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M8bDsm7K2OlrFYOpmOWEs/qY81heoFRclV5y23lUDJ4=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0 h1:TMyTOH3F/DB16zRVcYyreMH6GnZZrwQVAoYjRBZyWFQ= github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0 h1:TMyTOH3F/DB16zRVcYyreMH6GnZZrwQVAoYjRBZyWFQ=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncjaFoBhdsK/akog= github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncjaFoBhdsK/akog=

57
quic/quic_protocol_test.go
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@ -109,63 +109,6 @@ func TestConnectResponseMeta(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestUnregisterUdpSession(t *testing.T) {
unregisterMessage := "closed by eyeball"
var tests = []struct {
name string
sessionRPCServer mockSessionRPCServer
timeout time.Duration
}{
{
name: "UnregisterUdpSessionTimesout if the RPC server does not respond",
sessionRPCServer: mockSessionRPCServer{
sessionID: uuid.New(),
dstIP: net.IP{172, 16, 0, 1},
dstPort: 8000,
closeIdleAfter: testCloseIdleAfterHint,
unregisterMessage: unregisterMessage,
traceContext: "1241ce3ecdefc68854e8514e69ba42ca:b38f1bf5eae406f3:0:1",
},
// very very low value so we trigger the timeout every time.
timeout: time.Nanosecond * 1,
},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
logger := zerolog.Nop()
clientStream, serverStream := newMockRPCStreams()
sessionRegisteredChan := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
protocol, err := DetermineProtocol(serverStream)
assert.NoError(t, err)
rpcServerStream, err := NewRPCServerStream(serverStream, protocol)
assert.NoError(t, err)
err = rpcServerStream.Serve(test.sessionRPCServer, nil, &logger)
assert.NoError(t, err)
serverStream.Close()
close(sessionRegisteredChan)
}()
rpcClientStream, err := NewRPCClientStream(context.Background(), clientStream, test.timeout, &logger)
assert.NoError(t, err)
reg, err := rpcClientStream.RegisterUdpSession(context.Background(), test.sessionRPCServer.sessionID, test.sessionRPCServer.dstIP, test.sessionRPCServer.dstPort, testCloseIdleAfterHint, test.sessionRPCServer.traceContext)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NoError(t, reg.Err)
assert.Error(t, rpcClientStream.UnregisterUdpSession(context.Background(), test.sessionRPCServer.sessionID, unregisterMessage))
rpcClientStream.Close()
<-sessionRegisteredChan
})
}
}
func TestRegisterUdpSession(t *testing.T) { func TestRegisterUdpSession(t *testing.T) {
unregisterMessage := "closed by eyeball" unregisterMessage := "closed by eyeball"

27
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/LICENSE generated vendored
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@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
met:
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
* Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/README.md generated vendored
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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
# qtls
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20)
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go).

109
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go generated vendored
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@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import "strconv"
// An AlertError is a TLS alert.
//
// When using a QUIC transport, QUICConn methods will return an error
// which wraps AlertError rather than sending a TLS alert.
type AlertError uint8
func (e AlertError) Error() string {
return alert(e).String()
}
type alert uint8
const (
// alert level
alertLevelWarning = 1
alertLevelError = 2
)
const (
alertCloseNotify alert = 0
alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10
alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20
alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21
alertRecordOverflow alert = 22
alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30
alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40
alertBadCertificate alert = 42
alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43
alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44
alertCertificateExpired alert = 45
alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46
alertIllegalParameter alert = 47
alertUnknownCA alert = 48
alertAccessDenied alert = 49
alertDecodeError alert = 50
alertDecryptError alert = 51
alertExportRestriction alert = 60
alertProtocolVersion alert = 70
alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71
alertInternalError alert = 80
alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86
alertUserCanceled alert = 90
alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100
alertMissingExtension alert = 109
alertUnsupportedExtension alert = 110
alertCertificateUnobtainable alert = 111
alertUnrecognizedName alert = 112
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113
alertBadCertificateHashValue alert = 114
alertUnknownPSKIdentity alert = 115
alertCertificateRequired alert = 116
alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120
)
var alertText = map[alert]string{
alertCloseNotify: "close notify",
alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message",
alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC",
alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed",
alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow",
alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure",
alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure",
alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate",
alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate",
alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate",
alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate",
alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate",
alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter",
alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority",
alertAccessDenied: "access denied",
alertDecodeError: "error decoding message",
alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message",
alertExportRestriction: "export restriction",
alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported",
alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level",
alertInternalError: "internal error",
alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback",
alertUserCanceled: "user canceled",
alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation",
alertMissingExtension: "missing extension",
alertUnsupportedExtension: "unsupported extension",
alertCertificateUnobtainable: "certificate unobtainable",
alertUnrecognizedName: "unrecognized name",
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response",
alertBadCertificateHashValue: "bad certificate hash value",
alertUnknownPSKIdentity: "unknown PSK identity",
alertCertificateRequired: "certificate required",
alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol",
}
func (e alert) String() string {
s, ok := alertText[e]
if ok {
return "tls: " + s
}
return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")"
}
func (e alert) Error() string {
return e.String()
}

293
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/auth.go generated vendored
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@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
)
// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed
// (if required) handshake contents.
func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error {
switch sigType {
case signatureECDSA:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pubKey, signed, sig) {
return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
}
case signatureEd25519:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) {
return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure")
}
case signaturePKCS1v15:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil {
return err
}
case signatureRSAPSS:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}
if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil {
return err
}
default:
return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type")
}
return nil
}
const (
serverSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00"
clientSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00"
)
var signaturePadding = []byte{
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
}
// signedMessage returns the pre-hashed (if necessary) message to be signed by
// certificate keys in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
if sigHash == directSigning {
b := &bytes.Buffer{}
b.Write(signaturePadding)
io.WriteString(b, context)
b.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
return b.Bytes()
}
h := sigHash.New()
h.Write(signaturePadding)
io.WriteString(h, context)
h.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
return h.Sum(nil)
}
// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and
// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme.
func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
switch signatureAlgorithm {
case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
sigType = signaturePKCS1v15
case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
sigType = signatureRSAPSS
case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
sigType = signatureECDSA
case Ed25519:
sigType = signatureEd25519
default:
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
}
switch signatureAlgorithm {
case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1:
hash = crypto.SHA1
case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
hash = crypto.SHA256
case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
hash = crypto.SHA384
case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
hash = crypto.SHA512
case Ed25519:
hash = directSigning
default:
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
}
return sigType, hash, nil
}
// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for
// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of
// signature algorithm negotiation.
func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
switch pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
case ed25519.PublicKey:
// RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
// but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
// full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
// complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
default:
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub)
}
}
var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct {
scheme SignatureScheme
minModulusBytes int
maxVersion uint16
}{
// RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires
// emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2
{PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
{PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
{PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
// PKCS #1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires
// emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11
// TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS #1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS.
{PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
{PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
{PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
{PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
}
// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes
// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version,
// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms.
//
// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
// FIPS filtering is applied in the caller, selectSignatureScheme.
func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme {
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return nil
}
var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme
switch pub := priv.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
if version != VersionTLS13 {
// In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not
// constrained to a single curve.
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{
ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
ECDSAWithSHA1,
}
break
}
switch pub.Curve {
case elliptic.P256():
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256}
case elliptic.P384():
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384}
case elliptic.P521():
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512}
default:
return nil
}
case *rsa.PublicKey:
size := pub.Size()
sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes))
for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes {
if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion {
sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme)
}
}
case ed25519.PublicKey:
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519}
default:
return nil
}
if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme
for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs {
if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg)
}
}
return filteredSigAlgs
}
return sigAlgs
}
// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list
// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol
// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) {
supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c)
if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 {
return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c)
}
if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 {
// For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we
// can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1}
}
// Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our
// preference order is not configurable.
for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs {
if needFIPS() && !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
continue
}
if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) {
return preferredAlg, nil
}
}
return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms")
}
// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with
// an unsupported private key.
func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error {
switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T",
cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey)
case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey")
}
signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer",
cert.PrivateKey)
}
switch pub := signer.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
switch pub.Curve {
case elliptic.P256():
case elliptic.P384():
case elliptic.P521():
default:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name)
}
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms")
case ed25519.PublicKey:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub)
}
if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms")
}
return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey)
}

95
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cache.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto/x509"
"runtime"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
type cacheEntry struct {
refs atomic.Int64
cert *x509.Certificate
}
// certCache implements an intern table for reference counted x509.Certificates,
// implemented in a similar fashion to BoringSSL's CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL. This
// allows for a single x509.Certificate to be kept in memory and referenced from
// multiple Conns. Returned references should not be mutated by callers. Certificates
// are still safe to use after they are removed from the cache.
//
// Certificates are returned wrapped in a activeCert struct that should be held by
// the caller. When references to the activeCert are freed, the number of references
// to the certificate in the cache is decremented. Once the number of references
// reaches zero, the entry is evicted from the cache.
//
// The main difference between this implementation and CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL is that
// CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL is a more generic structure which supports blobs of data,
// rather than specific structures. Since we only care about x509.Certificates,
// certCache is implemented as a specific cache, rather than a generic one.
//
// See https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/include/openssl/pool.h
// and https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/crypto/pool/pool.c
// for the BoringSSL reference.
type certCache struct {
sync.Map
}
var clientCertCache = new(certCache)
// activeCert is a handle to a certificate held in the cache. Once there are
// no alive activeCerts for a given certificate, the certificate is removed
// from the cache by a finalizer.
type activeCert struct {
cert *x509.Certificate
}
// active increments the number of references to the entry, wraps the
// certificate in the entry in a activeCert, and sets the finalizer.
//
// Note that there is a race between active and the finalizer set on the
// returned activeCert, triggered if active is called after the ref count is
// decremented such that refs may be > 0 when evict is called. We consider this
// safe, since the caller holding an activeCert for an entry that is no longer
// in the cache is fine, with the only side effect being the memory overhead of
// there being more than one distinct reference to a certificate alive at once.
func (cc *certCache) active(e *cacheEntry) *activeCert {
e.refs.Add(1)
a := &activeCert{e.cert}
runtime.SetFinalizer(a, func(_ *activeCert) {
if e.refs.Add(-1) == 0 {
cc.evict(e)
}
})
return a
}
// evict removes a cacheEntry from the cache.
func (cc *certCache) evict(e *cacheEntry) {
cc.Delete(string(e.cert.Raw))
}
// newCert returns a x509.Certificate parsed from der. If there is already a copy
// of the certificate in the cache, a reference to the existing certificate will
// be returned. Otherwise, a fresh certificate will be added to the cache, and
// the reference returned. The returned reference should not be mutated.
func (cc *certCache) newCert(der []byte) (*activeCert, error) {
if entry, ok := cc.Load(string(der)); ok {
return cc.active(entry.(*cacheEntry)), nil
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
entry := &cacheEntry{cert: cert}
if entry, loaded := cc.LoadOrStore(string(der), entry); loaded {
return cc.active(entry.(*cacheEntry)), nil
}
return cc.active(entry), nil
}

691
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go generated vendored
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@ -1,691 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/des"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rc4"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"hash"
"runtime"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
type CipherSuite struct {
ID uint16
Name string
// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
// negotiate this cipher suite.
SupportedVersions []uint16
// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
Insecure bool
}
var (
supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
)
// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
// InsecureCipherSuites.
//
// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
// and might not match those returned by this function.
func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
return []*CipherSuite{
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
}
}
// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
// this package and which have security issues.
//
// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
// only use those returned by CipherSuites.
func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
return []*CipherSuite{
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
}
}
// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
if c.ID == id {
return c.Name
}
}
for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
if c.ID == id {
return c.Name
}
}
return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
}
const (
// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
// that we're happy with.
suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
// is RSA based.
suiteECSign
// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
suiteTLS12
// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
// handshake hash.
suiteSHA384
)
// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
type cipherSuite struct {
id uint16
// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
keyLen int
macLen int
ivLen int
ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
flags int
cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
}
var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
}
// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
for _, id := range ids {
candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
continue
}
for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
if id == suppID {
return candidate
}
}
}
return nil
}
// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
id uint16
keyLen int
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
hash crypto.Hash
}
var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
}
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
//
// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
//
// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
// first (most important) applicable one:
//
// - Anything else comes before RC4
//
// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
//
// - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
//
// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
//
// - Anything else comes before 3DES
//
// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
//
// - ECDHE comes before anything else
//
// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
//
// - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
//
// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
//
// - AES comes before ChaCha20
//
// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
//
// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
//
// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
//
// - AES-128 comes before AES-256
//
// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
// contribute to the advantages above).
//
// - ECDSA comes before RSA
//
// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
// AEADs w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
// CBC w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
// AEADs w/o ECDHE
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
// CBC w/o ECDHE
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
// 3DES
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
// CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
// RC4
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
}
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
// ChaCha20Poly1305
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
}
// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
// CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
// RC4
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
}
var (
defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
defaultCipherSuites = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
)
// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
}
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
}
var (
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 ||
runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 ||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X
)
var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
// TLS 1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
// TLS 1.3
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
}
var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
// TLS 1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
// TLS 1.3
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
}
// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
for _, cID := range ciphers {
if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
}
if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
}
}
return false
}
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
return cipher
}
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
if isRead {
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
}
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
}
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
if isRead {
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
}
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
}
// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
h := sha1.New
h = newConstantTimeHash(h)
return hmac.New(h, key)
}
// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}
type aead interface {
cipher.AEAD
// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
// zero for modern ones.
explicitNonceLen() int
}
const (
aeadNonceLength = 12
noncePrefixLength = 4
)
// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
// each call.
type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
aead cipher.AEAD
}
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
}
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
}
// xorNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
// before each call.
type xorNonceAEAD struct {
nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
aead cipher.AEAD
}
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
return result
}
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
return result, err
}
func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
var aead cipher.AEAD
aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
return ret
}
func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
return ret
}
func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
}
aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
return ret
}
type constantTimeHash interface {
hash.Hash
ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
}
// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
type cthWrapper struct {
h constantTimeHash
}
func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() }
func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() }
func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() }
func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
return func() hash.Hash {
return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
}
}
// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
h.Reset()
h.Write(seq)
h.Write(header)
h.Write(data)
res := h.Sum(out)
if extra != nil {
h.Write(extra)
}
return res
}
func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
return rsaKeyAgreement{}
}
func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
isRSA: false,
version: version,
}
}
func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
isRSA: true,
version: version,
}
}
// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
for _, id := range have {
if id == want {
return cipherSuiteByID(id)
}
}
return nil
}
func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
if cipherSuite.id == id {
return cipherSuite
}
}
return nil
}
func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
for _, id := range have {
if id == want {
return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
}
}
return nil
}
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
if cipherSuite.id == id {
return cipherSuite
}
}
return nil
}
// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
// package.
//
// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
const (
// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
)

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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"hash"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
)
type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
serverHello *serverHelloMsg
hello *clientHelloMsg
ecdheKey *ecdh.PrivateKey
session *clientSessionState
earlySecret []byte
binderKey []byte
certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
usingPSK bool
sentDummyCCS bool
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
transcript hash.Hash
masterSecret []byte
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
}
// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheKey, and,
// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
if needFIPS() {
return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
}
// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
if c.handshakes > 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
}
// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
if hs.ecdheKey == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
return err
}
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
return nil
}
// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
}
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
}
if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
}
if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
}
if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
}
if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
}
selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
}
if selectedSuite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
}
hs.suite = selectedSuite
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
return nil
}
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
if hs.c.quic != nil {
return nil
}
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
return nil
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
c := hs.c
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
// in any change in the ClientHello.
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
}
if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
}
// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
// share for it this time.
if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
curveOK := false
for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
if id == curveID {
curveOK = true
break
}
}
if !curveOK {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
}
if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); sentID == curveID {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.ecdheKey = key
hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}}
}
hs.hello.raw = nil
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
transcript.Write(chHash)
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
helloBytes, err := hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
return err
}
transcript.Write(helloBytes)
pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
if err := hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
}
}
if hs.hello.earlyData {
hs.hello.earlyData = false
c.quicRejectedEarlyData()
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
}
hs.serverHello = serverHello
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
c := hs.c
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
}
if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
}
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
}
if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != sentID {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
}
if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
return nil
}
if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
}
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
}
hs.usingPSK = true
c.didResume = true
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
c.scts = hs.session.scts
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
c := hs.c
peerKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.Curve().NewPublicKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
}
sharedKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.ECDH(peerKey)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
}
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
if !hs.usingPSK {
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
}
handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, clientSecret)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, serverSecret)
if c.quic != nil {
if c.hand.Len() != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, clientSecret)
c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, serverSecret)
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
}
if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol, c.quic != nil); err != nil {
// RFC 8446 specifies that no_application_protocol is sent by servers, but
// does not specify how clients handle the selection of an incompatible protocol.
// RFC 9001 Section 8.1 specifies that QUIC clients send no_application_protocol
// in this case. Always sending no_application_protocol seems reasonable.
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return err
}
c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
if c.quic != nil {
if encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters == nil {
// RFC 9001 Section 8.2.
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server did not send a quic_transport_parameters extension")
}
c.quicSetTransportParameters(encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters)
} else {
if encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unexpected quic_transport_parameters extension")
}
}
if hs.hello.earlyData && !encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
c.quicRejectedEarlyData()
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
if hs.usingPSK {
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
if ok {
hs.certReq = certReq
msg, err = c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
}
c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
}
expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
}
if err := transcriptMsg(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, serverSecret)
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.certReq == nil {
return nil
}
cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{
AcceptableCAs: hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
Version: c.vers,
ctx: hs.ctx,
}))
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
certMsg.certificate = *cert
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
return nil
}
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
finished := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.trafficSecret)
if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
}
if c.quic != nil {
if c.hand.Len() != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.suite.id, hs.trafficSecret)
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
if !c.isClient {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
}
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
return nil
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
if msg.lifetime == 0 {
return nil
}
lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
}
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
// We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order
// to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket.
// However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to
// the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct.
// We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice)
nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData)
copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce)
var appData []byte
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil {
appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState()
}
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision
b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData)
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(appData)
})
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(msg.nonce)
})
// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
session := &clientSessionState{
sessionTicket: msg.label,
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite,
masterSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
receivedAt: c.config.time(),
nonce: b.BytesOrPanic(),
useBy: c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
ageAdd: msg.ageAdd,
ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse,
scts: c.scts,
}
cacheKey := c.clientSessionCacheKey()
if cacheKey != "" {
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session))
}
return nil
}

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vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go generated vendored
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@ -1,899 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
"time"
)
// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
type serverHandshakeState struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
hello *serverHelloMsg
suite *cipherSuite
ecdheOk bool
ecSignOk bool
rsaDecryptOk bool
rsaSignOk bool
sessionState *sessionState
finishedHash finishedHash
masterSecret []byte
cert *Certificate
}
// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
c: c,
ctx: ctx,
clientHello: clientHello,
}
return hs.handshake()
}
hs := serverHandshakeState{
c: c,
ctx: ctx,
clientHello: clientHello,
}
return hs.handshake()
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
c.buffering = true
if hs.checkForResumption() {
// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
c.didResume = true
if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
// valid so we do a full handshake.
if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
return nil
}
// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
// clientHelloMsg is included in the transcript, but we haven't initialized
// it yet. The respective handshake functions will record it themselves.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
}
var configForClient *config
originalConfig := c.config
if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
chi := newClientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello)
if cfc, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return nil, err
} else if cfc != nil {
configForClient = fromConfig(cfc)
c.config = configForClient
}
}
c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient)
clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
}
c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
}
c.haveVers = true
c.in.version = c.vers
c.out.version = c.vers
return clientHello, nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
hs.hello.vers = c.vers
foundCompression := false
// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
if compression == compressionNone {
foundCompression = true
break
}
}
if !foundCompression {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
}
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
serverRandom := hs.hello.random
// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer)
if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary {
if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
} else {
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
}
serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
}
_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
}
hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
}
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, false)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return err
}
hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
if err != nil {
if err == errNoCertificates {
c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
return err
}
if hs.clientHello.scts {
hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
}
hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
if hs.ecdheOk && len(hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) > 0 {
// Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
//
// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
}
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
switch priv.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
hs.ecSignOk = true
case ed25519.PublicKey:
hs.ecSignOk = true
case *rsa.PublicKey:
hs.rsaSignOk = true
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
}
}
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
switch priv.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
}
}
return nil
}
// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server
// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it,
// it returns "" and no error.
func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string, quic bool) (string, error) {
if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 {
if quic && len(serverProtos) != 0 {
// RFC 9001, Section 8.1
return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client did not request an application protocol")
}
return "", nil
}
var http11fallback bool
for _, s := range serverProtos {
for _, c := range clientProtos {
if s == c {
return s, nil
}
if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" {
http11fallback = true
}
}
}
// As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they
// didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over
// time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but
// expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310.
if http11fallback {
return "", nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
}
// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
func supportsECDHE(c *config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
supportsCurve := false
for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
supportsCurve = true
break
}
}
supportsPointFormat := false
for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
supportsPointFormat = true
break
}
}
// Per RFC 8422, Section 5.1.2, if the Supported Point Formats extension is
// missing, uncompressed points are supported. If supportedPoints is empty,
// the extension must be missing, as an empty extension body is rejected by
// the parser. See https://go.dev/issue/49126.
if len(supportedPoints) == 0 {
supportsPointFormat = true
}
return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
c := hs.c
preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder
if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES
}
configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites))
for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder {
for _, id := range configCipherSuites {
if id == suiteID {
preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id)
break
}
}
}
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
if hs.suite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
}
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
}
break
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
if !hs.ecdheOk {
return false
}
if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
if !hs.ecSignOk {
return false
}
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
return false
}
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
return false
}
if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
return false
}
return true
}
// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
c := hs.c
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return false
}
plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
if plaintext == nil {
return false
}
hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
if !ok {
return false
}
createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0)
if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
return false
}
// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
return false
}
cipherSuiteOk := false
// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
cipherSuiteOk = true
break
}
}
if !cipherSuiteOk {
return false
}
// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
if hs.suite == nil {
return false
}
sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
return false
}
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
return false
}
return true
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
// that we're doing a resumption.
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
}
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
// certificates won't be used.
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certStatus, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
if skx != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(skx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
// Request a client certificate
certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
byte(certTypeRSASign),
byte(certTypeECDSASign),
}
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
}
// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
// the client that it may send any certificate in response
// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloDone, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message, even if it's empty.
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
// Get client key exchange
ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
}
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return err
}
}
signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
c := hs.c
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher, serverCipher any
var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
} else {
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
}
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
}
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
}
if err := transcriptMsg(clientFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
return nil
}
c := hs.c
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix())
if hs.sessionState != nil {
// If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep
// the original time it was created.
createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt
}
var certsFromClient [][]byte
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
}
state := sessionState{
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
createdAt: createdAt,
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
certificates: certsFromClient,
}
stateBytes, err := state.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
return nil
}
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
certificates := certificate.Certificate
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
var err error
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
if certs[i].PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA && certs[i].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey).N.BitLen() > maxRSAKeySize {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client sent certificate containing RSA key larger than %d bits", maxRSAKeySize)
}
}
if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
}
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return &CertificateVerificationError{UnverifiedCertificates: certs, Err: err}
}
c.verifiedChains = chains
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
if len(certs) > 0 {
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
default:
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
}
}
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func newClientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
}
return toClientHelloInfo(&clientHelloInfo{
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
Conn: c.conn,
config: toConfig(c.config),
ctx: ctx,
})
}

986
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,986 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rsa"
"errors"
"hash"
"io"
"time"
)
// maxClientPSKIdentities is the number of client PSK identities the server will
// attempt to validate. It will ignore the rest not to let cheap ClientHello
// messages cause too much work in session ticket decryption attempts.
const maxClientPSKIdentities = 5
type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
hello *serverHelloMsg
alpnNegotiationErr error
encryptedExtensions *encryptedExtensionsMsg
sentDummyCCS bool
usingPSK bool
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
cert *Certificate
sigAlg SignatureScheme
earlySecret []byte
sharedKey []byte
handshakeSecret []byte
masterSecret []byte
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
transcript hash.Hash
clientFinished []byte
earlyData bool
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
if needFIPS() {
return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
}
// For an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake, see RFC 8446, Section 2.
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.sendServerParameters(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendServerCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendServerFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Note that at this point we could start sending application data without
// waiting for the client's second flight, but the application might not
// expect the lack of replay protection of the ClientHello parameters.
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) processClientHello() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
hs.encryptedExtensions = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
// TLS 1.3 froze the ServerHello.legacy_version field, and uses
// supported_versions instead. See RFC 8446, sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1.
hs.hello.vers = VersionTLS12
hs.hello.supportedVersion = c.vers
if len(hs.clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client used the legacy version field to negotiate TLS 1.3")
}
// Abort if the client is doing a fallback and landing lower than what we
// support. See RFC 7507, which however does not specify the interaction
// with supported_versions. The only difference is that with
// supported_versions a client has a chance to attempt a [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.4]
// handshake in case TLS 1.3 is broken but 1.2 is not. Alas, in that case,
// it will have to drop the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV protection if it falls back to
// TLS 1.2, because a TLS 1.3 server would abort here. The situation before
// supported_versions was not better because there was just no way to do a
// TLS 1.4 handshake without risking the server selecting TLS 1.3.
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
// Use c.vers instead of max(supported_versions) because an attacker
// could defeat this by adding an arbitrary high version otherwise.
if c.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
}
break
}
}
if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 ||
hs.clientHello.compressionMethods[0] != compressionNone {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: TLS 1.3 client supports illegal compression methods")
}
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
}
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
preferenceList := defaultCipherSuitesTLS13
if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
}
for _, suiteID := range preferenceList {
hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, suiteID)
if hs.suite != nil {
break
}
}
if hs.suite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
}
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
// Pick the ECDHE group in server preference order, but give priority to
// groups with a key share, to avoid a HelloRetryRequest round-trip.
var selectedGroup CurveID
var clientKeyShare *keyShare
GroupSelection:
for _, preferredGroup := range c.config.curvePreferences() {
for _, ks := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
if ks.group == preferredGroup {
selectedGroup = ks.group
clientKeyShare = &ks
break GroupSelection
}
}
if selectedGroup != 0 {
continue
}
for _, group := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
if group == preferredGroup {
selectedGroup = group
break
}
}
}
if selectedGroup == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no ECDHE curve supported by both client and server")
}
if clientKeyShare == nil {
if err := hs.doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup); err != nil {
return err
}
clientKeyShare = &hs.clientHello.keyShares[0]
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(selectedGroup); !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), selectedGroup)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.hello.serverShare = keyShare{group: selectedGroup, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}
peerKey, err := key.Curve().NewPublicKey(clientKeyShare.data)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
}
hs.sharedKey, err = key.ECDH(peerKey)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
}
if c.quic != nil {
// RFC 9001 Section 4.2: Clients MUST NOT offer TLS versions older than 1.3.
for _, v := range hs.clientHello.supportedVersions {
if v < VersionTLS13 {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return errors.New("tls: client offered TLS version older than TLS 1.3")
}
}
// RFC 9001 Section 8.2.
if hs.clientHello.quicTransportParameters == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
return errors.New("tls: client did not send a quic_transport_parameters extension")
}
c.quicSetTransportParameters(hs.clientHello.quicTransportParameters)
} else {
if hs.clientHello.quicTransportParameters != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: client sent an unexpected quic_transport_parameters extension")
}
}
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.quic != nil)
if err != nil {
hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err
}
hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
c := hs.c
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return nil
}
modeOK := false
for _, mode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
if mode == pskModeDHE {
modeOK = true
break
}
}
if !modeOK {
return nil
}
if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) != len(hs.clientHello.pskBinders) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid or missing PSK binders")
}
if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) == 0 {
return nil
}
for i, identity := range hs.clientHello.pskIdentities {
if i >= maxClientPSKIdentities {
break
}
plaintext, _ := c.decryptTicket(identity.label)
if plaintext == nil {
continue
}
sessionState := new(sessionStateTLS13)
if ok := sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext); !ok {
continue
}
if hs.clientHello.earlyData {
if sessionState.maxEarlyData == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: client sent unexpected early data")
}
if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol &&
c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT &&
c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) {
hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true
}
}
createdAt := time.Unix(int64(sessionState.createdAt), 0)
if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
continue
}
// We don't check the obfuscated ticket age because it's affected by
// clock skew and it's only a freshness signal useful for shrinking the
// window for replay attacks, which don't affect us as we don't do 0-RTT.
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(sessionState.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil || pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
continue
}
// PSK connections don't re-establish client certificates, but carry
// them over in the session ticket. Ensure the presence of client certs
// in the ticket is consistent with the configured requirements.
sessionHasClientCerts := len(sessionState.certificate.Certificate) != 0
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
continue
}
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
continue
}
psk := hs.suite.expandLabel(sessionState.resumptionSecret, "resumption",
nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
hs.earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(psk, nil)
binderKey := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil)
// Clone the transcript in case a HelloRetryRequest was recorded.
transcript := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
if transcript == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
}
clientHelloBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
transcript.Write(clientHelloBytes)
pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder")
}
if c.quic != nil && hs.clientHello.earlyData && hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData && i == 0 &&
sessionState.maxEarlyData > 0 && sessionState.cipherSuite == hs.suite.id {
hs.earlyData = true
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
earlyTrafficSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, clientEarlyTrafficLabel, transcript)
c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelEarly, hs.suite.id, earlyTrafficSecret)
}
c.didResume = true
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true
hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i)
hs.usingPSK = true
return nil
}
return nil
}
// cloneHash uses the encoding.BinaryMarshaler and encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler
// interfaces implemented by standard library hashes to clone the state of in
// to a new instance of h. It returns nil if the operation fails.
func cloneHash(in hash.Hash, h crypto.Hash) hash.Hash {
// Recreate the interface to avoid importing encoding.
type binaryMarshaler interface {
MarshalBinary() (data []byte, err error)
UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error
}
marshaler, ok := in.(binaryMarshaler)
if !ok {
return nil
}
state, err := marshaler.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
out := h.New()
unmarshaler, ok := out.(binaryMarshaler)
if !ok {
return nil
}
if err := unmarshaler.UnmarshalBinary(state); err != nil {
return nil
}
return out
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
if hs.usingPSK {
return nil
}
// signature_algorithms is required in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3.
if len(hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) == 0 {
return c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
}
certificate, err := c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
if err != nil {
if err == errNoCertificates {
c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
return err
}
hs.sigAlg, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, certificate, hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
// getCertificate returned a certificate that is unsupported or
// incompatible with the client's signature algorithms.
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
hs.cert = certificate
return nil
}
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
if hs.c.quic != nil {
return nil
}
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
return nil
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
c := hs.c
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
helloRetryRequest := &serverHelloMsg{
vers: hs.hello.vers,
random: helloRetryRequestRandom,
sessionId: hs.hello.sessionId,
cipherSuite: hs.hello.cipherSuite,
compressionMethod: hs.hello.compressionMethod,
supportedVersion: hs.hello.supportedVersion,
selectedGroup: selectedGroup,
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloRetryRequest, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
// clientHelloMsg is not included in the transcript.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
}
if len(clientHello.keyShares) != 1 || clientHello.keyShares[0].group != selectedGroup {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client sent invalid key share in second ClientHello")
}
if clientHello.earlyData {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client indicated early data in second ClientHello")
}
if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello")
}
if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello")
}
hs.clientHello = clientHello
return nil
}
// illegalClientHelloChange reports whether the two ClientHello messages are
// different, with the exception of the changes allowed before and after a
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2.
func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
if len(ch.supportedVersions) != len(ch1.supportedVersions) ||
len(ch.cipherSuites) != len(ch1.cipherSuites) ||
len(ch.supportedCurves) != len(ch1.supportedCurves) ||
len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) ||
len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) ||
len(ch.alpnProtocols) != len(ch1.alpnProtocols) {
return true
}
for i := range ch.supportedVersions {
if ch.supportedVersions[i] != ch1.supportedVersions[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.cipherSuites {
if ch.cipherSuites[i] != ch1.cipherSuites[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.supportedCurves {
if ch.supportedCurves[i] != ch1.supportedCurves[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert {
if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.alpnProtocols {
if ch.alpnProtocols[i] != ch1.alpnProtocols[i] {
return true
}
}
return ch.vers != ch1.vers ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.random, ch1.random) ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionId, ch1.sessionId) ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.compressionMethods, ch1.compressionMethods) ||
ch.serverName != ch1.serverName ||
ch.ocspStapling != ch1.ocspStapling ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.supportedPoints, ch1.supportedPoints) ||
ch.ticketSupported != ch1.ticketSupported ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionTicket, ch1.sessionTicket) ||
ch.secureRenegotiationSupported != ch1.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.secureRenegotiation, ch1.secureRenegotiation) ||
ch.scts != ch1.scts ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.cookie, ch1.cookie) ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.pskModes, ch1.pskModes)
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
if earlySecret == nil {
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
}
hs.handshakeSecret = hs.suite.extract(hs.sharedKey,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, clientSecret)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, serverSecret)
if c.quic != nil {
if c.hand.Len() != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, serverSecret)
c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, clientSecret)
}
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.quic != nil)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return err
}
hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
if c.quic != nil {
p, err := c.quicGetTransportParameters()
if err != nil {
return err
}
hs.encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters = p
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.encryptedExtensions, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) requestClientCert() bool {
return hs.c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert && !hs.usingPSK
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
if hs.usingPSK {
return nil
}
if hs.requestClientCert() {
// Request a client certificate
certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
certReq.ocspStapling = true
certReq.scts = true
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
certMsg.certificate = *hs.cert
certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm = hs.sigAlg
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(hs.sigAlg)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
public := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Public()
if rsaKey, ok := public.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok && sigType == signatureRSAPSS &&
rsaKey.N.BitLen()/8 < sigHash.Size()*2+2 { // key too small for RSA-PSS
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
finished := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, serverSecret)
if c.quic != nil {
if c.hand.Len() != 0 {
// TODO: Handle this in setTrafficSecret?
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.suite.id, serverSecret)
}
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
// If we did not request client certificates, at this point we can
// precompute the client finished and roll the transcript forward to send
// session tickets in our first flight.
if !hs.requestClientCert() {
if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool {
if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return false
}
// QUIC tickets are sent by QUICConn.SendSessionTicket, not automatically.
if hs.c.quic != nil {
return false
}
// Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
if pskMode == pskModeDHE {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
c := hs.c
hs.clientFinished = hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
}
if err := transcriptMsg(finishedMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
return nil
}
return c.sendSessionTicket(false)
}
func (c *Conn) sendSessionTicket(earlyData bool) error {
suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
if suite == nil {
return errors.New("tls: internal error: unknown cipher suite")
}
m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13)
var certsFromClient [][]byte
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
}
state := sessionStateTLS13{
cipherSuite: suite.id,
createdAt: uint64(c.config.time().Unix()),
resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
certificate: Certificate{
Certificate: certsFromClient,
OCSPStaple: c.ocspResponse,
SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts,
},
alpn: c.clientProtocol,
}
if earlyData {
state.maxEarlyData = 0xffffffff
state.appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionTicket()
}
stateBytes, err := state.marshal()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
// because 0-RTT is not supported.
ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if earlyData {
// RFC 9001, Section 4.6.1
m.maxEarlyData = 0xffffffff
}
if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
if !hs.requestClientCert() {
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not
// the server requested a client certificate.
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
// are ready to do it now.
if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
// finishedMsg is not included in the transcript.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
}
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientFinished, finished.verifyData) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash")
}
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.trafficSecret)
return nil
}

366
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_agreement.go generated vendored
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@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/md5"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
)
// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
type keyAgreement interface {
// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
// nil.
generateServerKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
processClientKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
// ServerKeyExchange message.
processServerKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
generateClientKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
}
var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message")
var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message")
// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client
// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key.
type rsaKeyAgreement struct{}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1])
if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:]
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter")
}
// Perform constant time RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption
preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
return preMasterSecret, nil
}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange")
}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8)
preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers)
_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
rsaKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: server certificate contains incorrect key type for selected ciphersuite")
}
encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), rsaKey, preMasterSecret)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2)
ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8)
ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted))
copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted)
return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil
}
// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices.
func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
hsha1 := sha1.New()
for _, slice := range slices {
hsha1.Write(slice)
}
return hsha1.Sum(nil)
}
// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the
// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
hmd5 := md5.New()
for _, slice := range slices {
hmd5.Write(slice)
}
copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil))
copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices))
return md5sha1
}
// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest
// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on
// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't
// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices.
func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte {
if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
var signed []byte
for _, slice := range slices {
signed = append(signed, slice...)
}
return signed
}
if version >= VersionTLS12 {
h := hashFunc.New()
for _, slice := range slices {
h.Write(slice)
}
digest := h.Sum(nil)
return digest
}
if sigType == signatureECDSA {
return sha1Hash(slices)
}
return md5SHA1Hash(slices)
}
// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server
// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The
// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may
// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA.
type ecdheKeyAgreement struct {
version uint16
isRSA bool
key *ecdh.PrivateKey
// ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange
// and returned in generateClientKeyExchange.
ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg
preMasterSecret []byte
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
var curveID CurveID
for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves {
if config.supportsCurve(c) {
curveID = c
break
}
}
if curveID == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered")
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
key, err := generateECDHEKey(config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ka.key = key
// See RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
ecdhePublic := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic))
serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve
serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8)
serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID)
serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic))
copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic)
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey)
}
var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite")
}
signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error())
}
skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg)
sigAndHashLen := 0
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
sigAndHashLen = 2
}
skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig))
copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams)
k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):]
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8)
k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm)
k = k[2:]
}
k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8)
k[1] = byte(len(sig))
copy(k[2:], sig)
return skx, nil
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
peerKey, err := ka.key.Curve().NewPublicKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:])
if err != nil {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
preMasterSecret, err := ka.key.ECDH(peerKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
return preMasterSecret, nil
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
if len(skx.key) < 4 {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
}
curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2])
publicLen := int(skx.key[3])
if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen]
publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:]
sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:]
if len(sig) < 2 {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
}
key, err := generateECDHEKey(config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ka.key = key
peerKey, err := key.Curve().NewPublicKey(publicKey)
if err != nil {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
ka.preMasterSecret, err = key.ECDH(peerKey)
if err != nil {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
ourPublicKey := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey))
ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey))
copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey)
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1])
sig = sig[2:]
if len(sig) < 2 {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1])
if sigLen+2 != len(sig) {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
sig = sig[2:]
signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
return nil
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
if ka.ckx == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message")
}
return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil
}

159
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go generated vendored
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@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/hmac"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
)
// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key
// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7.
const (
resumptionBinderLabel = "res binder"
clientEarlyTrafficLabel = "c e traffic"
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel = "c hs traffic"
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel = "s hs traffic"
clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic"
serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic"
exporterLabel = "exp master"
resumptionLabel = "res master"
trafficUpdateLabel = "traffic upd"
)
// expandLabel implements HKDF-Expand-Label from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []byte, length int) []byte {
var hkdfLabel cryptobyte.Builder
hkdfLabel.AddUint16(uint16(length))
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes([]byte("tls13 "))
b.AddBytes([]byte(label))
})
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(context)
})
hkdfLabelBytes, err := hkdfLabel.Bytes()
if err != nil {
// Rather than calling BytesOrPanic, we explicitly handle this error, in
// order to provide a reasonable error message. It should be basically
// impossible for this to panic, and routing errors back through the
// tree rooted in this function is quite painful. The labels are fixed
// size, and the context is either a fixed-length computed hash, or
// parsed from a field which has the same length limitation. As such, an
// error here is likely to only be caused during development.
//
// NOTE: another reasonable approach here might be to return a
// randomized slice if we encounter an error, which would break the
// connection, but avoid panicking. This would perhaps be safer but
// significantly more confusing to users.
panic(fmt.Errorf("failed to construct HKDF label: %s", err))
}
out := make([]byte, length)
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabelBytes).Read(out)
if err != nil || n != length {
panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
}
return out
}
// deriveSecret implements Derive-Secret from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) deriveSecret(secret []byte, label string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
if transcript == nil {
transcript = c.hash.New()
}
return c.expandLabel(secret, label, transcript.Sum(nil), c.hash.Size())
}
// extract implements HKDF-Extract with the cipher suite hash.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) extract(newSecret, currentSecret []byte) []byte {
if newSecret == nil {
newSecret = make([]byte, c.hash.Size())
}
return hkdf.Extract(c.hash.New, newSecret, currentSecret)
}
// nextTrafficSecret generates the next traffic secret, given the current one,
// according to RFC 8446, Section 7.2.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) nextTrafficSecret(trafficSecret []byte) []byte {
return c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, trafficUpdateLabel, nil, c.hash.Size())
}
// trafficKey generates traffic keys according to RFC 8446, Section 7.3.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
key = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "key", nil, c.keyLen)
iv = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "iv", nil, aeadNonceLength)
return
}
// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according
// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey
// selection.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size())
verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey)
verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
return verifyData.Sum(nil)
}
// exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to
// RFC 8446, Section 7.5.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
expMasterSecret := c.deriveSecret(masterSecret, exporterLabel, transcript)
return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
secret := c.deriveSecret(expMasterSecret, label, nil)
h := c.hash.New()
h.Write(context)
return c.expandLabel(secret, "exporter", h.Sum(nil), length), nil
}
}
// generateECDHEKey returns a PrivateKey that implements Diffie-Hellman
// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2.
func generateECDHEKey(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (*ecdh.PrivateKey, error) {
curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve")
}
return curve.GenerateKey(rand)
}
func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (ecdh.Curve, bool) {
switch id {
case X25519:
return ecdh.X25519(), true
case CurveP256:
return ecdh.P256(), true
case CurveP384:
return ecdh.P384(), true
case CurveP521:
return ecdh.P521(), true
default:
return nil, false
}
}
func curveIDForCurve(curve ecdh.Curve) (CurveID, bool) {
switch curve {
case ecdh.X25519():
return X25519, true
case ecdh.P256():
return CurveP256, true
case ecdh.P384():
return CurveP384, true
case ecdh.P521():
return CurveP521, true
default:
return 0, false
}
}

18
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/notboring.go generated vendored
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@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
func needFIPS() bool { return false }
func supportedSignatureAlgorithms() []SignatureScheme {
return defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms
}
func fipsMinVersion(c *config) uint16 { panic("fipsMinVersion") }
func fipsMaxVersion(c *config) uint16 { panic("fipsMaxVersion") }
func fipsCurvePreferences(c *config) []CurveID { panic("fipsCurvePreferences") }
func fipsCipherSuites(c *config) []uint16 { panic("fipsCipherSuites") }
var fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme

283
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/prf.go generated vendored
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@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/md5"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
)
// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5.
func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) {
s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2]
s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:]
return
}
// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5.
func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) {
h := hmac.New(hash, secret)
h.Write(seed)
a := h.Sum(nil)
j := 0
for j < len(result) {
h.Reset()
h.Write(a)
h.Write(seed)
b := h.Sum(nil)
copy(result[j:], b)
j += len(b)
h.Reset()
h.Write(a)
a = h.Sum(nil)
}
}
// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5.
func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
hashSHA1 := sha1.New
hashMD5 := md5.New
labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
copy(labelAndSeed, label)
copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret)
pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5)
result2 := make([]byte, len(result))
pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1)
for i, b := range result2 {
result[i] ^= b
}
}
// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5.
func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
copy(labelAndSeed, label)
copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc)
}
}
const (
masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1.
finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message.
)
var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret")
var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion")
var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished")
var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished")
func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) {
switch version {
case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11:
return prf10, crypto.Hash(0)
case VersionTLS12:
if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 {
return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384
}
return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256
default:
panic("unknown version")
}
}
func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite)
return prf
}
// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master
// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1.
func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte {
seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom))
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed)
return masterSecret
}
// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master
// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in
// RFC 2246, Section 6.3.
func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) {
seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom))
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen
keyMaterial := make([]byte, n)
prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed)
clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
return
}
func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash {
var buffer []byte
if version >= VersionTLS12 {
buffer = []byte{}
}
prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite)
if hash != 0 {
return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf}
}
return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf}
}
// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable
// for including in a Finished message.
type finishedHash struct {
client hash.Hash
server hash.Hash
// Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required.
clientMD5 hash.Hash
serverMD5 hash.Hash
// In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required.
buffer []byte
version uint16
prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte)
}
func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) {
h.client.Write(msg)
h.server.Write(msg)
if h.version < VersionTLS12 {
h.clientMD5.Write(msg)
h.serverMD5.Write(msg)
}
if h.buffer != nil {
h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...)
}
return len(msg), nil
}
func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte {
if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
return h.client.Sum(nil)
}
out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out)
return h.client.Sum(out)
}
// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's
// Finished message.
func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
return out
}
// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's
// Finished message.
func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
return out
}
// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if
// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate.
func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash) []byte {
if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil {
panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer")
}
if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
return h.buffer
}
if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
hash := hashAlg.New()
hash.Write(h.buffer)
return hash.Sum(nil)
}
if sigType == signatureECDSA {
return h.server.Sum(nil)
}
return h.Sum()
}
// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to
// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages.
func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
h.buffer = nil
}
// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of
// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus
// we wish to fail all key-material export requests.
func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled")
}
// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705.
func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
switch label {
case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion":
// These values are reserved and may not be used.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label)
}
seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom)
if context != nil {
seedLen += 2 + len(context)
}
seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen)
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
if context != nil {
if len(context) >= 1<<16 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long")
}
seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context)))
seed = append(seed, context...)
}
keyMaterial := make([]byte, length)
prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed)
return keyMaterial, nil
}
}

418
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/quic.go generated vendored
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@ -1,418 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
)
// QUICEncryptionLevel represents a QUIC encryption level used to transmit
// handshake messages.
type QUICEncryptionLevel int
const (
QUICEncryptionLevelInitial = QUICEncryptionLevel(iota)
QUICEncryptionLevelEarly
QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake
QUICEncryptionLevelApplication
)
func (l QUICEncryptionLevel) String() string {
switch l {
case QUICEncryptionLevelInitial:
return "Initial"
case QUICEncryptionLevelEarly:
return "Early"
case QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake:
return "Handshake"
case QUICEncryptionLevelApplication:
return "Application"
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("QUICEncryptionLevel(%v)", int(l))
}
}
// A QUICConn represents a connection which uses a QUIC implementation as the underlying
// transport as described in RFC 9001.
//
// Methods of QUICConn are not safe for concurrent use.
type QUICConn struct {
conn *Conn
sessionTicketSent bool
}
// A QUICConfig configures a QUICConn.
type QUICConfig struct {
TLSConfig *Config
ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig
}
// A QUICEventKind is a type of operation on a QUIC connection.
type QUICEventKind int
const (
// QUICNoEvent indicates that there are no events available.
QUICNoEvent QUICEventKind = iota
// QUICSetReadSecret and QUICSetWriteSecret provide the read and write
// secrets for a given encryption level.
// QUICEvent.Level, QUICEvent.Data, and QUICEvent.Suite are set.
//
// Secrets for the Initial encryption level are derived from the initial
// destination connection ID, and are not provided by the QUICConn.
QUICSetReadSecret
QUICSetWriteSecret
// QUICWriteData provides data to send to the peer in CRYPTO frames.
// QUICEvent.Data is set.
QUICWriteData
// QUICTransportParameters provides the peer's QUIC transport parameters.
// QUICEvent.Data is set.
QUICTransportParameters
// QUICTransportParametersRequired indicates that the caller must provide
// QUIC transport parameters to send to the peer. The caller should set
// the transport parameters with QUICConn.SetTransportParameters and call
// QUICConn.NextEvent again.
//
// If transport parameters are set before calling QUICConn.Start, the
// connection will never generate a QUICTransportParametersRequired event.
QUICTransportParametersRequired
// QUICRejectedEarlyData indicates that the server rejected 0-RTT data even
// if we offered it. It's returned before QUICEncryptionLevelApplication
// keys are returned.
QUICRejectedEarlyData
// QUICHandshakeDone indicates that the TLS handshake has completed.
QUICHandshakeDone
)
// A QUICEvent is an event occurring on a QUIC connection.
//
// The type of event is specified by the Kind field.
// The contents of the other fields are kind-specific.
type QUICEvent struct {
Kind QUICEventKind
// Set for QUICSetReadSecret, QUICSetWriteSecret, and QUICWriteData.
Level QUICEncryptionLevel
// Set for QUICTransportParameters, QUICSetReadSecret, QUICSetWriteSecret, and QUICWriteData.
// The contents are owned by crypto/tls, and are valid until the next NextEvent call.
Data []byte
// Set for QUICSetReadSecret and QUICSetWriteSecret.
Suite uint16
}
type quicState struct {
events []QUICEvent
nextEvent int
// eventArr is a statically allocated event array, large enough to handle
// the usual maximum number of events resulting from a single call: transport
// parameters, Initial data, Early read secret, Handshake write and read
// secrets, Handshake data, Application write secret, Application data.
eventArr [8]QUICEvent
started bool
signalc chan struct{} // handshake data is available to be read
blockedc chan struct{} // handshake is waiting for data, closed when done
cancelc <-chan struct{} // handshake has been canceled
cancel context.CancelFunc
// readbuf is shared between HandleData and the handshake goroutine.
// HandshakeCryptoData passes ownership to the handshake goroutine by
// reading from signalc, and reclaims ownership by reading from blockedc.
readbuf []byte
transportParams []byte // to send to the peer
}
// QUICClient returns a new TLS client side connection using QUICTransport as the
// underlying transport. The config cannot be nil.
//
// The config's MinVersion must be at least TLS 1.3.
func QUICClient(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn {
return newQUICConn(Client(nil, config.TLSConfig), config.ExtraConfig)
}
// QUICServer returns a new TLS server side connection using QUICTransport as the
// underlying transport. The config cannot be nil.
//
// The config's MinVersion must be at least TLS 1.3.
func QUICServer(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn {
return newQUICConn(Server(nil, config.TLSConfig), config.ExtraConfig)
}
func newQUICConn(conn *Conn, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *QUICConn {
conn.quic = &quicState{
signalc: make(chan struct{}),
blockedc: make(chan struct{}),
}
conn.quic.events = conn.quic.eventArr[:0]
conn.extraConfig = extraConfig
return &QUICConn{
conn: conn,
}
}
// Start starts the client or server handshake protocol.
// It may produce connection events, which may be read with NextEvent.
//
// Start must be called at most once.
func (q *QUICConn) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
if q.conn.quic.started {
return quicError(errors.New("tls: Start called more than once"))
}
q.conn.quic.started = true
if q.conn.config.MinVersion < VersionTLS13 {
return quicError(errors.New("tls: Config MinVersion must be at least TLS 1.13"))
}
go q.conn.HandshakeContext(ctx)
if _, ok := <-q.conn.quic.blockedc; !ok {
return q.conn.handshakeErr
}
return nil
}
// NextEvent returns the next event occurring on the connection.
// It returns an event with a Kind of QUICNoEvent when no events are available.
func (q *QUICConn) NextEvent() QUICEvent {
qs := q.conn.quic
if last := qs.nextEvent - 1; last >= 0 && len(qs.events[last].Data) > 0 {
// Write over some of the previous event's data,
// to catch callers erroniously retaining it.
qs.events[last].Data[0] = 0
}
if qs.nextEvent >= len(qs.events) {
qs.events = qs.events[:0]
qs.nextEvent = 0
return QUICEvent{Kind: QUICNoEvent}
}
e := qs.events[qs.nextEvent]
qs.events[qs.nextEvent] = QUICEvent{} // zero out references to data
qs.nextEvent++
return e
}
// Close closes the connection and stops any in-progress handshake.
func (q *QUICConn) Close() error {
if q.conn.quic.cancel == nil {
return nil // never started
}
q.conn.quic.cancel()
for range q.conn.quic.blockedc {
// Wait for the handshake goroutine to return.
}
return q.conn.handshakeErr
}
// HandleData handles handshake bytes received from the peer.
// It may produce connection events, which may be read with NextEvent.
func (q *QUICConn) HandleData(level QUICEncryptionLevel, data []byte) error {
c := q.conn
if c.in.level != level {
return quicError(c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: handshake data received at wrong level")))
}
c.quic.readbuf = data
<-c.quic.signalc
_, ok := <-c.quic.blockedc
if ok {
// The handshake goroutine is waiting for more data.
return nil
}
// The handshake goroutine has exited.
c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
c.hand.Write(c.quic.readbuf)
c.quic.readbuf = nil
for q.conn.hand.Len() >= 4 && q.conn.handshakeErr == nil {
b := q.conn.hand.Bytes()
n := int(b[1])<<16 | int(b[2])<<8 | int(b[3])
if n > maxHandshake {
q.conn.handshakeErr = fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshake)
break
}
if len(b) < 4+n {
return nil
}
if err := q.conn.handlePostHandshakeMessage(); err != nil {
q.conn.handshakeErr = err
}
}
if q.conn.handshakeErr != nil {
return quicError(q.conn.handshakeErr)
}
return nil
}
// SendSessionTicket sends a session ticket to the client.
// It produces connection events, which may be read with NextEvent.
// Currently, it can only be called once.
func (q *QUICConn) SendSessionTicket(earlyData bool) error {
c := q.conn
if !c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() {
return quicError(errors.New("tls: SendSessionTicket called before handshake completed"))
}
if c.isClient {
return quicError(errors.New("tls: SendSessionTicket called on the client"))
}
if q.sessionTicketSent {
return quicError(errors.New("tls: SendSessionTicket called multiple times"))
}
q.sessionTicketSent = true
return quicError(c.sendSessionTicket(earlyData))
}
// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection.
func (q *QUICConn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
return q.conn.ConnectionState()
}
// SetTransportParameters sets the transport parameters to send to the peer.
//
// Server connections may delay setting the transport parameters until after
// receiving the client's transport parameters. See QUICTransportParametersRequired.
func (q *QUICConn) SetTransportParameters(params []byte) {
if params == nil {
params = []byte{}
}
q.conn.quic.transportParams = params
if q.conn.quic.started {
<-q.conn.quic.signalc
<-q.conn.quic.blockedc
}
}
// quicError ensures err is an AlertError.
// If err is not already, quicError wraps it with alertInternalError.
func quicError(err error) error {
if err == nil {
return nil
}
var ae AlertError
if errors.As(err, &ae) {
return err
}
var a alert
if !errors.As(err, &a) {
a = alertInternalError
}
// Return an error wrapping the original error and an AlertError.
// Truncate the text of the alert to 0 characters.
return fmt.Errorf("%w%.0w", err, AlertError(a))
}
func (c *Conn) quicReadHandshakeBytes(n int) error {
for c.hand.Len() < n {
if err := c.quicWaitForSignal(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) quicSetReadSecret(level QUICEncryptionLevel, suite uint16, secret []byte) {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICSetReadSecret,
Level: level,
Suite: suite,
Data: secret,
})
}
func (c *Conn) quicSetWriteSecret(level QUICEncryptionLevel, suite uint16, secret []byte) {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICSetWriteSecret,
Level: level,
Suite: suite,
Data: secret,
})
}
func (c *Conn) quicWriteCryptoData(level QUICEncryptionLevel, data []byte) {
var last *QUICEvent
if len(c.quic.events) > 0 {
last = &c.quic.events[len(c.quic.events)-1]
}
if last == nil || last.Kind != QUICWriteData || last.Level != level {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICWriteData,
Level: level,
})
last = &c.quic.events[len(c.quic.events)-1]
}
last.Data = append(last.Data, data...)
}
func (c *Conn) quicSetTransportParameters(params []byte) {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICTransportParameters,
Data: params,
})
}
func (c *Conn) quicGetTransportParameters() ([]byte, error) {
if c.quic.transportParams == nil {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICTransportParametersRequired,
})
}
for c.quic.transportParams == nil {
if err := c.quicWaitForSignal(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return c.quic.transportParams, nil
}
func (c *Conn) quicHandshakeComplete() {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICHandshakeDone,
})
}
func (c *Conn) quicRejectedEarlyData() {
c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{
Kind: QUICRejectedEarlyData,
})
}
// quicWaitForSignal notifies the QUICConn that handshake progress is blocked,
// and waits for a signal that the handshake should proceed.
//
// The handshake may become blocked waiting for handshake bytes
// or for the user to provide transport parameters.
func (c *Conn) quicWaitForSignal() error {
// Drop the handshake mutex while blocked to allow the user
// to call ConnectionState before the handshake completes.
c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
defer c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
// Send on blockedc to notify the QUICConn that the handshake is blocked.
// Exported methods of QUICConn wait for the handshake to become blocked
// before returning to the user.
select {
case c.quic.blockedc <- struct{}{}:
case <-c.quic.cancelc:
return c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify)
}
// The QUICConn reads from signalc to notify us that the handshake may
// be able to proceed. (The QUICConn reads, because we close signalc to
// indicate that the handshake has completed.)
select {
case c.quic.signalc <- struct{}{}:
c.hand.Write(c.quic.readbuf)
c.quic.readbuf = nil
case <-c.quic.cancelc:
return c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify)
}
return nil
}

203
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"io"
)
// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session
// ticket in order to later resume a connection.
type sessionState struct {
vers uint16
cipherSuite uint16
createdAt uint64
masterSecret []byte // opaque master_secret<1..2^16-1>;
// struct { opaque certificate<1..2^24-1> } Certificate;
certificates [][]byte // Certificate certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
// usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from
// was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed.
usedOldKey bool
}
func (m *sessionState) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(m.vers)
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.masterSecret)
})
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
for _, cert := range m.certificates {
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(cert)
})
}
})
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
*m = sessionState{usedOldKey: m.usedOldKey}
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
if ok := s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) &&
s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.masterSecret) &&
len(m.masterSecret) != 0; !ok {
return false
}
var certList cryptobyte.String
if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) {
return false
}
for !certList.Empty() {
var cert []byte
if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) {
return false
}
m.certificates = append(m.certificates, cert)
}
return s.Empty()
}
// sessionStateTLS13 is the content of a TLS 1.3 session ticket. Its first
// version (revision = 0) doesn't carry any of the information needed for 0-RTT
// validation and the nonce is always empty.
// version (revision = 1) carries the max_early_data_size sent in the ticket.
// version (revision = 2) carries the ALPN sent in the ticket.
type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
// uint8 version = 0x0304;
// uint8 revision = 2;
cipherSuite uint16
createdAt uint64
resumptionSecret []byte // opaque resumption_master_secret<1..2^8-1>;
certificate Certificate // CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
maxEarlyData uint32
alpn string
appData []byte
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
b.AddUint8(2) // revision
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.resumptionSecret)
})
marshalCertificate(&b, m.certificate)
b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData)
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpn))
})
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.appData)
})
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
*m = sessionStateTLS13{}
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
var version uint16
var revision uint8
var alpn []byte
ret := s.ReadUint16(&version) &&
version == VersionTLS13 &&
s.ReadUint8(&revision) &&
revision == 2 &&
s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.resumptionSecret) &&
len(m.resumptionSecret) != 0 &&
unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) &&
s.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) &&
readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &alpn) &&
readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.appData) &&
s.Empty()
m.alpn = string(alpn)
return ret
}
func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(c.ticketKeys) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: session ticket keys unavailable")
}
encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size)
keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
key := c.ticketKeys[0]
copy(keyName, key.keyName[:])
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error())
}
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
mac.Sum(macBytes[:0])
return encrypted, nil
}
func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) {
if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size {
return nil, false
}
keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]
keyIndex := -1
for i, candidateKey := range c.ticketKeys {
if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) {
keyIndex = i
break
}
}
if keyIndex == -1 {
return nil, false
}
key := &c.ticketKeys[keyIndex]
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
expected := mac.Sum(nil)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 {
return nil, false
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
return plaintext, keyIndex > 0
}

356
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// package qtls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246,
// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446.
package qtls
// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures
// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1
// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"strings"
)
// Server returns a new TLS server side connection
// using conn as the underlying transport.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
c := &Conn{
conn: conn,
config: fromConfig(config),
}
c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake
return c
}
// Client returns a new TLS client side connection
// using conn as the underlying transport.
// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or
// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
c := &Conn{
conn: conn,
config: fromConfig(config),
isClient: true,
}
c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake
return c
}
// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections.
type listener struct {
net.Listener
config *Config
}
// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection.
// The returned connection is of type *Conn.
func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return Server(c, l.config), nil
}
// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner
// Listener and wraps each connection with Server.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config) net.Listener {
l := new(listener)
l.Listener = inner
l.config = config
return l
}
// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the
// given network address using net.Listen.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config) (net.Listener, error) {
if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 &&
config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config")
}
l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewListener(l, config), nil
}
type timeoutError struct{}
func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" }
func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true }
func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and
// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any
// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS
// handshake as a whole.
//
// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults.
//
// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
// use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer.
func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config)
}
func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
if netDialer.Timeout != 0 {
var cancel context.CancelFunc
ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout)
defer cancel()
}
if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
var cancel context.CancelFunc
ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline)
defer cancel()
}
rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
if colonPos == -1 {
colonPos = len(addr)
}
hostname := addr[:colonPos]
if config == nil {
config = defaultConfig()
}
// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
// from the hostname we're connecting to.
if config.ServerName == "" {
// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
c := config.Clone()
c.ServerName = hostname
config = c
}
conn := Client(rawConn, config)
if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
rawConn.Close()
return nil, err
}
return conn, nil
}
// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial
// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting
// TLS connection.
// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to
// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config
// for the defaults.
func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) {
return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config)
}
// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the
// underlying connection.
type Dialer struct {
// NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections'
// underlying TCP connections.
// A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value.
NetDialer *net.Dialer
// Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections.
// A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the
// defaults.
Config *Config
}
// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
//
// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
//
// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
// use DialContext.
func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr)
}
func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer {
if d.NetDialer != nil {
return d.NetDialer
}
return new(net.Dialer)
}
// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
//
// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before
// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully
// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the
// connection.
//
// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config)
if err != nil {
// Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface.
return nil, err
}
return c, nil
}
// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair
// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file
// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to
// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will
// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) {
certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
if err != nil {
return Certificate{}, err
}
keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
if err != nil {
return Certificate{}, err
}
return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock)
}
// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because
// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) {
fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err }
var cert Certificate
var skippedBlockTypes []string
for {
var certDERBlock *pem.Block
certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock)
if certDERBlock == nil {
break
}
if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes)
} else {
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type)
}
}
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input"))
}
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") {
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched"))
}
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
}
skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0]
var keyDERBlock *pem.Block
for {
keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock)
if keyDERBlock == nil {
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input"))
}
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" {
return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key"))
}
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
}
if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
break
}
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type)
}
// We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway
// to check that it looks sane and matches the private key.
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
return fail(err)
}
cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return fail(err)
}
switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
}
if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
}
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
}
if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
}
case ed25519.PublicKey:
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
}
if !bytes.Equal(priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), pub) {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
}
default:
return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm"))
}
return cert, nil
}
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys.
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey:
return key, nil
default:
return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
}
}
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key")
}

101
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
package qtls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"reflect"
"unsafe"
)
func init() {
if !structsEqual(&tls.ConnectionState{}, &connectionState{}) {
panic("qtls.ConnectionState doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientSessionState{}, &clientSessionState{}) {
panic("qtls.ClientSessionState doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.CertificateRequestInfo{}, &certificateRequestInfo{}) {
panic("qtls.CertificateRequestInfo doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.Config{}, &config{}) {
panic("qtls.Config doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientHelloInfo{}, &clientHelloInfo{}) {
panic("qtls.ClientHelloInfo doesn't match")
}
}
func toConnectionState(c connectionState) ConnectionState {
return *(*ConnectionState)(unsafe.Pointer(&c))
}
func toClientSessionState(s *clientSessionState) *ClientSessionState {
return (*ClientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
}
func fromClientSessionState(s *ClientSessionState) *clientSessionState {
return (*clientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
}
func toCertificateRequestInfo(i *certificateRequestInfo) *CertificateRequestInfo {
return (*CertificateRequestInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(i))
}
func toConfig(c *config) *Config {
return (*Config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
}
func fromConfig(c *Config) *config {
return (*config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
}
func toClientHelloInfo(chi *clientHelloInfo) *ClientHelloInfo {
return (*ClientHelloInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(chi))
}
func structsEqual(a, b interface{}) bool {
return compare(reflect.ValueOf(a), reflect.ValueOf(b))
}
func compare(a, b reflect.Value) bool {
sa := a.Elem()
sb := b.Elem()
if sa.NumField() != sb.NumField() {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < sa.NumField(); i++ {
fa := sa.Type().Field(i)
fb := sb.Type().Field(i)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
if fa.Type.Kind() != fb.Type.Kind() {
return false
}
if fa.Type.Kind() == reflect.Slice {
if !compareStruct(fa.Type.Elem(), fb.Type.Elem()) {
return false
}
continue
}
return false
}
}
return true
}
func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool {
if a.NumField() != b.NumField() {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < a.NumField(); i++ {
fa := a.Field(i)
fb := b.Field(i)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// InitSessionTicketKeys triggers the initialization of session ticket keys.
func InitSessionTicketKeys(conf *Config) {
fromConfig(conf).ticketKeys(nil)
}

18
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/.golangci.yml generated vendored
View File

@ -3,15 +3,15 @@ run:
- internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go - internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go
linters-settings: linters-settings:
depguard: depguard:
type: blacklist rules:
packages: qtls:
- github.com/marten-seemann/qtls list-mode: lax
- github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 files:
- github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 - "!internal/qtls/**"
packages-with-error-message: - "$all"
- github.com/marten-seemann/qtls: "importing qtls only allowed in internal/qtls" deny:
- github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19: "importing qtls only allowed in internal/qtls" - pkg: github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20
- github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20: "importing qtls only allowed in internal/qtls" desc: "importing qtls only allowed in internal/qtls"
misspell: misspell:
ignore-words: ignore-words:
- ect - ect

10
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md generated vendored
View File

@ -227,12 +227,13 @@ http.Client{
## Projects using quic-go ## Projects using quic-go
| Project | Description | Stars | | Project | Description | Stars |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [AdGuardHome](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome) | Free and open source, powerful network-wide ads & trackers blocking DNS server. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome?style=flat-square) | | [AdGuardHome](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome) | Free and open source, powerful network-wide ads & trackers blocking DNS server. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome?style=flat-square) |
| [algernon](https://github.com/xyproto/algernon) | Small self-contained pure-Go web server with Lua, Markdown, HTTP/2, QUIC, Redis and PostgreSQL support | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/xyproto/algernon?style=flat-square) | | [algernon](https://github.com/xyproto/algernon) | Small self-contained pure-Go web server with Lua, Markdown, HTTP/2, QUIC, Redis and PostgreSQL support | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/xyproto/algernon?style=flat-square) |
| [caddy](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/) | Fast, multi-platform web server with automatic HTTPS | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/caddyserver/caddy?style=flat-square) | | [caddy](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/) | Fast, multi-platform web server with automatic HTTPS | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/caddyserver/caddy?style=flat-square) |
| [cloudflared](https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared) | A tunneling daemon that proxies traffic from the Cloudflare network to your origins | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/cloudflare/cloudflared?style=flat-square) | | [cloudflared](https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared) | A tunneling daemon that proxies traffic from the Cloudflare network to your origins | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/cloudflare/cloudflared?style=flat-square) |
| [go-libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p) | libp2p implementation in Go, powering [Kubo](https://github.com/ipfs/kubo) (IPFS) and [Lotus](https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus) (Filecoin), among others | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/libp2p/go-libp2p?style=flat-square) | | [go-libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p) | libp2p implementation in Go, powering [Kubo](https://github.com/ipfs/kubo) (IPFS) and [Lotus](https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus) (Filecoin), among others | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/libp2p/go-libp2p?style=flat-square) |
| [gost](https://github.com/go-gost/gost) | A simple security tunnel written in Go | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/go-gost/gost?style=flat-square) |
| [Hysteria](https://github.com/apernet/hysteria) | A powerful, lightning fast and censorship resistant proxy | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/apernet/hysteria?style=flat-square) | | [Hysteria](https://github.com/apernet/hysteria) | A powerful, lightning fast and censorship resistant proxy | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/apernet/hysteria?style=flat-square) |
| [Mercure](https://github.com/dunglas/mercure) | An open, easy, fast, reliable and battery-efficient solution for real-time communications | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/dunglas/mercure?style=flat-square) | | [Mercure](https://github.com/dunglas/mercure) | An open, easy, fast, reliable and battery-efficient solution for real-time communications | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/dunglas/mercure?style=flat-square) |
| [OONI Probe](https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli) | Next generation OONI Probe. Library and CLI tool. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ooni/probe-cli?style=flat-square) | | [OONI Probe](https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli) | Next generation OONI Probe. Library and CLI tool. | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ooni/probe-cli?style=flat-square) |
@ -247,11 +248,6 @@ If you'd like to see your project added to this list, please send us a PR.
quic-go always aims to support the latest two Go releases. quic-go always aims to support the latest two Go releases.
### Dependency on forked crypto/tls
Since the standard library didn't provide any QUIC APIs before the Go 1.21 release, we had to fork crypto/tls to add the required APIs ourselves: [qtls for Go 1.20](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20).
This had led to a lot of pain in the Go ecosystem, and we're happy that we can rely on Go 1.21 going forward.
## Contributing ## Contributing
We are always happy to welcome new contributors! We have a number of self-contained issues that are suitable for first-time contributors, they are tagged with [help wanted](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22help+wanted%22). If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out by opening an issue or leaving a comment. We are always happy to welcome new contributors! We have a number of self-contained issues that are suitable for first-time contributors, they are tagged with [help wanted](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22help+wanted%22). If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out by opening an issue or leaving a comment.

3
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/conn_id_generator.go generated vendored
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire"
) )
@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ func (m *connIDGenerator) SetMaxActiveConnIDs(limit uint64) error {
// transport parameter. // transport parameter.
// We currently don't send the preferred_address transport parameter, // We currently don't send the preferred_address transport parameter,
// so we can issue (limit - 1) connection IDs. // so we can issue (limit - 1) connection IDs.
for i := uint64(len(m.activeSrcConnIDs)); i < utils.Min(limit, protocol.MaxIssuedConnectionIDs); i++ { for i := uint64(len(m.activeSrcConnIDs)); i < min(limit, protocol.MaxIssuedConnectionIDs); i++ {
if err := m.issueNewConnID(); err != nil { if err := m.issueNewConnID(); err != nil {
return err return err
} }

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/conn_id_manager.go generated vendored
View File

@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func (h *connIDManager) updateConnectionID() {
h.queueControlFrame(&wire.RetireConnectionIDFrame{ h.queueControlFrame(&wire.RetireConnectionIDFrame{
SequenceNumber: h.activeSequenceNumber, SequenceNumber: h.activeSequenceNumber,
}) })
h.highestRetired = utils.Max(h.highestRetired, h.activeSequenceNumber) h.highestRetired = max(h.highestRetired, h.activeSequenceNumber)
if h.activeStatelessResetToken != nil { if h.activeStatelessResetToken != nil {
h.removeStatelessResetToken(*h.activeStatelessResetToken) h.removeStatelessResetToken(*h.activeStatelessResetToken)
} }

27
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/connection.go generated vendored
View File

@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ runLoop:
sendQueueAvailable = s.sendQueue.Available() sendQueueAvailable = s.sendQueue.Available()
continue continue
} }
if err := s.triggerSending(); err != nil { if err := s.triggerSending(now); err != nil {
s.closeLocal(err) s.closeLocal(err)
} }
if s.sendQueue.WouldBlock() { if s.sendQueue.WouldBlock() {
@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ func (s *connection) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
// Time when the connection should time out // Time when the connection should time out
func (s *connection) nextIdleTimeoutTime() time.Time { func (s *connection) nextIdleTimeoutTime() time.Time {
idleTimeout := utils.Max(s.idleTimeout, s.rttStats.PTO(true)*3) idleTimeout := max(s.idleTimeout, s.rttStats.PTO(true)*3)
return s.idleTimeoutStartTime().Add(idleTimeout) return s.idleTimeoutStartTime().Add(idleTimeout)
} }
@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ func (s *connection) nextKeepAliveTime() time.Time {
if s.config.KeepAlivePeriod == 0 || s.keepAlivePingSent || !s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime.IsZero() { if s.config.KeepAlivePeriod == 0 || s.keepAlivePingSent || !s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime.IsZero() {
return time.Time{} return time.Time{}
} }
keepAliveInterval := utils.Max(s.keepAliveInterval, s.rttStats.PTO(true)*3/2) keepAliveInterval := max(s.keepAliveInterval, s.rttStats.PTO(true)*3/2)
return s.lastPacketReceivedTime.Add(keepAliveInterval) return s.lastPacketReceivedTime.Add(keepAliveInterval)
} }
@ -731,6 +731,10 @@ func (s *connection) handleHandshakeComplete() error {
s.connIDManager.SetHandshakeComplete() s.connIDManager.SetHandshakeComplete()
s.connIDGenerator.SetHandshakeComplete() s.connIDGenerator.SetHandshakeComplete()
if s.tracer != nil && s.tracer.ChoseALPN != nil {
s.tracer.ChoseALPN(s.cryptoStreamHandler.ConnectionState().NegotiatedProtocol)
}
// The server applies transport parameters right away, but the client side has to wait for handshake completion. // The server applies transport parameters right away, but the client side has to wait for handshake completion.
// During a 0-RTT connection, the client is only allowed to use the new transport parameters for 1-RTT packets. // During a 0-RTT connection, the client is only allowed to use the new transport parameters for 1-RTT packets.
if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
@ -776,7 +780,7 @@ func (s *connection) handleHandshakeConfirmed() error {
if maxPacketSize == 0 { if maxPacketSize == 0 {
maxPacketSize = protocol.MaxByteCount maxPacketSize = protocol.MaxByteCount
} }
s.mtuDiscoverer.Start(utils.Min(maxPacketSize, protocol.MaxPacketBufferSize)) s.mtuDiscoverer.Start(min(maxPacketSize, protocol.MaxPacketBufferSize))
} }
return nil return nil
} }
@ -1751,7 +1755,7 @@ func (s *connection) applyTransportParameters() {
params := s.peerParams params := s.peerParams
// Our local idle timeout will always be > 0. // Our local idle timeout will always be > 0.
s.idleTimeout = utils.MinNonZeroDuration(s.config.MaxIdleTimeout, params.MaxIdleTimeout) s.idleTimeout = utils.MinNonZeroDuration(s.config.MaxIdleTimeout, params.MaxIdleTimeout)
s.keepAliveInterval = utils.Min(s.config.KeepAlivePeriod, utils.Min(s.idleTimeout/2, protocol.MaxKeepAliveInterval)) s.keepAliveInterval = min(s.config.KeepAlivePeriod, min(s.idleTimeout/2, protocol.MaxKeepAliveInterval))
s.streamsMap.UpdateLimits(params) s.streamsMap.UpdateLimits(params)
s.frameParser.SetAckDelayExponent(params.AckDelayExponent) s.frameParser.SetAckDelayExponent(params.AckDelayExponent)
s.connFlowController.UpdateSendWindow(params.InitialMaxData) s.connFlowController.UpdateSendWindow(params.InitialMaxData)
@ -1767,9 +1771,8 @@ func (s *connection) applyTransportParameters() {
} }
} }
func (s *connection) triggerSending() error { func (s *connection) triggerSending(now time.Time) error {
s.pacingDeadline = time.Time{} s.pacingDeadline = time.Time{}
now := time.Now()
sendMode := s.sentPacketHandler.SendMode(now) sendMode := s.sentPacketHandler.SendMode(now)
//nolint:exhaustive // No need to handle pacing limited here. //nolint:exhaustive // No need to handle pacing limited here.
@ -1801,7 +1804,7 @@ func (s *connection) triggerSending() error {
s.scheduleSending() s.scheduleSending()
return nil return nil
} }
return s.triggerSending() return s.triggerSending(now)
case ackhandler.SendPTOHandshake: case ackhandler.SendPTOHandshake:
if err := s.sendProbePacket(protocol.EncryptionHandshake, now); err != nil { if err := s.sendProbePacket(protocol.EncryptionHandshake, now); err != nil {
return err return err
@ -1810,7 +1813,7 @@ func (s *connection) triggerSending() error {
s.scheduleSending() s.scheduleSending()
return nil return nil
} }
return s.triggerSending() return s.triggerSending(now)
case ackhandler.SendPTOAppData: case ackhandler.SendPTOAppData:
if err := s.sendProbePacket(protocol.Encryption1RTT, now); err != nil { if err := s.sendProbePacket(protocol.Encryption1RTT, now); err != nil {
return err return err
@ -1819,7 +1822,7 @@ func (s *connection) triggerSending() error {
s.scheduleSending() s.scheduleSending()
return nil return nil
} }
return s.triggerSending() return s.triggerSending(now)
default: default:
return fmt.Errorf("BUG: invalid send mode %d", sendMode) return fmt.Errorf("BUG: invalid send mode %d", sendMode)
} }
@ -1988,7 +1991,7 @@ func (s *connection) maybeSendAckOnlyPacket(now time.Time) error {
if packet == nil { if packet == nil {
return nil return nil
} }
return s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, ecn, time.Now()) return s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, ecn, now)
} }
ecn := s.sentPacketHandler.ECNMode(true) ecn := s.sentPacketHandler.ECNMode(true)
@ -2356,7 +2359,7 @@ func (s *connection) SendDatagram(p []byte) error {
} }
f.Data = make([]byte, len(p)) f.Data = make([]byte, len(p))
copy(f.Data, p) copy(f.Data, p)
return s.datagramQueue.AddAndWait(f) return s.datagramQueue.Add(f)
} }
func (s *connection) ReceiveDatagram(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) { func (s *connection) ReceiveDatagram(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) {

5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream.go generated vendored
View File

@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire"
) )
@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) HandleCryptoFrame(f *wire.CryptoFrame) error {
// could e.g. be a retransmission // could e.g. be a retransmission
return nil return nil
} }
s.highestOffset = utils.Max(s.highestOffset, highestOffset) s.highestOffset = max(s.highestOffset, highestOffset)
if err := s.queue.Push(f.Data, f.Offset, nil); err != nil { if err := s.queue.Push(f.Data, f.Offset, nil); err != nil {
return err return err
} }
@ -99,7 +98,7 @@ func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) HasData() bool {
func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) PopCryptoFrame(maxLen protocol.ByteCount) *wire.CryptoFrame { func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) PopCryptoFrame(maxLen protocol.ByteCount) *wire.CryptoFrame {
f := &wire.CryptoFrame{Offset: s.writeOffset} f := &wire.CryptoFrame{Offset: s.writeOffset}
n := utils.Min(f.MaxDataLen(maxLen), protocol.ByteCount(len(s.writeBuf))) n := min(f.MaxDataLen(maxLen), protocol.ByteCount(len(s.writeBuf)))
f.Data = s.writeBuf[:n] f.Data = s.writeBuf[:n]
s.writeBuf = s.writeBuf[n:] s.writeBuf = s.writeBuf[n:]
s.writeOffset += n s.writeOffset += n

87
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/datagram_queue.go generated vendored
View File

@ -4,14 +4,20 @@ import (
"context" "context"
"sync" "sync"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/ringbuffer"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire"
) )
const (
maxDatagramSendQueueLen = 32
maxDatagramRcvQueueLen = 128
)
type datagramQueue struct { type datagramQueue struct {
sendQueue chan *wire.DatagramFrame sendMx sync.Mutex
nextFrame *wire.DatagramFrame sendQueue ringbuffer.RingBuffer[*wire.DatagramFrame]
sent chan struct{} // used to notify Add that a datagram was dequeued
rcvMx sync.Mutex rcvMx sync.Mutex
rcvQueue [][]byte rcvQueue [][]byte
@ -22,60 +28,65 @@ type datagramQueue struct {
hasData func() hasData func()
dequeued chan struct{}
logger utils.Logger logger utils.Logger
} }
func newDatagramQueue(hasData func(), logger utils.Logger) *datagramQueue { func newDatagramQueue(hasData func(), logger utils.Logger) *datagramQueue {
return &datagramQueue{ return &datagramQueue{
hasData: hasData, hasData: hasData,
sendQueue: make(chan *wire.DatagramFrame, 1), rcvd: make(chan struct{}, 1),
rcvd: make(chan struct{}, 1), sent: make(chan struct{}, 1),
dequeued: make(chan struct{}), closed: make(chan struct{}),
closed: make(chan struct{}), logger: logger,
logger: logger,
} }
} }
// AddAndWait queues a new DATAGRAM frame for sending. // Add queues a new DATAGRAM frame for sending.
// It blocks until the frame has been dequeued. // Up to 32 DATAGRAM frames will be queued.
func (h *datagramQueue) AddAndWait(f *wire.DatagramFrame) error { // Once that limit is reached, Add blocks until the queue size has reduced.
select { func (h *datagramQueue) Add(f *wire.DatagramFrame) error {
case h.sendQueue <- f: h.sendMx.Lock()
h.hasData()
case <-h.closed:
return h.closeErr
}
select { for {
case <-h.dequeued: if h.sendQueue.Len() < maxDatagramSendQueueLen {
return nil h.sendQueue.PushBack(f)
case <-h.closed: h.sendMx.Unlock()
return h.closeErr h.hasData()
return nil
}
select {
case <-h.sent: // drain the queue so we don't loop immediately
default:
}
h.sendMx.Unlock()
select {
case <-h.closed:
return h.closeErr
case <-h.sent:
}
h.sendMx.Lock()
} }
} }
// Peek gets the next DATAGRAM frame for sending. // Peek gets the next DATAGRAM frame for sending.
// If actually sent out, Pop needs to be called before the next call to Peek. // If actually sent out, Pop needs to be called before the next call to Peek.
func (h *datagramQueue) Peek() *wire.DatagramFrame { func (h *datagramQueue) Peek() *wire.DatagramFrame {
if h.nextFrame != nil { h.sendMx.Lock()
return h.nextFrame defer h.sendMx.Unlock()
} if h.sendQueue.Empty() {
select {
case h.nextFrame = <-h.sendQueue:
h.dequeued <- struct{}{}
default:
return nil return nil
} }
return h.nextFrame return h.sendQueue.PeekFront()
} }
func (h *datagramQueue) Pop() { func (h *datagramQueue) Pop() {
if h.nextFrame == nil { h.sendMx.Lock()
panic("datagramQueue BUG: Pop called for nil frame") defer h.sendMx.Unlock()
_ = h.sendQueue.PopFront()
select {
case h.sent <- struct{}{}:
default:
} }
h.nextFrame = nil
} }
// HandleDatagramFrame handles a received DATAGRAM frame. // HandleDatagramFrame handles a received DATAGRAM frame.
@ -84,7 +95,7 @@ func (h *datagramQueue) HandleDatagramFrame(f *wire.DatagramFrame) {
copy(data, f.Data) copy(data, f.Data)
var queued bool var queued bool
h.rcvMx.Lock() h.rcvMx.Lock()
if len(h.rcvQueue) < protocol.DatagramRcvQueueLen { if len(h.rcvQueue) < maxDatagramRcvQueueLen {
h.rcvQueue = append(h.rcvQueue, data) h.rcvQueue = append(h.rcvQueue, data)
queued = true queued = true
select { select {
@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ func (h *datagramQueue) HandleDatagramFrame(f *wire.DatagramFrame) {
} }
h.rcvMx.Unlock() h.rcvMx.Unlock()
if !queued && h.logger.Debug() { if !queued && h.logger.Debug() {
h.logger.Debugf("Discarding DATAGRAM frame (%d bytes payload)", len(f.Data)) h.logger.Debugf("Discarding received DATAGRAM frame (%d bytes payload)", len(f.Data))
} }
} }

37
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/framer.go generated vendored
View File

@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ type framer interface {
Handle0RTTRejection() error Handle0RTTRejection() error
} }
const maxPathResponses = 256
type framerI struct { type framerI struct {
mutex sync.Mutex mutex sync.Mutex
@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ type framerI struct {
controlFrameMutex sync.Mutex controlFrameMutex sync.Mutex
controlFrames []wire.Frame controlFrames []wire.Frame
pathResponses []*wire.PathResponseFrame
} }
var _ framer = &framerI{} var _ framer = &framerI{}
@ -52,20 +55,43 @@ func (f *framerI) HasData() bool {
return true return true
} }
f.controlFrameMutex.Lock() f.controlFrameMutex.Lock()
hasData = len(f.controlFrames) > 0 defer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()
f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock() return len(f.controlFrames) > 0 || len(f.pathResponses) > 0
return hasData
} }
func (f *framerI) QueueControlFrame(frame wire.Frame) { func (f *framerI) QueueControlFrame(frame wire.Frame) {
f.controlFrameMutex.Lock() f.controlFrameMutex.Lock()
defer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()
if pr, ok := frame.(*wire.PathResponseFrame); ok {
// Only queue up to maxPathResponses PATH_RESPONSE frames.
// This limit should be high enough to never be hit in practice,
// unless the peer is doing something malicious.
if len(f.pathResponses) >= maxPathResponses {
return
}
f.pathResponses = append(f.pathResponses, pr)
return
}
f.controlFrames = append(f.controlFrames, frame) f.controlFrames = append(f.controlFrames, frame)
f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()
} }
func (f *framerI) AppendControlFrames(frames []ackhandler.Frame, maxLen protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.VersionNumber) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) { func (f *framerI) AppendControlFrames(frames []ackhandler.Frame, maxLen protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.VersionNumber) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) {
var length protocol.ByteCount
f.controlFrameMutex.Lock() f.controlFrameMutex.Lock()
defer f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()
var length protocol.ByteCount
// add a PATH_RESPONSE first, but only pack a single PATH_RESPONSE per packet
if len(f.pathResponses) > 0 {
frame := f.pathResponses[0]
frameLen := frame.Length(v)
if frameLen <= maxLen {
frames = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: frame})
length += frameLen
f.pathResponses = f.pathResponses[1:]
}
}
for len(f.controlFrames) > 0 { for len(f.controlFrames) > 0 {
frame := f.controlFrames[len(f.controlFrames)-1] frame := f.controlFrames[len(f.controlFrames)-1]
frameLen := frame.Length(v) frameLen := frame.Length(v)
@ -76,7 +102,6 @@ func (f *framerI) AppendControlFrames(frames []ackhandler.Frame, maxLen protocol
length += frameLen length += frameLen
f.controlFrames = f.controlFrames[:len(f.controlFrames)-1] f.controlFrames = f.controlFrames[:len(f.controlFrames)-1]
} }
f.controlFrameMutex.Unlock()
return frames, length return frames, length
} }

8
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/interface.go generated vendored
View File

@ -187,8 +187,12 @@ type Connection interface {
// Warning: This API should not be considered stable and might change soon. // Warning: This API should not be considered stable and might change soon.
ConnectionState() ConnectionState ConnectionState() ConnectionState
// SendDatagram sends a message as a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221. // SendDatagram sends a message using a QUIC datagram, as specified in RFC 9221.
SendDatagram([]byte) error // There is no delivery guarantee for DATAGRAM frames, they are not retransmitted if lost.
// The payload of the datagram needs to fit into a single QUIC packet.
// In addition, a datagram may be dropped before being sent out if the available packet size suddenly decreases.
// If the payload is too large to be sent at the current time, a DatagramTooLargeError is returned.
SendDatagram(payload []byte) error
// ReceiveDatagram gets a message received in a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221. // ReceiveDatagram gets a message received in a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221.
ReceiveDatagram(context.Context) ([]byte, error) ReceiveDatagram(context.Context) ([]byte, error)
} }

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/packet_number_generator.go generated vendored
View File

@ -80,5 +80,5 @@ func (p *skippingPacketNumberGenerator) Pop() (bool, protocol.PacketNumber) {
func (p *skippingPacketNumberGenerator) generateNewSkip() { func (p *skippingPacketNumberGenerator) generateNewSkip() {
// make sure that there are never two consecutive packet numbers that are skipped // make sure that there are never two consecutive packet numbers that are skipped
p.nextToSkip = p.next + 3 + protocol.PacketNumber(p.rng.Int31n(int32(2*p.period))) p.nextToSkip = p.next + 3 + protocol.PacketNumber(p.rng.Int31n(int32(2*p.period)))
p.period = utils.Min(2*p.period, p.maxPeriod) p.period = min(2*p.period, p.maxPeriod)
} }

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/received_packet_tracker.go generated vendored
View File

@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ func (h *receivedPacketTracker) GetAckFrame(onlyIfQueued bool) *wire.AckFrame {
ack = &wire.AckFrame{} ack = &wire.AckFrame{}
} }
ack.Reset() ack.Reset()
ack.DelayTime = utils.Max(0, now.Sub(h.largestObservedRcvdTime)) ack.DelayTime = max(0, now.Sub(h.largestObservedRcvdTime))
ack.ECT0 = h.ect0 ack.ECT0 = h.ect0
ack.ECT1 = h.ect1 ack.ECT1 = h.ect1
ack.ECNCE = h.ecnce ack.ECNCE = h.ecnce

14
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_handler.go generated vendored
View File

@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) SentPacket(
pnSpace := h.getPacketNumberSpace(encLevel) pnSpace := h.getPacketNumberSpace(encLevel)
if h.logger.Debug() && pnSpace.history.HasOutstandingPackets() { if h.logger.Debug() && pnSpace.history.HasOutstandingPackets() {
for p := utils.Max(0, pnSpace.largestSent+1); p < pn; p++ { for p := max(0, pnSpace.largestSent+1); p < pn; p++ {
h.logger.Debugf("Skipping packet number %d", p) h.logger.Debugf("Skipping packet number %d", p)
} }
} }
@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) ReceivedAck(ack *wire.AckFrame, encLevel protocol.En
// don't use the ack delay for Initial and Handshake packets // don't use the ack delay for Initial and Handshake packets
var ackDelay time.Duration var ackDelay time.Duration
if encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT { if encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT {
ackDelay = utils.Min(ack.DelayTime, h.rttStats.MaxAckDelay()) ackDelay = min(ack.DelayTime, h.rttStats.MaxAckDelay())
} }
h.rttStats.UpdateRTT(rcvTime.Sub(p.SendTime), ackDelay, rcvTime) h.rttStats.UpdateRTT(rcvTime.Sub(p.SendTime), ackDelay, rcvTime)
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) ReceivedAck(ack *wire.AckFrame, encLevel protocol.En
} }
} }
pnSpace.largestAcked = utils.Max(pnSpace.largestAcked, largestAcked) pnSpace.largestAcked = max(pnSpace.largestAcked, largestAcked)
if err := h.detectLostPackets(rcvTime, encLevel); err != nil { if err := h.detectLostPackets(rcvTime, encLevel); err != nil {
return false, err return false, err
@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) detectAndRemoveAckedPackets(ack *wire.AckFrame, encL
for _, p := range h.ackedPackets { for _, p := range h.ackedPackets {
if p.LargestAcked != protocol.InvalidPacketNumber && encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT { if p.LargestAcked != protocol.InvalidPacketNumber && encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT {
h.lowestNotConfirmedAcked = utils.Max(h.lowestNotConfirmedAcked, p.LargestAcked+1) h.lowestNotConfirmedAcked = max(h.lowestNotConfirmedAcked, p.LargestAcked+1)
} }
for _, f := range p.Frames { for _, f := range p.Frames {
@ -607,11 +607,11 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) detectLostPackets(now time.Time, encLevel protocol.E
pnSpace := h.getPacketNumberSpace(encLevel) pnSpace := h.getPacketNumberSpace(encLevel)
pnSpace.lossTime = time.Time{} pnSpace.lossTime = time.Time{}
maxRTT := float64(utils.Max(h.rttStats.LatestRTT(), h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT())) maxRTT := float64(max(h.rttStats.LatestRTT(), h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT()))
lossDelay := time.Duration(timeThreshold * maxRTT) lossDelay := time.Duration(timeThreshold * maxRTT)
// Minimum time of granularity before packets are deemed lost. // Minimum time of granularity before packets are deemed lost.
lossDelay = utils.Max(lossDelay, protocol.TimerGranularity) lossDelay = max(lossDelay, protocol.TimerGranularity)
// Packets sent before this time are deemed lost. // Packets sent before this time are deemed lost.
lostSendTime := now.Add(-lossDelay) lostSendTime := now.Add(-lossDelay)
@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) ResetForRetry(now time.Time) error {
// Otherwise, we don't know which Initial the Retry was sent in response to. // Otherwise, we don't know which Initial the Retry was sent in response to.
if h.ptoCount == 0 { if h.ptoCount == 0 {
// Don't set the RTT to a value lower than 5ms here. // Don't set the RTT to a value lower than 5ms here.
h.rttStats.UpdateRTT(utils.Max(minRTTAfterRetry, now.Sub(firstPacketSendTime)), 0, now) h.rttStats.UpdateRTT(max(minRTTAfterRetry, now.Sub(firstPacketSendTime)), 0, now)
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
h.logger.Debugf("\tupdated RTT: %s (σ: %s)", h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT(), h.rttStats.MeanDeviation()) h.logger.Debugf("\tupdated RTT: %s (σ: %s)", h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT(), h.rttStats.MeanDeviation())
} }

3
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/congestion/cubic.go generated vendored
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
) )
// This cubic implementation is based on the one found in Chromiums's QUIC // This cubic implementation is based on the one found in Chromiums's QUIC
@ -187,7 +186,7 @@ func (c *Cubic) CongestionWindowAfterAck(
targetCongestionWindow = c.originPointCongestionWindow - deltaCongestionWindow targetCongestionWindow = c.originPointCongestionWindow - deltaCongestionWindow
} }
// Limit the CWND increase to half the acked bytes. // Limit the CWND increase to half the acked bytes.
targetCongestionWindow = utils.Min(targetCongestionWindow, currentCongestionWindow+c.ackedBytesCount/2) targetCongestionWindow = min(targetCongestionWindow, currentCongestionWindow+c.ackedBytesCount/2)
// Increase the window by approximately Alpha * 1 MSS of bytes every // Increase the window by approximately Alpha * 1 MSS of bytes every
// time we ack an estimated tcp window of bytes. For small // time we ack an estimated tcp window of bytes. For small

4
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/congestion/cubic_sender.go generated vendored
View File

@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func (c *cubicSender) OnPacketAcked(
priorInFlight protocol.ByteCount, priorInFlight protocol.ByteCount,
eventTime time.Time, eventTime time.Time,
) { ) {
c.largestAckedPacketNumber = utils.Max(ackedPacketNumber, c.largestAckedPacketNumber) c.largestAckedPacketNumber = max(ackedPacketNumber, c.largestAckedPacketNumber)
if c.InRecovery() { if c.InRecovery() {
return return
} }
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func (c *cubicSender) maybeIncreaseCwnd(
c.numAckedPackets = 0 c.numAckedPackets = 0
} }
} else { } else {
c.congestionWindow = utils.Min(c.maxCongestionWindow(), c.cubic.CongestionWindowAfterAck(ackedBytes, c.congestionWindow, c.rttStats.MinRTT(), eventTime)) c.congestionWindow = min(c.maxCongestionWindow(), c.cubic.CongestionWindowAfterAck(ackedBytes, c.congestionWindow, c.rttStats.MinRTT(), eventTime))
} }
} }

5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/congestion/hybrid_slow_start.go generated vendored
View File

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
) )
// Note(pwestin): the magic clamping numbers come from the original code in // Note(pwestin): the magic clamping numbers come from the original code in
@ -75,8 +74,8 @@ func (s *HybridSlowStart) ShouldExitSlowStart(latestRTT time.Duration, minRTT ti
// Divide minRTT by 8 to get a rtt increase threshold for exiting. // Divide minRTT by 8 to get a rtt increase threshold for exiting.
minRTTincreaseThresholdUs := int64(minRTT / time.Microsecond >> hybridStartDelayFactorExp) minRTTincreaseThresholdUs := int64(minRTT / time.Microsecond >> hybridStartDelayFactorExp)
// Ensure the rtt threshold is never less than 2ms or more than 16ms. // Ensure the rtt threshold is never less than 2ms or more than 16ms.
minRTTincreaseThresholdUs = utils.Min(minRTTincreaseThresholdUs, hybridStartDelayMaxThresholdUs) minRTTincreaseThresholdUs = min(minRTTincreaseThresholdUs, hybridStartDelayMaxThresholdUs)
minRTTincreaseThreshold := time.Duration(utils.Max(minRTTincreaseThresholdUs, hybridStartDelayMinThresholdUs)) * time.Microsecond minRTTincreaseThreshold := time.Duration(max(minRTTincreaseThresholdUs, hybridStartDelayMinThresholdUs)) * time.Microsecond
if s.currentMinRTT > (minRTT + minRTTincreaseThreshold) { if s.currentMinRTT > (minRTT + minRTTincreaseThreshold) {
s.hystartFound = true s.hystartFound = true

7
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/congestion/pacer.go generated vendored
View File

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
) )
const maxBurstSizePackets = 10 const maxBurstSizePackets = 10
@ -52,11 +51,11 @@ func (p *pacer) Budget(now time.Time) protocol.ByteCount {
if budget < 0 { // protect against overflows if budget < 0 { // protect against overflows
budget = protocol.MaxByteCount budget = protocol.MaxByteCount
} }
return utils.Min(p.maxBurstSize(), budget) return min(p.maxBurstSize(), budget)
} }
func (p *pacer) maxBurstSize() protocol.ByteCount { func (p *pacer) maxBurstSize() protocol.ByteCount {
return utils.Max( return max(
protocol.ByteCount(uint64((protocol.MinPacingDelay+protocol.TimerGranularity).Nanoseconds())*p.adjustedBandwidth())/1e9, protocol.ByteCount(uint64((protocol.MinPacingDelay+protocol.TimerGranularity).Nanoseconds())*p.adjustedBandwidth())/1e9,
maxBurstSizePackets*p.maxDatagramSize, maxBurstSizePackets*p.maxDatagramSize,
) )
@ -77,7 +76,7 @@ func (p *pacer) TimeUntilSend() time.Time {
if diff%bw > 0 { if diff%bw > 0 {
d++ d++
} }
return p.lastSentTime.Add(utils.Max(protocol.MinPacingDelay, time.Duration(d)*time.Nanosecond)) return p.lastSentTime.Add(max(protocol.MinPacingDelay, time.Duration(d)*time.Nanosecond))
} }
func (p *pacer) SetMaxDatagramSize(s protocol.ByteCount) { func (p *pacer) SetMaxDatagramSize(s protocol.ByteCount) {

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/flowcontrol/base_flow_controller.go generated vendored
View File

@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func (c *baseFlowController) maybeAdjustWindowSize() {
now := time.Now() now := time.Now()
if now.Sub(c.epochStartTime) < time.Duration(4*fraction*float64(rtt)) { if now.Sub(c.epochStartTime) < time.Duration(4*fraction*float64(rtt)) {
// window is consumed too fast, try to increase the window size // window is consumed too fast, try to increase the window size
newSize := utils.Min(2*c.receiveWindowSize, c.maxReceiveWindowSize) newSize := min(2*c.receiveWindowSize, c.maxReceiveWindowSize)
if newSize > c.receiveWindowSize && (c.allowWindowIncrease == nil || c.allowWindowIncrease(newSize-c.receiveWindowSize)) { if newSize > c.receiveWindowSize && (c.allowWindowIncrease == nil || c.allowWindowIncrease(newSize-c.receiveWindowSize)) {
c.receiveWindowSize = newSize c.receiveWindowSize = newSize
} }

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/flowcontrol/connection_flow_controller.go generated vendored
View File

@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func (c *connectionFlowController) EnsureMinimumWindowSize(inc protocol.ByteCoun
c.mutex.Lock() c.mutex.Lock()
if inc > c.receiveWindowSize { if inc > c.receiveWindowSize {
c.logger.Debugf("Increasing receive flow control window for the connection to %d kB, in response to stream flow control window increase", c.receiveWindowSize/(1<<10)) c.logger.Debugf("Increasing receive flow control window for the connection to %d kB, in response to stream flow control window increase", c.receiveWindowSize/(1<<10))
newSize := utils.Min(inc, c.maxReceiveWindowSize) newSize := min(inc, c.maxReceiveWindowSize)
if delta := newSize - c.receiveWindowSize; delta > 0 && c.allowWindowIncrease(delta) { if delta := newSize - c.receiveWindowSize; delta > 0 && c.allowWindowIncrease(delta) {
c.receiveWindowSize = newSize c.receiveWindowSize = newSize
} }

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/flowcontrol/stream_flow_controller.go generated vendored
View File

@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ func (c *streamFlowController) AddBytesSent(n protocol.ByteCount) {
} }
func (c *streamFlowController) SendWindowSize() protocol.ByteCount { func (c *streamFlowController) SendWindowSize() protocol.ByteCount {
return utils.Min(c.baseFlowController.sendWindowSize(), c.connection.SendWindowSize()) return min(c.baseFlowController.sendWindowSize(), c.connection.SendWindowSize())
} }
func (c *streamFlowController) shouldQueueWindowUpdate() bool { func (c *streamFlowController) shouldQueueWindowUpdate() bool {

3
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/aead.go generated vendored
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"encoding/binary" "encoding/binary"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
) )
func createAEAD(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) cipher.AEAD { func createAEAD(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) cipher.AEAD {
@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ func (o *longHeaderOpener) Open(dst, src []byte, pn protocol.PacketNumber, ad []
// It uses the nonce provided here and XOR it with the IV. // It uses the nonce provided here and XOR it with the IV.
dec, err := o.aead.Open(dst, o.nonceBuf, src, ad) dec, err := o.aead.Open(dst, o.nonceBuf, src, ad)
if err == nil { if err == nil {
o.highestRcvdPN = utils.Max(o.highestRcvdPN, pn) o.highestRcvdPN = max(o.highestRcvdPN, pn)
} else { } else {
err = ErrDecryptionFailed err = ErrDecryptionFailed
} }

100
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go generated vendored
View File

@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ type quicVersionContextKey struct{}
var QUICVersionContextKey = &quicVersionContextKey{} var QUICVersionContextKey = &quicVersionContextKey{}
const clientSessionStateRevision = 3 const clientSessionStateRevision = 4
type cryptoSetup struct { type cryptoSetup struct {
tlsConf *tls.Config tlsConf *tls.Config
conn *qtls.QUICConn conn *tls.QUICConn
events []Event events []Event
@ -93,12 +93,12 @@ func NewCryptoSetupClient(
tlsConf = tlsConf.Clone() tlsConf = tlsConf.Clone()
tlsConf.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 tlsConf.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13
quicConf := &qtls.QUICConfig{TLSConfig: tlsConf} quicConf := &tls.QUICConfig{TLSConfig: tlsConf}
qtls.SetupConfigForClient(quicConf, cs.marshalDataForSessionState, cs.handleDataFromSessionState) qtls.SetupConfigForClient(quicConf, cs.marshalDataForSessionState, cs.handleDataFromSessionState)
cs.tlsConf = tlsConf cs.tlsConf = tlsConf
cs.allow0RTT = enable0RTT cs.allow0RTT = enable0RTT
cs.conn = qtls.QUICClient(quicConf) cs.conn = tls.QUICClient(quicConf)
cs.conn.SetTransportParameters(cs.ourParams.Marshal(protocol.PerspectiveClient)) cs.conn.SetTransportParameters(cs.ourParams.Marshal(protocol.PerspectiveClient))
return cs return cs
@ -127,12 +127,12 @@ func NewCryptoSetupServer(
) )
cs.allow0RTT = allow0RTT cs.allow0RTT = allow0RTT
quicConf := &qtls.QUICConfig{TLSConfig: tlsConf} quicConf := &tls.QUICConfig{TLSConfig: tlsConf}
qtls.SetupConfigForServer(quicConf, cs.allow0RTT, cs.getDataForSessionTicket, cs.handleSessionTicket) qtls.SetupConfigForServer(quicConf, cs.allow0RTT, cs.getDataForSessionTicket, cs.handleSessionTicket)
addConnToClientHelloInfo(quicConf.TLSConfig, localAddr, remoteAddr) addConnToClientHelloInfo(quicConf.TLSConfig, localAddr, remoteAddr)
cs.tlsConf = quicConf.TLSConfig cs.tlsConf = quicConf.TLSConfig
cs.conn = qtls.QUICServer(quicConf) cs.conn = tls.QUICServer(quicConf)
return cs return cs
} }
@ -264,28 +264,28 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) handleMessage(data []byte, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLev
} }
} }
func (h *cryptoSetup) handleEvent(ev qtls.QUICEvent) (done bool, err error) { func (h *cryptoSetup) handleEvent(ev tls.QUICEvent) (done bool, err error) {
switch ev.Kind { switch ev.Kind {
case qtls.QUICNoEvent: case tls.QUICNoEvent:
return true, nil return true, nil
case qtls.QUICSetReadSecret: case tls.QUICSetReadSecret:
h.SetReadKey(ev.Level, ev.Suite, ev.Data) h.SetReadKey(ev.Level, ev.Suite, ev.Data)
return false, nil return false, nil
case qtls.QUICSetWriteSecret: case tls.QUICSetWriteSecret:
h.SetWriteKey(ev.Level, ev.Suite, ev.Data) h.SetWriteKey(ev.Level, ev.Suite, ev.Data)
return false, nil return false, nil
case qtls.QUICTransportParameters: case tls.QUICTransportParameters:
return false, h.handleTransportParameters(ev.Data) return false, h.handleTransportParameters(ev.Data)
case qtls.QUICTransportParametersRequired: case tls.QUICTransportParametersRequired:
h.conn.SetTransportParameters(h.ourParams.Marshal(h.perspective)) h.conn.SetTransportParameters(h.ourParams.Marshal(h.perspective))
return false, nil return false, nil
case qtls.QUICRejectedEarlyData: case tls.QUICRejectedEarlyData:
h.rejected0RTT() h.rejected0RTT()
return false, nil return false, nil
case qtls.QUICWriteData: case tls.QUICWriteData:
h.WriteRecord(ev.Level, ev.Data) h.writeRecord(ev.Level, ev.Data)
return false, nil return false, nil
case qtls.QUICHandshakeDone: case tls.QUICHandshakeDone:
h.handshakeComplete() h.handshakeComplete()
return false, nil return false, nil
default: default:
@ -313,19 +313,24 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) handleTransportParameters(data []byte) error {
} }
// must be called after receiving the transport parameters // must be called after receiving the transport parameters
func (h *cryptoSetup) marshalDataForSessionState() []byte { func (h *cryptoSetup) marshalDataForSessionState(earlyData bool) []byte {
b := make([]byte, 0, 256) b := make([]byte, 0, 256)
b = quicvarint.Append(b, clientSessionStateRevision) b = quicvarint.Append(b, clientSessionStateRevision)
b = quicvarint.Append(b, uint64(h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT().Microseconds())) b = quicvarint.Append(b, uint64(h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT().Microseconds()))
return h.peerParams.MarshalForSessionTicket(b) if earlyData {
// only save the transport parameters for 0-RTT enabled session tickets
return h.peerParams.MarshalForSessionTicket(b)
}
return b
} }
func (h *cryptoSetup) handleDataFromSessionState(data []byte) (allowEarlyData bool) { func (h *cryptoSetup) handleDataFromSessionState(data []byte, earlyData bool) (allowEarlyData bool) {
tp, err := h.handleDataFromSessionStateImpl(data) rtt, tp, err := decodeDataFromSessionState(data, earlyData)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
h.logger.Debugf("Restoring of transport parameters from session ticket failed: %s", err.Error()) h.logger.Debugf("Restoring of transport parameters from session ticket failed: %s", err.Error())
return return
} }
h.rttStats.SetInitialRTT(rtt)
// The session ticket might have been saved from a connection that allowed 0-RTT, // The session ticket might have been saved from a connection that allowed 0-RTT,
// and therefore contain transport parameters. // and therefore contain transport parameters.
// Only use them if 0-RTT is actually used on the new connection. // Only use them if 0-RTT is actually used on the new connection.
@ -336,25 +341,28 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) handleDataFromSessionState(data []byte) (allowEarlyData bo
return false return false
} }
func (h *cryptoSetup) handleDataFromSessionStateImpl(data []byte) (*wire.TransportParameters, error) { func decodeDataFromSessionState(data []byte, earlyData bool) (time.Duration, *wire.TransportParameters, error) {
r := bytes.NewReader(data) r := bytes.NewReader(data)
ver, err := quicvarint.Read(r) ver, err := quicvarint.Read(r)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return 0, nil, err
} }
if ver != clientSessionStateRevision { if ver != clientSessionStateRevision {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mismatching version. Got %d, expected %d", ver, clientSessionStateRevision) return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("mismatching version. Got %d, expected %d", ver, clientSessionStateRevision)
} }
rtt, err := quicvarint.Read(r) rttEncoded, err := quicvarint.Read(r)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return 0, nil, err
}
rtt := time.Duration(rttEncoded) * time.Microsecond
if !earlyData {
return rtt, nil, nil
} }
h.rttStats.SetInitialRTT(time.Duration(rtt) * time.Microsecond)
var tp wire.TransportParameters var tp wire.TransportParameters
if err := tp.UnmarshalFromSessionTicket(r); err != nil { if err := tp.UnmarshalFromSessionTicket(r); err != nil {
return nil, err return 0, nil, err
} }
return &tp, nil return rtt, &tp, nil
} }
func (h *cryptoSetup) getDataForSessionTicket() []byte { func (h *cryptoSetup) getDataForSessionTicket() []byte {
@ -371,7 +379,9 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) getDataForSessionTicket() []byte {
// Due to limitations in crypto/tls, it's only possible to generate a single session ticket per connection. // Due to limitations in crypto/tls, it's only possible to generate a single session ticket per connection.
// It is only valid for the server. // It is only valid for the server.
func (h *cryptoSetup) GetSessionTicket() ([]byte, error) { func (h *cryptoSetup) GetSessionTicket() ([]byte, error) {
if err := qtls.SendSessionTicket(h.conn, h.allow0RTT); err != nil { if err := h.conn.SendSessionTicket(tls.QUICSessionTicketOptions{
EarlyData: h.allow0RTT,
}); err != nil {
// Session tickets might be disabled by tls.Config.SessionTicketsDisabled. // Session tickets might be disabled by tls.Config.SessionTicketsDisabled.
// We can't check h.tlsConfig here, since the actual config might have been obtained from // We can't check h.tlsConfig here, since the actual config might have been obtained from
// the GetConfigForClient callback. // the GetConfigForClient callback.
@ -383,11 +393,11 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) GetSessionTicket() ([]byte, error) {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
ev := h.conn.NextEvent() ev := h.conn.NextEvent()
if ev.Kind != qtls.QUICWriteData || ev.Level != qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication { if ev.Kind != tls.QUICWriteData || ev.Level != tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication {
panic("crypto/tls bug: where's my session ticket?") panic("crypto/tls bug: where's my session ticket?")
} }
ticket := ev.Data ticket := ev.Data
if ev := h.conn.NextEvent(); ev.Kind != qtls.QUICNoEvent { if ev := h.conn.NextEvent(); ev.Kind != tls.QUICNoEvent {
panic("crypto/tls bug: why more than one ticket?") panic("crypto/tls bug: why more than one ticket?")
} }
return ticket, nil return ticket, nil
@ -434,12 +444,12 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) rejected0RTT() {
} }
} }
func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, trafficSecret []byte) { func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(el tls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, trafficSecret []byte) {
suite := getCipherSuite(suiteID) suite := getCipherSuite(suiteID)
h.mutex.Lock() h.mutex.Lock()
//nolint:exhaustive // The TLS stack doesn't export Initial keys. //nolint:exhaustive // The TLS stack doesn't export Initial keys.
switch el { switch el {
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly:
if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
panic("Received 0-RTT read key for the client") panic("Received 0-RTT read key for the client")
} }
@ -451,7 +461,7 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, tr
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
h.logger.Debugf("Installed 0-RTT Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) h.logger.Debugf("Installed 0-RTT Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID))
} }
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake:
h.handshakeOpener = newLongHeaderOpener( h.handshakeOpener = newLongHeaderOpener(
createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version), createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version),
newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version), newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version),
@ -459,7 +469,7 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, tr
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
h.logger.Debugf("Installed Handshake Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) h.logger.Debugf("Installed Handshake Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID))
} }
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication:
h.aead.SetReadKey(suite, trafficSecret) h.aead.SetReadKey(suite, trafficSecret)
h.has1RTTOpener = true h.has1RTTOpener = true
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
@ -475,12 +485,12 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, tr
} }
} }
func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, trafficSecret []byte) { func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(el tls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, trafficSecret []byte) {
suite := getCipherSuite(suiteID) suite := getCipherSuite(suiteID)
h.mutex.Lock() h.mutex.Lock()
//nolint:exhaustive // The TLS stack doesn't export Initial keys. //nolint:exhaustive // The TLS stack doesn't export Initial keys.
switch el { switch el {
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly:
if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer { if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer {
panic("Received 0-RTT write key for the server") panic("Received 0-RTT write key for the server")
} }
@ -497,7 +507,7 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, t
} }
// don't set used0RTT here. 0-RTT might still get rejected. // don't set used0RTT here. 0-RTT might still get rejected.
return return
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake:
h.handshakeSealer = newLongHeaderSealer( h.handshakeSealer = newLongHeaderSealer(
createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version), createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version),
newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version), newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version),
@ -505,7 +515,7 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, t
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
h.logger.Debugf("Installed Handshake Write keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) h.logger.Debugf("Installed Handshake Write keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID))
} }
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication:
h.aead.SetWriteKey(suite, trafficSecret) h.aead.SetWriteKey(suite, trafficSecret)
h.has1RTTSealer = true h.has1RTTSealer = true
if h.logger.Debug() { if h.logger.Debug() {
@ -529,15 +539,15 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, t
} }
} }
// WriteRecord is called when TLS writes data // writeRecord is called when TLS writes data
func (h *cryptoSetup) WriteRecord(encLevel qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, p []byte) { func (h *cryptoSetup) writeRecord(encLevel tls.QUICEncryptionLevel, p []byte) {
//nolint:exhaustive // handshake records can only be written for Initial and Handshake. //nolint:exhaustive // handshake records can only be written for Initial and Handshake.
switch encLevel { switch encLevel {
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial:
h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventWriteInitialData, Data: p}) h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventWriteInitialData, Data: p})
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake:
h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventWriteHandshakeData, Data: p}) h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventWriteHandshakeData, Data: p})
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication:
panic("unexpected write") panic("unexpected write")
default: default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected write encryption level: %s", encLevel)) panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected write encryption level: %s", encLevel))
@ -684,7 +694,7 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
func wrapError(err error) error { func wrapError(err error) error {
// alert 80 is an internal error // alert 80 is an internal error
if alertErr := qtls.AlertError(0); errors.As(err, &alertErr) && alertErr != 80 { if alertErr := tls.AlertError(0); errors.As(err, &alertErr) && alertErr != 80 {
return qerr.NewLocalCryptoError(uint8(alertErr), err) return qerr.NewLocalCryptoError(uint8(alertErr), err)
} }
return &qerr.TransportError{ErrorCode: qerr.InternalError, ErrorMessage: err.Error()} return &qerr.TransportError{ErrorCode: qerr.InternalError, ErrorMessage: err.Error()}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/updatable_aead.go generated vendored
View File

@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func (a *updatableAEAD) Open(dst, src []byte, rcvTime time.Time, pn protocol.Pac
} }
} }
if err == nil { if err == nil {
a.highestRcvdPN = utils.Max(a.highestRcvdPN, pn) a.highestRcvdPN = max(a.highestRcvdPN, pn)
} }
return dec, err return dec, err
} }

3
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol/params.go generated vendored
View File

@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ const MaxPostHandshakeCryptoFrameSize = 1000
// but must ensure that a maximum size ACK frame fits into one packet. // but must ensure that a maximum size ACK frame fits into one packet.
const MaxAckFrameSize ByteCount = 1000 const MaxAckFrameSize ByteCount = 1000
// DatagramRcvQueueLen is the length of the receive queue for DATAGRAM frames (RFC 9221)
const DatagramRcvQueueLen = 128
// MaxNumAckRanges is the maximum number of ACK ranges that we send in an ACK frame. // MaxNumAckRanges is the maximum number of ACK ranges that we send in an ACK frame.
// It also serves as a limit for the packet history. // It also serves as a limit for the packet history.
// If at any point we keep track of more ranges, old ranges are discarded. // If at any point we keep track of more ranges, old ranges are discarded.

5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr/error_codes.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
package qerr package qerr
import ( import (
"crypto/tls"
"fmt" "fmt"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls"
) )
// TransportErrorCode is a QUIC transport error. // TransportErrorCode is a QUIC transport error.
@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ func (e TransportErrorCode) Message() string {
if !e.IsCryptoError() { if !e.IsCryptoError() {
return "" return ""
} }
return qtls.AlertError(e - 0x100).Error() return tls.AlertError(e - 0x100).Error()
} }
func (e TransportErrorCode) String() string { func (e TransportErrorCode) String() string {

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/cipher_suite_go121.go → vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/cipher_suite.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
//go:build go1.21
package qtls package qtls
import ( import (

13
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/client_session_cache.go generated vendored
View File

@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ import (
) )
type clientSessionCache struct { type clientSessionCache struct {
getData func() []byte getData func(earlyData bool) []byte
setData func([]byte) (allowEarlyData bool) setData func(data []byte, earlyData bool) (allowEarlyData bool)
wrapped tls.ClientSessionCache wrapped tls.ClientSessionCache
} }
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ func (c clientSessionCache) Put(key string, cs *tls.ClientSessionState) {
c.wrapped.Put(key, cs) c.wrapped.Put(key, cs)
return return
} }
state.Extra = append(state.Extra, addExtraPrefix(c.getData())) state.Extra = append(state.Extra, addExtraPrefix(c.getData(state.EarlyData)))
newCS, err := tls.NewResumptionState(ticket, state) newCS, err := tls.NewResumptionState(ticket, state)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
// It's not clear why this would error. Just save the original state. // It's not clear why this would error. Just save the original state.
@ -46,12 +46,13 @@ func (c clientSessionCache) Get(key string) (*tls.ClientSessionState, bool) {
c.wrapped.Put(key, nil) c.wrapped.Put(key, nil)
return nil, false return nil, false
} }
var earlyData bool
// restore QUIC transport parameters and RTT stored in state.Extra // restore QUIC transport parameters and RTT stored in state.Extra
if extra := findExtraData(state.Extra); extra != nil { if extra := findExtraData(state.Extra); extra != nil {
earlyData = c.setData(extra) earlyData := c.setData(extra, state.EarlyData)
if state.EarlyData {
state.EarlyData = earlyData
}
} }
state.EarlyData = earlyData
session, err := tls.NewResumptionState(ticket, state) session, err := tls.NewResumptionState(ticket, state)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
// It's not clear why this would error. // It's not clear why this would error.

147
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
//go:build go1.20 && !go1.21
package qtls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"unsafe"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20"
)
type (
QUICConn = qtls.QUICConn
QUICConfig = qtls.QUICConfig
QUICEvent = qtls.QUICEvent
QUICEventKind = qtls.QUICEventKind
QUICEncryptionLevel = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel
AlertError = qtls.AlertError
)
const (
QUICEncryptionLevelInitial = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial
QUICEncryptionLevelEarly = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly
QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake
QUICEncryptionLevelApplication = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication
)
const (
QUICNoEvent = qtls.QUICNoEvent
QUICSetReadSecret = qtls.QUICSetReadSecret
QUICSetWriteSecret = qtls.QUICSetWriteSecret
QUICWriteData = qtls.QUICWriteData
QUICTransportParameters = qtls.QUICTransportParameters
QUICTransportParametersRequired = qtls.QUICTransportParametersRequired
QUICRejectedEarlyData = qtls.QUICRejectedEarlyData
QUICHandshakeDone = qtls.QUICHandshakeDone
)
func SetupConfigForServer(conf *QUICConfig, enable0RTT bool, getDataForSessionTicket func() []byte, handleSessionTicket func([]byte, bool) bool) {
qtls.InitSessionTicketKeys(conf.TLSConfig)
conf.TLSConfig = conf.TLSConfig.Clone()
conf.TLSConfig.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13
conf.ExtraConfig = &qtls.ExtraConfig{
Enable0RTT: enable0RTT,
Accept0RTT: func(data []byte) bool {
return handleSessionTicket(data, true)
},
GetAppDataForSessionTicket: getDataForSessionTicket,
}
}
func SetupConfigForClient(conf *QUICConfig, getDataForSessionState func() []byte, setDataFromSessionState func([]byte) bool) {
conf.ExtraConfig = &qtls.ExtraConfig{
GetAppDataForSessionState: getDataForSessionState,
SetAppDataFromSessionState: setDataFromSessionState,
}
}
func QUICServer(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn {
return qtls.QUICServer(config)
}
func QUICClient(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn {
return qtls.QUICClient(config)
}
func ToTLSEncryptionLevel(e protocol.EncryptionLevel) qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel {
switch e {
case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial
case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake
case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication
case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected encryption level: %s", e))
}
}
func FromTLSEncryptionLevel(e qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel) protocol.EncryptionLevel {
switch e {
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial:
return protocol.EncryptionInitial
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake:
return protocol.EncryptionHandshake
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication:
return protocol.Encryption1RTT
case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly:
return protocol.Encryption0RTT
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpect encryption level: %s", e))
}
}
//go:linkname cipherSuitesTLS13 github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.cipherSuitesTLS13
var cipherSuitesTLS13 []unsafe.Pointer
//go:linkname defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.defaultCipherSuitesTLS13
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 []uint16
//go:linkname defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES []uint16
var cipherSuitesModified bool
// SetCipherSuite modifies the cipherSuiteTLS13 slice of cipher suites inside qtls
// such that it only contains the cipher suite with the chosen id.
// The reset function returned resets them back to the original value.
func SetCipherSuite(id uint16) (reset func()) {
if cipherSuitesModified {
panic("cipher suites modified multiple times without resetting")
}
cipherSuitesModified = true
origCipherSuitesTLS13 := append([]unsafe.Pointer{}, cipherSuitesTLS13...)
origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 := append([]uint16{}, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13...)
origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES := append([]uint16{}, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES...)
// The order is given by the order of the slice elements in cipherSuitesTLS13 in qtls.
switch id {
case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[:1]
case tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[1:2]
case tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[2:]
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected cipher suite: %d", id))
}
defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{id}
defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{id}
return func() {
cipherSuitesTLS13 = origCipherSuitesTLS13
defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13
defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
cipherSuitesModified = false
}
}
func SendSessionTicket(c *QUICConn, allow0RTT bool) error {
return c.SendSessionTicket(allow0RTT)
}

5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go_oldversion.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
//go:build !go1.20
package qtls
var _ int = "The version of quic-go you're using can't be built using outdated Go versions. For more details, please see https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/quic-go-and-Go-versions."

47
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go121.go → vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/qtls.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
//go:build go1.21
package qtls package qtls
import ( import (
@ -10,38 +8,7 @@ import (
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
) )
type ( func SetupConfigForServer(qconf *tls.QUICConfig, _ bool, getData func() []byte, handleSessionTicket func([]byte, bool) bool) {
QUICConn = tls.QUICConn
QUICConfig = tls.QUICConfig
QUICEvent = tls.QUICEvent
QUICEventKind = tls.QUICEventKind
QUICEncryptionLevel = tls.QUICEncryptionLevel
QUICSessionTicketOptions = tls.QUICSessionTicketOptions
AlertError = tls.AlertError
)
const (
QUICEncryptionLevelInitial = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial
QUICEncryptionLevelEarly = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly
QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake
QUICEncryptionLevelApplication = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication
)
const (
QUICNoEvent = tls.QUICNoEvent
QUICSetReadSecret = tls.QUICSetReadSecret
QUICSetWriteSecret = tls.QUICSetWriteSecret
QUICWriteData = tls.QUICWriteData
QUICTransportParameters = tls.QUICTransportParameters
QUICTransportParametersRequired = tls.QUICTransportParametersRequired
QUICRejectedEarlyData = tls.QUICRejectedEarlyData
QUICHandshakeDone = tls.QUICHandshakeDone
)
func QUICServer(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { return tls.QUICServer(config) }
func QUICClient(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { return tls.QUICClient(config) }
func SetupConfigForServer(qconf *QUICConfig, _ bool, getData func() []byte, handleSessionTicket func([]byte, bool) bool) {
conf := qconf.TLSConfig conf := qconf.TLSConfig
// Workaround for https://github.com/golang/go/issues/60506. // Workaround for https://github.com/golang/go/issues/60506.
@ -93,7 +60,11 @@ func SetupConfigForServer(qconf *QUICConfig, _ bool, getData func() []byte, hand
} }
} }
func SetupConfigForClient(qconf *QUICConfig, getData func() []byte, setData func([]byte) bool) { func SetupConfigForClient(
qconf *tls.QUICConfig,
getData func(earlyData bool) []byte,
setData func(data []byte, earlyData bool) (allowEarlyData bool),
) {
conf := qconf.TLSConfig conf := qconf.TLSConfig
if conf.ClientSessionCache != nil { if conf.ClientSessionCache != nil {
origCache := conf.ClientSessionCache origCache := conf.ClientSessionCache
@ -151,9 +122,3 @@ func findExtraData(extras [][]byte) []byte {
} }
return nil return nil
} }
func SendSessionTicket(c *QUICConn, allow0RTT bool) error {
return c.SendSessionTicket(tls.QUICSessionTicketOptions{
EarlyData: allow0RTT,
})
}

26
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/minmax.go generated vendored
View File

@ -3,27 +3,11 @@ package utils
import ( import (
"math" "math"
"time" "time"
"golang.org/x/exp/constraints"
) )
// InfDuration is a duration of infinite length // InfDuration is a duration of infinite length
const InfDuration = time.Duration(math.MaxInt64) const InfDuration = time.Duration(math.MaxInt64)
func Max[T constraints.Ordered](a, b T) T {
if a < b {
return b
}
return a
}
func Min[T constraints.Ordered](a, b T) T {
if a < b {
return a
}
return b
}
// MinNonZeroDuration return the minimum duration that's not zero. // MinNonZeroDuration return the minimum duration that's not zero.
func MinNonZeroDuration(a, b time.Duration) time.Duration { func MinNonZeroDuration(a, b time.Duration) time.Duration {
if a == 0 { if a == 0 {
@ -32,15 +16,7 @@ func MinNonZeroDuration(a, b time.Duration) time.Duration {
if b == 0 { if b == 0 {
return a return a
} }
return Min(a, b) return min(a, b)
}
// AbsDuration returns the absolute value of a time duration
func AbsDuration(d time.Duration) time.Duration {
if d >= 0 {
return d
}
return -d
} }
// MinTime returns the earlier time // MinTime returns the earlier time

12
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/ringbuffer/ringbuffer.go generated vendored
View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ type RingBuffer[T any] struct {
full bool full bool
} }
// Init preallocs a buffer with a certain size. // Init preallocates a buffer with a certain size.
func (r *RingBuffer[T]) Init(size int) { func (r *RingBuffer[T]) Init(size int) {
r.ring = make([]T, size) r.ring = make([]T, size)
} }
@ -62,6 +62,16 @@ func (r *RingBuffer[T]) PopFront() T {
return t return t
} }
// PeekFront returns the next element.
// It must not be called when the buffer is empty, that means that
// callers might need to check if there are elements in the buffer first.
func (r *RingBuffer[T]) PeekFront() T {
if r.Empty() {
panic("github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/ringbuffer: peek from an empty queue")
}
return r.ring[r.headPos]
}
// Grow the maximum size of the queue. // Grow the maximum size of the queue.
// This method assume the queue is full. // This method assume the queue is full.
func (r *RingBuffer[T]) grow() { func (r *RingBuffer[T]) grow() {

8
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/rtt_stats.go generated vendored
View File

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func (r *RTTStats) PTO(includeMaxAckDelay bool) time.Duration {
if r.SmoothedRTT() == 0 { if r.SmoothedRTT() == 0 {
return 2 * defaultInitialRTT return 2 * defaultInitialRTT
} }
pto := r.SmoothedRTT() + Max(4*r.MeanDeviation(), protocol.TimerGranularity) pto := r.SmoothedRTT() + max(4*r.MeanDeviation(), protocol.TimerGranularity)
if includeMaxAckDelay { if includeMaxAckDelay {
pto += r.MaxAckDelay() pto += r.MaxAckDelay()
} }
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func (r *RTTStats) UpdateRTT(sendDelta, ackDelay time.Duration, now time.Time) {
r.smoothedRTT = sample r.smoothedRTT = sample
r.meanDeviation = sample / 2 r.meanDeviation = sample / 2
} else { } else {
r.meanDeviation = time.Duration(oneMinusBeta*float32(r.meanDeviation/time.Microsecond)+rttBeta*float32(AbsDuration(r.smoothedRTT-sample)/time.Microsecond)) * time.Microsecond r.meanDeviation = time.Duration(oneMinusBeta*float32(r.meanDeviation/time.Microsecond)+rttBeta*float32((r.smoothedRTT-sample).Abs()/time.Microsecond)) * time.Microsecond
r.smoothedRTT = time.Duration((float32(r.smoothedRTT/time.Microsecond)*oneMinusAlpha)+(float32(sample/time.Microsecond)*rttAlpha)) * time.Microsecond r.smoothedRTT = time.Duration((float32(r.smoothedRTT/time.Microsecond)*oneMinusAlpha)+(float32(sample/time.Microsecond)*rttAlpha)) * time.Microsecond
} }
} }
@ -126,6 +126,6 @@ func (r *RTTStats) OnConnectionMigration() {
// is larger. The mean deviation is increased to the most recent deviation if // is larger. The mean deviation is increased to the most recent deviation if
// it's larger. // it's larger.
func (r *RTTStats) ExpireSmoothedMetrics() { func (r *RTTStats) ExpireSmoothedMetrics() {
r.meanDeviation = Max(r.meanDeviation, AbsDuration(r.smoothedRTT-r.latestRTT)) r.meanDeviation = max(r.meanDeviation, (r.smoothedRTT - r.latestRTT).Abs())
r.smoothedRTT = Max(r.smoothedRTT, r.latestRTT) r.smoothedRTT = max(r.smoothedRTT, r.latestRTT)
} }

4
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire/ack_frame.go generated vendored
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ func parseAckFrame(frame *AckFrame, r *bytes.Reader, typ uint64, ackDelayExponen
delayTime := time.Duration(delay*1<<ackDelayExponent) * time.Microsecond delayTime := time.Duration(delay*1<<ackDelayExponent) * time.Microsecond
if delayTime < 0 { if delayTime < 0 {
// If the delay time overflows, set it to the maximum encodable value. // If the delay time overflows, set it to the maximum encode-able value.
delayTime = utils.InfDuration delayTime = utils.InfDuration
} }
frame.DelayTime = delayTime frame.DelayTime = delayTime
@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ func parseAckFrame(frame *AckFrame, r *bytes.Reader, typ uint64, ackDelayExponen
return errors.New("invalid first ACK range") return errors.New("invalid first ACK range")
} }
smallest := largestAcked - ackBlock smallest := largestAcked - ackBlock
frame.AckRanges = append(frame.AckRanges, AckRange{Smallest: smallest, Largest: largestAcked})
// read all the other ACK ranges // read all the other ACK ranges
frame.AckRanges = append(frame.AckRanges, AckRange{Smallest: smallest, Largest: largestAcked})
for i := uint64(0); i < numBlocks; i++ { for i := uint64(0); i < numBlocks; i++ {
g, err := quicvarint.Read(r) g, err := quicvarint.Read(r)
if err != nil { if err != nil {

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire/transport_parameters.go generated vendored
View File

@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ func (p *TransportParameters) readNumericTransportParameter(
return fmt.Errorf("initial_max_streams_uni too large: %d (maximum %d)", p.MaxUniStreamNum, protocol.MaxStreamCount) return fmt.Errorf("initial_max_streams_uni too large: %d (maximum %d)", p.MaxUniStreamNum, protocol.MaxStreamCount)
} }
case maxIdleTimeoutParameterID: case maxIdleTimeoutParameterID:
p.MaxIdleTimeout = utils.Max(protocol.MinRemoteIdleTimeout, time.Duration(val)*time.Millisecond) p.MaxIdleTimeout = max(protocol.MinRemoteIdleTimeout, time.Duration(val)*time.Millisecond)
case maxUDPPayloadSizeParameterID: case maxUDPPayloadSizeParameterID:
if val < 1200 { if val < 1200 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid value for max_packet_size: %d (minimum 1200)", val) return fmt.Errorf("invalid value for max_packet_size: %d (minimum 1200)", val)

8
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/logging/connection_tracer.go generated vendored
View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ type ConnectionTracer struct {
LossTimerExpired func(TimerType, EncryptionLevel) LossTimerExpired func(TimerType, EncryptionLevel)
LossTimerCanceled func() LossTimerCanceled func()
ECNStateUpdated func(state ECNState, trigger ECNStateTrigger) ECNStateUpdated func(state ECNState, trigger ECNStateTrigger)
ChoseALPN func(protocol string)
// Close is called when the connection is closed. // Close is called when the connection is closed.
Close func() Close func()
Debug func(name, msg string) Debug func(name, msg string)
@ -237,6 +238,13 @@ func NewMultiplexedConnectionTracer(tracers ...*ConnectionTracer) *ConnectionTra
} }
} }
}, },
ChoseALPN: func(protocol string) {
for _, t := range tracers {
if t.ChoseALPN != nil {
t.ChoseALPN(protocol)
}
}
},
Close: func() { Close: func() {
for _, t := range tracers { for _, t := range tracers {
if t.Close != nil { if t.Close != nil {

6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/oss-fuzz.sh generated vendored
View File

@ -3,12 +3,12 @@
# Install Go manually, since oss-fuzz ships with an outdated Go version. # Install Go manually, since oss-fuzz ships with an outdated Go version.
# See https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10643. # See https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10643.
export CXX="${CXX} -lresolv" # required by Go 1.20 export CXX="${CXX} -lresolv" # required by Go 1.20
wget https://go.dev/dl/go1.20.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz \ wget https://go.dev/dl/go1.21.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
&& mkdir temp-go \ && mkdir temp-go \
&& rm -rf /root/.go/* \ && rm -rf /root/.go/* \
&& tar -C temp-go/ -xzf go1.20.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz \ && tar -C temp-go/ -xzf go1.21.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
&& mv temp-go/go/* /root/.go/ \ && mv temp-go/go/* /root/.go/ \
&& rm -rf temp-go go1.20.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz && rm -rf temp-go go1.21.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz
( (
# fuzz qpack # fuzz qpack

16
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/packet_packer.go generated vendored
View File

@ -606,11 +606,17 @@ func (p *packetPacker) composeNextPacket(maxFrameSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAc
if p.datagramQueue != nil { if p.datagramQueue != nil {
if f := p.datagramQueue.Peek(); f != nil { if f := p.datagramQueue.Peek(); f != nil {
size := f.Length(v) size := f.Length(v)
if size <= maxFrameSize-pl.length { if size <= maxFrameSize-pl.length { // DATAGRAM frame fits
pl.frames = append(pl.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: f}) pl.frames = append(pl.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: f})
pl.length += size pl.length += size
p.datagramQueue.Pop() p.datagramQueue.Pop()
} else if !hasAck {
// The DATAGRAM frame doesn't fit, and the packet doesn't contain an ACK.
// Discard this frame. There's no point in retrying this in the next packet,
// as it's unlikely that the available packet size will increase.
p.datagramQueue.Pop()
} }
// If the DATAGRAM frame was too large and the packet contained an ACK, we'll try to send it out later.
} }
} }
@ -640,7 +646,13 @@ func (p *packetPacker) composeNextPacket(maxFrameSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAc
pl.length += lengthAdded pl.length += lengthAdded
// add handlers for the control frames that were added // add handlers for the control frames that were added
for i := startLen; i < len(pl.frames); i++ { for i := startLen; i < len(pl.frames); i++ {
pl.frames[i].Handler = p.retransmissionQueue.AppDataAckHandler() switch pl.frames[i].Frame.(type) {
case *wire.PathChallengeFrame, *wire.PathResponseFrame:
// Path probing is currently not supported, therefore we don't need to set the OnAcked callback yet.
// PATH_CHALLENGE and PATH_RESPONSE are never retransmitted.
default:
pl.frames[i].Handler = p.retransmissionQueue.AppDataAckHandler()
}
} }
pl.streamFrames, lengthAdded = p.framer.AppendStreamFrames(pl.streamFrames, maxFrameSize-pl.length, v) pl.streamFrames, lengthAdded = p.framer.AppendStreamFrames(pl.streamFrames, maxFrameSize-pl.length, v)

4
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_stream.go generated vendored
View File

@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) popNewStreamFrame(maxBytes, sendWindow protocol.ByteCount,
nextFrame := s.nextFrame nextFrame := s.nextFrame
s.nextFrame = nil s.nextFrame = nil
maxDataLen := utils.Min(sendWindow, nextFrame.MaxDataLen(maxBytes, v)) maxDataLen := min(sendWindow, nextFrame.MaxDataLen(maxBytes, v))
if nextFrame.DataLen() > maxDataLen { if nextFrame.DataLen() > maxDataLen {
s.nextFrame = wire.GetStreamFrame() s.nextFrame = wire.GetStreamFrame()
s.nextFrame.StreamID = s.streamID s.nextFrame.StreamID = s.streamID
@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) popNewStreamFrameWithoutBuffer(f *wire.StreamFrame, maxByte
if maxDataLen == 0 { // a STREAM frame must have at least one byte of data if maxDataLen == 0 { // a STREAM frame must have at least one byte of data
return s.dataForWriting != nil || s.nextFrame != nil || s.finishedWriting return s.dataForWriting != nil || s.nextFrame != nil || s.finishedWriting
} }
s.getDataForWriting(f, utils.Min(maxDataLen, sendWindow)) s.getDataForWriting(f, min(maxDataLen, sendWindow))
return s.dataForWriting != nil || s.nextFrame != nil || s.finishedWriting return s.dataForWriting != nil || s.nextFrame != nil || s.finishedWriting
} }

5
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/token_store.go generated vendored
View File

@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package quic
import ( import (
"sync" "sync"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
list "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/linkedlist" list "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/linkedlist"
) )
@ -20,14 +19,14 @@ func newSingleOriginTokenStore(size int) *singleOriginTokenStore {
func (s *singleOriginTokenStore) Add(token *ClientToken) { func (s *singleOriginTokenStore) Add(token *ClientToken) {
s.tokens[s.p] = token s.tokens[s.p] = token
s.p = s.index(s.p + 1) s.p = s.index(s.p + 1)
s.len = utils.Min(s.len+1, len(s.tokens)) s.len = min(s.len+1, len(s.tokens))
} }
func (s *singleOriginTokenStore) Pop() *ClientToken { func (s *singleOriginTokenStore) Pop() *ClientToken {
s.p = s.index(s.p - 1) s.p = s.index(s.p - 1)
token := s.tokens[s.p] token := s.tokens[s.p]
s.tokens[s.p] = nil s.tokens[s.p] = nil
s.len = utils.Max(s.len-1, 0) s.len = max(s.len-1, 0)
return token return token
} }

825
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,825 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package cryptobyte
import (
encoding_asn1 "encoding/asn1"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"reflect"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
)
// This file contains ASN.1-related methods for String and Builder.
// Builder
// AddASN1Int64 appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1Int64(v int64) {
b.addASN1Signed(asn1.INTEGER, v)
}
// AddASN1Int64WithTag appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER with the
// given tag.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1Int64WithTag(v int64, tag asn1.Tag) {
b.addASN1Signed(tag, v)
}
// AddASN1Enum appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 ENUMERATION.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1Enum(v int64) {
b.addASN1Signed(asn1.ENUM, v)
}
func (b *Builder) addASN1Signed(tag asn1.Tag, v int64) {
b.AddASN1(tag, func(c *Builder) {
length := 1
for i := v; i >= 0x80 || i < -0x80; i >>= 8 {
length++
}
for ; length > 0; length-- {
i := v >> uint((length-1)*8) & 0xff
c.AddUint8(uint8(i))
}
})
}
// AddASN1Uint64 appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1Uint64(v uint64) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *Builder) {
length := 1
for i := v; i >= 0x80; i >>= 8 {
length++
}
for ; length > 0; length-- {
i := v >> uint((length-1)*8) & 0xff
c.AddUint8(uint8(i))
}
})
}
// AddASN1BigInt appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1BigInt(n *big.Int) {
if b.err != nil {
return
}
b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *Builder) {
if n.Sign() < 0 {
// A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement form. So we
// invert and subtract 1. If the most-significant-bit isn't set then
// we'll need to pad the beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number
// negative.
nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n)
nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne)
bytes := nMinus1.Bytes()
for i := range bytes {
bytes[i] ^= 0xff
}
if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 {
c.add(0xff)
}
c.add(bytes...)
} else if n.Sign() == 0 {
c.add(0)
} else {
bytes := n.Bytes()
if bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 {
c.add(0)
}
c.add(bytes...)
}
})
}
// AddASN1OctetString appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 OCTET STRING.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1OctetString(bytes []byte) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.OCTET_STRING, func(c *Builder) {
c.AddBytes(bytes)
})
}
const generalizedTimeFormatStr = "20060102150405Z0700"
// AddASN1GeneralizedTime appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 GENERALIZEDTIME.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1GeneralizedTime(t time.Time) {
if t.Year() < 0 || t.Year() > 9999 {
b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: cannot represent %v as a GeneralizedTime", t)
return
}
b.AddASN1(asn1.GeneralizedTime, func(c *Builder) {
c.AddBytes([]byte(t.Format(generalizedTimeFormatStr)))
})
}
// AddASN1UTCTime appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 UTCTime.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1UTCTime(t time.Time) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.UTCTime, func(c *Builder) {
// As utilized by the X.509 profile, UTCTime can only
// represent the years 1950 through 2049.
if t.Year() < 1950 || t.Year() >= 2050 {
b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: cannot represent %v as a UTCTime", t)
return
}
c.AddBytes([]byte(t.Format(defaultUTCTimeFormatStr)))
})
}
// AddASN1BitString appends a DER-encoded ASN.1 BIT STRING. This does not
// support BIT STRINGs that are not a whole number of bytes.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1BitString(data []byte) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.BIT_STRING, func(b *Builder) {
b.AddUint8(0)
b.AddBytes(data)
})
}
func (b *Builder) addBase128Int(n int64) {
var length int
if n == 0 {
length = 1
} else {
for i := n; i > 0; i >>= 7 {
length++
}
}
for i := length - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
o := byte(n >> uint(i*7))
o &= 0x7f
if i != 0 {
o |= 0x80
}
b.add(o)
}
}
func isValidOID(oid encoding_asn1.ObjectIdentifier) bool {
if len(oid) < 2 {
return false
}
if oid[0] > 2 || (oid[0] <= 1 && oid[1] >= 40) {
return false
}
for _, v := range oid {
if v < 0 {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (b *Builder) AddASN1ObjectIdentifier(oid encoding_asn1.ObjectIdentifier) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, func(b *Builder) {
if !isValidOID(oid) {
b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: invalid OID: %v", oid)
return
}
b.addBase128Int(int64(oid[0])*40 + int64(oid[1]))
for _, v := range oid[2:] {
b.addBase128Int(int64(v))
}
})
}
func (b *Builder) AddASN1Boolean(v bool) {
b.AddASN1(asn1.BOOLEAN, func(b *Builder) {
if v {
b.AddUint8(0xff)
} else {
b.AddUint8(0)
}
})
}
func (b *Builder) AddASN1NULL() {
b.add(uint8(asn1.NULL), 0)
}
// MarshalASN1 calls encoding_asn1.Marshal on its input and appends the result if
// successful or records an error if one occurred.
func (b *Builder) MarshalASN1(v interface{}) {
// NOTE(martinkr): This is somewhat of a hack to allow propagation of
// encoding_asn1.Marshal errors into Builder.err. N.B. if you call MarshalASN1 with a
// value embedded into a struct, its tag information is lost.
if b.err != nil {
return
}
bytes, err := encoding_asn1.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
b.err = err
return
}
b.AddBytes(bytes)
}
// AddASN1 appends an ASN.1 object. The object is prefixed with the given tag.
// Tags greater than 30 are not supported and result in an error (i.e.
// low-tag-number form only). The child builder passed to the
// BuilderContinuation can be used to build the content of the ASN.1 object.
func (b *Builder) AddASN1(tag asn1.Tag, f BuilderContinuation) {
if b.err != nil {
return
}
// Identifiers with the low five bits set indicate high-tag-number format
// (two or more octets), which we don't support.
if tag&0x1f == 0x1f {
b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: high-tag number identifier octects not supported: 0x%x", tag)
return
}
b.AddUint8(uint8(tag))
b.addLengthPrefixed(1, true, f)
}
// String
// ReadASN1Boolean decodes an ASN.1 BOOLEAN and converts it to a boolean
// representation into out and advances. It reports whether the read
// was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Boolean(out *bool) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BOOLEAN) || len(bytes) != 1 {
return false
}
switch bytes[0] {
case 0:
*out = false
case 0xff:
*out = true
default:
return false
}
return true
}
// ReadASN1Integer decodes an ASN.1 INTEGER into out and advances. If out does
// not point to an integer, to a big.Int, or to a []byte it panics. Only
// positive and zero values can be decoded into []byte, and they are returned as
// big-endian binary values that share memory with s. Positive values will have
// no leading zeroes, and zero will be returned as a single zero byte.
// ReadASN1Integer reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Integer(out interface{}) bool {
switch out := out.(type) {
case *int, *int8, *int16, *int32, *int64:
var i int64
if !s.readASN1Int64(&i) || reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().OverflowInt(i) {
return false
}
reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().SetInt(i)
return true
case *uint, *uint8, *uint16, *uint32, *uint64:
var u uint64
if !s.readASN1Uint64(&u) || reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().OverflowUint(u) {
return false
}
reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().SetUint(u)
return true
case *big.Int:
return s.readASN1BigInt(out)
case *[]byte:
return s.readASN1Bytes(out)
default:
panic("out does not point to an integer type")
}
}
func checkASN1Integer(bytes []byte) bool {
if len(bytes) == 0 {
// An INTEGER is encoded with at least one octet.
return false
}
if len(bytes) == 1 {
return true
}
if bytes[0] == 0 && bytes[1]&0x80 == 0 || bytes[0] == 0xff && bytes[1]&0x80 == 0x80 {
// Value is not minimally encoded.
return false
}
return true
}
var bigOne = big.NewInt(1)
func (s *String) readASN1BigInt(out *big.Int) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) {
return false
}
if bytes[0]&0x80 == 0x80 {
// Negative number.
neg := make([]byte, len(bytes))
for i, b := range bytes {
neg[i] = ^b
}
out.SetBytes(neg)
out.Add(out, bigOne)
out.Neg(out)
} else {
out.SetBytes(bytes)
}
return true
}
func (s *String) readASN1Bytes(out *[]byte) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) {
return false
}
if bytes[0]&0x80 == 0x80 {
return false
}
for len(bytes) > 1 && bytes[0] == 0 {
bytes = bytes[1:]
}
*out = bytes
return true
}
func (s *String) readASN1Int64(out *int64) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Signed(out, bytes) {
return false
}
return true
}
func asn1Signed(out *int64, n []byte) bool {
length := len(n)
if length > 8 {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < length; i++ {
*out <<= 8
*out |= int64(n[i])
}
// Shift up and down in order to sign extend the result.
*out <<= 64 - uint8(length)*8
*out >>= 64 - uint8(length)*8
return true
}
func (s *String) readASN1Uint64(out *uint64) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.INTEGER) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Unsigned(out, bytes) {
return false
}
return true
}
func asn1Unsigned(out *uint64, n []byte) bool {
length := len(n)
if length > 9 || length == 9 && n[0] != 0 {
// Too large for uint64.
return false
}
if n[0]&0x80 != 0 {
// Negative number.
return false
}
for i := 0; i < length; i++ {
*out <<= 8
*out |= uint64(n[i])
}
return true
}
// ReadASN1Int64WithTag decodes an ASN.1 INTEGER with the given tag into out
// and advances. It reports whether the read was successful and resulted in a
// value that can be represented in an int64.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Int64WithTag(out *int64, tag asn1.Tag) bool {
var bytes String
return s.ReadASN1(&bytes, tag) && checkASN1Integer(bytes) && asn1Signed(out, bytes)
}
// ReadASN1Enum decodes an ASN.1 ENUMERATION into out and advances. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Enum(out *int) bool {
var bytes String
var i int64
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.ENUM) || !checkASN1Integer(bytes) || !asn1Signed(&i, bytes) {
return false
}
if int64(int(i)) != i {
return false
}
*out = int(i)
return true
}
func (s *String) readBase128Int(out *int) bool {
ret := 0
for i := 0; len(*s) > 0; i++ {
if i == 5 {
return false
}
// Avoid overflowing int on a 32-bit platform.
// We don't want different behavior based on the architecture.
if ret >= 1<<(31-7) {
return false
}
ret <<= 7
b := s.read(1)[0]
// ITU-T X.690, section 8.19.2:
// The subidentifier shall be encoded in the fewest possible octets,
// that is, the leading octet of the subidentifier shall not have the value 0x80.
if i == 0 && b == 0x80 {
return false
}
ret |= int(b & 0x7f)
if b&0x80 == 0 {
*out = ret
return true
}
}
return false // truncated
}
// ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier decodes an ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER into out and
// advances. It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1ObjectIdentifier(out *encoding_asn1.ObjectIdentifier) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) || len(bytes) == 0 {
return false
}
// In the worst case, we get two elements from the first byte (which is
// encoded differently) and then every varint is a single byte long.
components := make([]int, len(bytes)+1)
// The first varint is 40*value1 + value2:
// According to this packing, value1 can take the values 0, 1 and 2 only.
// When value1 = 0 or value1 = 1, then value2 is <= 39. When value1 = 2,
// then there are no restrictions on value2.
var v int
if !bytes.readBase128Int(&v) {
return false
}
if v < 80 {
components[0] = v / 40
components[1] = v % 40
} else {
components[0] = 2
components[1] = v - 80
}
i := 2
for ; len(bytes) > 0; i++ {
if !bytes.readBase128Int(&v) {
return false
}
components[i] = v
}
*out = components[:i]
return true
}
// ReadASN1GeneralizedTime decodes an ASN.1 GENERALIZEDTIME into out and
// advances. It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1GeneralizedTime(out *time.Time) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.GeneralizedTime) {
return false
}
t := string(bytes)
res, err := time.Parse(generalizedTimeFormatStr, t)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if serialized := res.Format(generalizedTimeFormatStr); serialized != t {
return false
}
*out = res
return true
}
const defaultUTCTimeFormatStr = "060102150405Z0700"
// ReadASN1UTCTime decodes an ASN.1 UTCTime into out and advances.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1UTCTime(out *time.Time) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.UTCTime) {
return false
}
t := string(bytes)
formatStr := defaultUTCTimeFormatStr
var err error
res, err := time.Parse(formatStr, t)
if err != nil {
// Fallback to minute precision if we can't parse second
// precision. If we are following X.509 or X.690 we shouldn't
// support this, but we do.
formatStr = "0601021504Z0700"
res, err = time.Parse(formatStr, t)
}
if err != nil {
return false
}
if serialized := res.Format(formatStr); serialized != t {
return false
}
if res.Year() >= 2050 {
// UTCTime interprets the low order digits 50-99 as 1950-99.
// This only applies to its use in the X.509 profile.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.5.1
res = res.AddDate(-100, 0, 0)
}
*out = res
return true
}
// ReadASN1BitString decodes an ASN.1 BIT STRING into out and advances.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1BitString(out *encoding_asn1.BitString) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BIT_STRING) || len(bytes) == 0 ||
len(bytes)*8/8 != len(bytes) {
return false
}
paddingBits := bytes[0]
bytes = bytes[1:]
if paddingBits > 7 ||
len(bytes) == 0 && paddingBits != 0 ||
len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[len(bytes)-1]&(1<<paddingBits-1) != 0 {
return false
}
out.BitLength = len(bytes)*8 - int(paddingBits)
out.Bytes = bytes
return true
}
// ReadASN1BitStringAsBytes decodes an ASN.1 BIT STRING into out and advances. It is
// an error if the BIT STRING is not a whole number of bytes. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1BitStringAsBytes(out *[]byte) bool {
var bytes String
if !s.ReadASN1(&bytes, asn1.BIT_STRING) || len(bytes) == 0 {
return false
}
paddingBits := bytes[0]
if paddingBits != 0 {
return false
}
*out = bytes[1:]
return true
}
// ReadASN1Bytes reads the contents of a DER-encoded ASN.1 element (not including
// tag and length bytes) into out, and advances. The element must match the
// given tag. It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadASN1Bytes(out *[]byte, tag asn1.Tag) bool {
return s.ReadASN1((*String)(out), tag)
}
// ReadASN1 reads the contents of a DER-encoded ASN.1 element (not including
// tag and length bytes) into out, and advances. The element must match the
// given tag. It reports whether the read was successful.
//
// Tags greater than 30 are not supported (i.e. low-tag-number format only).
func (s *String) ReadASN1(out *String, tag asn1.Tag) bool {
var t asn1.Tag
if !s.ReadAnyASN1(out, &t) || t != tag {
return false
}
return true
}
// ReadASN1Element reads the contents of a DER-encoded ASN.1 element (including
// tag and length bytes) into out, and advances. The element must match the
// given tag. It reports whether the read was successful.
//
// Tags greater than 30 are not supported (i.e. low-tag-number format only).
func (s *String) ReadASN1Element(out *String, tag asn1.Tag) bool {
var t asn1.Tag
if !s.ReadAnyASN1Element(out, &t) || t != tag {
return false
}
return true
}
// ReadAnyASN1 reads the contents of a DER-encoded ASN.1 element (not including
// tag and length bytes) into out, sets outTag to its tag, and advances.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
//
// Tags greater than 30 are not supported (i.e. low-tag-number format only).
func (s *String) ReadAnyASN1(out *String, outTag *asn1.Tag) bool {
return s.readASN1(out, outTag, true /* skip header */)
}
// ReadAnyASN1Element reads the contents of a DER-encoded ASN.1 element
// (including tag and length bytes) into out, sets outTag to is tag, and
// advances. It reports whether the read was successful.
//
// Tags greater than 30 are not supported (i.e. low-tag-number format only).
func (s *String) ReadAnyASN1Element(out *String, outTag *asn1.Tag) bool {
return s.readASN1(out, outTag, false /* include header */)
}
// PeekASN1Tag reports whether the next ASN.1 value on the string starts with
// the given tag.
func (s String) PeekASN1Tag(tag asn1.Tag) bool {
if len(s) == 0 {
return false
}
return asn1.Tag(s[0]) == tag
}
// SkipASN1 reads and discards an ASN.1 element with the given tag. It
// reports whether the operation was successful.
func (s *String) SkipASN1(tag asn1.Tag) bool {
var unused String
return s.ReadASN1(&unused, tag)
}
// ReadOptionalASN1 attempts to read the contents of a DER-encoded ASN.1
// element (not including tag and length bytes) tagged with the given tag into
// out. It stores whether an element with the tag was found in outPresent,
// unless outPresent is nil. It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadOptionalASN1(out *String, outPresent *bool, tag asn1.Tag) bool {
present := s.PeekASN1Tag(tag)
if outPresent != nil {
*outPresent = present
}
if present && !s.ReadASN1(out, tag) {
return false
}
return true
}
// SkipOptionalASN1 advances s over an ASN.1 element with the given tag, or
// else leaves s unchanged. It reports whether the operation was successful.
func (s *String) SkipOptionalASN1(tag asn1.Tag) bool {
if !s.PeekASN1Tag(tag) {
return true
}
var unused String
return s.ReadASN1(&unused, tag)
}
// ReadOptionalASN1Integer attempts to read an optional ASN.1 INTEGER explicitly
// tagged with tag into out and advances. If no element with a matching tag is
// present, it writes defaultValue into out instead. Otherwise, it behaves like
// ReadASN1Integer.
func (s *String) ReadOptionalASN1Integer(out interface{}, tag asn1.Tag, defaultValue interface{}) bool {
var present bool
var i String
if !s.ReadOptionalASN1(&i, &present, tag) {
return false
}
if !present {
switch out.(type) {
case *int, *int8, *int16, *int32, *int64,
*uint, *uint8, *uint16, *uint32, *uint64, *[]byte:
reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem().Set(reflect.ValueOf(defaultValue))
case *big.Int:
if defaultValue, ok := defaultValue.(*big.Int); ok {
out.(*big.Int).Set(defaultValue)
} else {
panic("out points to big.Int, but defaultValue does not")
}
default:
panic("invalid integer type")
}
return true
}
if !i.ReadASN1Integer(out) || !i.Empty() {
return false
}
return true
}
// ReadOptionalASN1OctetString attempts to read an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
// explicitly tagged with tag into out and advances. If no element with a
// matching tag is present, it sets "out" to nil instead. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadOptionalASN1OctetString(out *[]byte, outPresent *bool, tag asn1.Tag) bool {
var present bool
var child String
if !s.ReadOptionalASN1(&child, &present, tag) {
return false
}
if outPresent != nil {
*outPresent = present
}
if present {
var oct String
if !child.ReadASN1(&oct, asn1.OCTET_STRING) || !child.Empty() {
return false
}
*out = oct
} else {
*out = nil
}
return true
}
// ReadOptionalASN1Boolean attempts to read an optional ASN.1 BOOLEAN
// explicitly tagged with tag into out and advances. If no element with a
// matching tag is present, it sets "out" to defaultValue instead. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadOptionalASN1Boolean(out *bool, tag asn1.Tag, defaultValue bool) bool {
var present bool
var child String
if !s.ReadOptionalASN1(&child, &present, tag) {
return false
}
if !present {
*out = defaultValue
return true
}
return child.ReadASN1Boolean(out)
}
func (s *String) readASN1(out *String, outTag *asn1.Tag, skipHeader bool) bool {
if len(*s) < 2 {
return false
}
tag, lenByte := (*s)[0], (*s)[1]
if tag&0x1f == 0x1f {
// ITU-T X.690 section 8.1.2
//
// An identifier octet with a tag part of 0x1f indicates a high-tag-number
// form identifier with two or more octets. We only support tags less than
// 31 (i.e. low-tag-number form, single octet identifier).
return false
}
if outTag != nil {
*outTag = asn1.Tag(tag)
}
// ITU-T X.690 section 8.1.3
//
// Bit 8 of the first length byte indicates whether the length is short- or
// long-form.
var length, headerLen uint32 // length includes headerLen
if lenByte&0x80 == 0 {
// Short-form length (section 8.1.3.4), encoded in bits 1-7.
length = uint32(lenByte) + 2
headerLen = 2
} else {
// Long-form length (section 8.1.3.5). Bits 1-7 encode the number of octets
// used to encode the length.
lenLen := lenByte & 0x7f
var len32 uint32
if lenLen == 0 || lenLen > 4 || len(*s) < int(2+lenLen) {
return false
}
lenBytes := String((*s)[2 : 2+lenLen])
if !lenBytes.readUnsigned(&len32, int(lenLen)) {
return false
}
// ITU-T X.690 section 10.1 (DER length forms) requires encoding the length
// with the minimum number of octets.
if len32 < 128 {
// Length should have used short-form encoding.
return false
}
if len32>>((lenLen-1)*8) == 0 {
// Leading octet is 0. Length should have been at least one byte shorter.
return false
}
headerLen = 2 + uint32(lenLen)
if headerLen+len32 < len32 {
// Overflow.
return false
}
length = headerLen + len32
}
if int(length) < 0 || !s.ReadBytes((*[]byte)(out), int(length)) {
return false
}
if skipHeader && !out.Skip(int(headerLen)) {
panic("cryptobyte: internal error")
}
return true
}

46
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1/asn1.go generated vendored
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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package asn1 contains supporting types for parsing and building ASN.1
// messages with the cryptobyte package.
package asn1 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
// Tag represents an ASN.1 identifier octet, consisting of a tag number
// (indicating a type) and class (such as context-specific or constructed).
//
// Methods in the cryptobyte package only support the low-tag-number form, i.e.
// a single identifier octet with bits 7-8 encoding the class and bits 1-6
// encoding the tag number.
type Tag uint8
const (
classConstructed = 0x20
classContextSpecific = 0x80
)
// Constructed returns t with the constructed class bit set.
func (t Tag) Constructed() Tag { return t | classConstructed }
// ContextSpecific returns t with the context-specific class bit set.
func (t Tag) ContextSpecific() Tag { return t | classContextSpecific }
// The following is a list of standard tag and class combinations.
const (
BOOLEAN = Tag(1)
INTEGER = Tag(2)
BIT_STRING = Tag(3)
OCTET_STRING = Tag(4)
NULL = Tag(5)
OBJECT_IDENTIFIER = Tag(6)
ENUM = Tag(10)
UTF8String = Tag(12)
SEQUENCE = Tag(16 | classConstructed)
SET = Tag(17 | classConstructed)
PrintableString = Tag(19)
T61String = Tag(20)
IA5String = Tag(22)
UTCTime = Tag(23)
GeneralizedTime = Tag(24)
GeneralString = Tag(27)
)

350
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/builder.go generated vendored
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@ -1,350 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package cryptobyte
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
)
// A Builder builds byte strings from fixed-length and length-prefixed values.
// Builders either allocate space as needed, or are ‘fixed’, which means that
// they write into a given buffer and produce an error if it's exhausted.
//
// The zero value is a usable Builder that allocates space as needed.
//
// Simple values are marshaled and appended to a Builder using methods on the
// Builder. Length-prefixed values are marshaled by providing a
// BuilderContinuation, which is a function that writes the inner contents of
// the value to a given Builder. See the documentation for BuilderContinuation
// for details.
type Builder struct {
err error
result []byte
fixedSize bool
child *Builder
offset int
pendingLenLen int
pendingIsASN1 bool
inContinuation *bool
}
// NewBuilder creates a Builder that appends its output to the given buffer.
// Like append(), the slice will be reallocated if its capacity is exceeded.
// Use Bytes to get the final buffer.
func NewBuilder(buffer []byte) *Builder {
return &Builder{
result: buffer,
}
}
// NewFixedBuilder creates a Builder that appends its output into the given
// buffer. This builder does not reallocate the output buffer. Writes that
// would exceed the buffer's capacity are treated as an error.
func NewFixedBuilder(buffer []byte) *Builder {
return &Builder{
result: buffer,
fixedSize: true,
}
}
// SetError sets the value to be returned as the error from Bytes. Writes
// performed after calling SetError are ignored.
func (b *Builder) SetError(err error) {
b.err = err
}
// Bytes returns the bytes written by the builder or an error if one has
// occurred during building.
func (b *Builder) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
if b.err != nil {
return nil, b.err
}
return b.result[b.offset:], nil
}
// BytesOrPanic returns the bytes written by the builder or panics if an error
// has occurred during building.
func (b *Builder) BytesOrPanic() []byte {
if b.err != nil {
panic(b.err)
}
return b.result[b.offset:]
}
// AddUint8 appends an 8-bit value to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddUint8(v uint8) {
b.add(byte(v))
}
// AddUint16 appends a big-endian, 16-bit value to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddUint16(v uint16) {
b.add(byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddUint24 appends a big-endian, 24-bit value to the byte string. The highest
// byte of the 32-bit input value is silently truncated.
func (b *Builder) AddUint24(v uint32) {
b.add(byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddUint32 appends a big-endian, 32-bit value to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddUint32(v uint32) {
b.add(byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddUint48 appends a big-endian, 48-bit value to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddUint48(v uint64) {
b.add(byte(v>>40), byte(v>>32), byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddUint64 appends a big-endian, 64-bit value to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddUint64(v uint64) {
b.add(byte(v>>56), byte(v>>48), byte(v>>40), byte(v>>32), byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
}
// AddBytes appends a sequence of bytes to the byte string.
func (b *Builder) AddBytes(v []byte) {
b.add(v...)
}
// BuilderContinuation is a continuation-passing interface for building
// length-prefixed byte sequences. Builder methods for length-prefixed
// sequences (AddUint8LengthPrefixed etc) will invoke the BuilderContinuation
// supplied to them. The child builder passed to the continuation can be used
// to build the content of the length-prefixed sequence. For example:
//
// parent := cryptobyte.NewBuilder()
// parent.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (child *Builder) {
// child.AddUint8(42)
// child.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func (grandchild *Builder) {
// grandchild.AddUint8(5)
// })
// })
//
// It is an error to write more bytes to the child than allowed by the reserved
// length prefix. After the continuation returns, the child must be considered
// invalid, i.e. users must not store any copies or references of the child
// that outlive the continuation.
//
// If the continuation panics with a value of type BuildError then the inner
// error will be returned as the error from Bytes. If the child panics
// otherwise then Bytes will repanic with the same value.
type BuilderContinuation func(child *Builder)
// BuildError wraps an error. If a BuilderContinuation panics with this value,
// the panic will be recovered and the inner error will be returned from
// Builder.Bytes.
type BuildError struct {
Err error
}
// AddUint8LengthPrefixed adds a 8-bit length-prefixed byte sequence.
func (b *Builder) AddUint8LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) {
b.addLengthPrefixed(1, false, f)
}
// AddUint16LengthPrefixed adds a big-endian, 16-bit length-prefixed byte sequence.
func (b *Builder) AddUint16LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) {
b.addLengthPrefixed(2, false, f)
}
// AddUint24LengthPrefixed adds a big-endian, 24-bit length-prefixed byte sequence.
func (b *Builder) AddUint24LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) {
b.addLengthPrefixed(3, false, f)
}
// AddUint32LengthPrefixed adds a big-endian, 32-bit length-prefixed byte sequence.
func (b *Builder) AddUint32LengthPrefixed(f BuilderContinuation) {
b.addLengthPrefixed(4, false, f)
}
func (b *Builder) callContinuation(f BuilderContinuation, arg *Builder) {
if !*b.inContinuation {
*b.inContinuation = true
defer func() {
*b.inContinuation = false
r := recover()
if r == nil {
return
}
if buildError, ok := r.(BuildError); ok {
b.err = buildError.Err
} else {
panic(r)
}
}()
}
f(arg)
}
func (b *Builder) addLengthPrefixed(lenLen int, isASN1 bool, f BuilderContinuation) {
// Subsequent writes can be ignored if the builder has encountered an error.
if b.err != nil {
return
}
offset := len(b.result)
b.add(make([]byte, lenLen)...)
if b.inContinuation == nil {
b.inContinuation = new(bool)
}
b.child = &Builder{
result: b.result,
fixedSize: b.fixedSize,
offset: offset,
pendingLenLen: lenLen,
pendingIsASN1: isASN1,
inContinuation: b.inContinuation,
}
b.callContinuation(f, b.child)
b.flushChild()
if b.child != nil {
panic("cryptobyte: internal error")
}
}
func (b *Builder) flushChild() {
if b.child == nil {
return
}
b.child.flushChild()
child := b.child
b.child = nil
if child.err != nil {
b.err = child.err
return
}
length := len(child.result) - child.pendingLenLen - child.offset
if length < 0 {
panic("cryptobyte: internal error") // result unexpectedly shrunk
}
if child.pendingIsASN1 {
// For ASN.1, we reserved a single byte for the length. If that turned out
// to be incorrect, we have to move the contents along in order to make
// space.
if child.pendingLenLen != 1 {
panic("cryptobyte: internal error")
}
var lenLen, lenByte uint8
if int64(length) > 0xfffffffe {
b.err = errors.New("pending ASN.1 child too long")
return
} else if length > 0xffffff {
lenLen = 5
lenByte = 0x80 | 4
} else if length > 0xffff {
lenLen = 4
lenByte = 0x80 | 3
} else if length > 0xff {
lenLen = 3
lenByte = 0x80 | 2
} else if length > 0x7f {
lenLen = 2
lenByte = 0x80 | 1
} else {
lenLen = 1
lenByte = uint8(length)
length = 0
}
// Insert the initial length byte, make space for successive length bytes,
// and adjust the offset.
child.result[child.offset] = lenByte
extraBytes := int(lenLen - 1)
if extraBytes != 0 {
child.add(make([]byte, extraBytes)...)
childStart := child.offset + child.pendingLenLen
copy(child.result[childStart+extraBytes:], child.result[childStart:])
}
child.offset++
child.pendingLenLen = extraBytes
}
l := length
for i := child.pendingLenLen - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
child.result[child.offset+i] = uint8(l)
l >>= 8
}
if l != 0 {
b.err = fmt.Errorf("cryptobyte: pending child length %d exceeds %d-byte length prefix", length, child.pendingLenLen)
return
}
if b.fixedSize && &b.result[0] != &child.result[0] {
panic("cryptobyte: BuilderContinuation reallocated a fixed-size buffer")
}
b.result = child.result
}
func (b *Builder) add(bytes ...byte) {
if b.err != nil {
return
}
if b.child != nil {
panic("cryptobyte: attempted write while child is pending")
}
if len(b.result)+len(bytes) < len(bytes) {
b.err = errors.New("cryptobyte: length overflow")
}
if b.fixedSize && len(b.result)+len(bytes) > cap(b.result) {
b.err = errors.New("cryptobyte: Builder is exceeding its fixed-size buffer")
return
}
b.result = append(b.result, bytes...)
}
// Unwrite rolls back non-negative n bytes written directly to the Builder.
// An attempt by a child builder passed to a continuation to unwrite bytes
// from its parent will panic.
func (b *Builder) Unwrite(n int) {
if b.err != nil {
return
}
if b.child != nil {
panic("cryptobyte: attempted unwrite while child is pending")
}
length := len(b.result) - b.pendingLenLen - b.offset
if length < 0 {
panic("cryptobyte: internal error")
}
if n < 0 {
panic("cryptobyte: attempted to unwrite negative number of bytes")
}
if n > length {
panic("cryptobyte: attempted to unwrite more than was written")
}
b.result = b.result[:len(b.result)-n]
}
// A MarshalingValue marshals itself into a Builder.
type MarshalingValue interface {
// Marshal is called by Builder.AddValue. It receives a pointer to a builder
// to marshal itself into. It may return an error that occurred during
// marshaling, such as unset or invalid values.
Marshal(b *Builder) error
}
// AddValue calls Marshal on v, passing a pointer to the builder to append to.
// If Marshal returns an error, it is set on the Builder so that subsequent
// appends don't have an effect.
func (b *Builder) AddValue(v MarshalingValue) {
err := v.Marshal(b)
if err != nil {
b.err = err
}
}

183
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/string.go generated vendored
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@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package cryptobyte contains types that help with parsing and constructing
// length-prefixed, binary messages, including ASN.1 DER. (The asn1 subpackage
// contains useful ASN.1 constants.)
//
// The String type is for parsing. It wraps a []byte slice and provides helper
// functions for consuming structures, value by value.
//
// The Builder type is for constructing messages. It providers helper functions
// for appending values and also for appending length-prefixed submessages –
// without having to worry about calculating the length prefix ahead of time.
//
// See the documentation and examples for the Builder and String types to get
// started.
package cryptobyte // import "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
// String represents a string of bytes. It provides methods for parsing
// fixed-length and length-prefixed values from it.
type String []byte
// read advances a String by n bytes and returns them. If less than n bytes
// remain, it returns nil.
func (s *String) read(n int) []byte {
if len(*s) < n || n < 0 {
return nil
}
v := (*s)[:n]
*s = (*s)[n:]
return v
}
// Skip advances the String by n byte and reports whether it was successful.
func (s *String) Skip(n int) bool {
return s.read(n) != nil
}
// ReadUint8 decodes an 8-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint8(out *uint8) bool {
v := s.read(1)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint8(v[0])
return true
}
// ReadUint16 decodes a big-endian, 16-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint16(out *uint16) bool {
v := s.read(2)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint16(v[0])<<8 | uint16(v[1])
return true
}
// ReadUint24 decodes a big-endian, 24-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint24(out *uint32) bool {
v := s.read(3)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint32(v[0])<<16 | uint32(v[1])<<8 | uint32(v[2])
return true
}
// ReadUint32 decodes a big-endian, 32-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint32(out *uint32) bool {
v := s.read(4)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint32(v[0])<<24 | uint32(v[1])<<16 | uint32(v[2])<<8 | uint32(v[3])
return true
}
// ReadUint48 decodes a big-endian, 48-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint48(out *uint64) bool {
v := s.read(6)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint64(v[0])<<40 | uint64(v[1])<<32 | uint64(v[2])<<24 | uint64(v[3])<<16 | uint64(v[4])<<8 | uint64(v[5])
return true
}
// ReadUint64 decodes a big-endian, 64-bit value into out and advances over it.
// It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint64(out *uint64) bool {
v := s.read(8)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = uint64(v[0])<<56 | uint64(v[1])<<48 | uint64(v[2])<<40 | uint64(v[3])<<32 | uint64(v[4])<<24 | uint64(v[5])<<16 | uint64(v[6])<<8 | uint64(v[7])
return true
}
func (s *String) readUnsigned(out *uint32, length int) bool {
v := s.read(length)
if v == nil {
return false
}
var result uint32
for i := 0; i < length; i++ {
result <<= 8
result |= uint32(v[i])
}
*out = result
return true
}
func (s *String) readLengthPrefixed(lenLen int, outChild *String) bool {
lenBytes := s.read(lenLen)
if lenBytes == nil {
return false
}
var length uint32
for _, b := range lenBytes {
length = length << 8
length = length | uint32(b)
}
v := s.read(int(length))
if v == nil {
return false
}
*outChild = v
return true
}
// ReadUint8LengthPrefixed reads the content of an 8-bit length-prefixed value
// into out and advances over it. It reports whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(out *String) bool {
return s.readLengthPrefixed(1, out)
}
// ReadUint16LengthPrefixed reads the content of a big-endian, 16-bit
// length-prefixed value into out and advances over it. It reports whether the
// read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(out *String) bool {
return s.readLengthPrefixed(2, out)
}
// ReadUint24LengthPrefixed reads the content of a big-endian, 24-bit
// length-prefixed value into out and advances over it. It reports whether
// the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(out *String) bool {
return s.readLengthPrefixed(3, out)
}
// ReadBytes reads n bytes into out and advances over them. It reports
// whether the read was successful.
func (s *String) ReadBytes(out *[]byte, n int) bool {
v := s.read(n)
if v == nil {
return false
}
*out = v
return true
}
// CopyBytes copies len(out) bytes into out and advances over them. It reports
// whether the copy operation was successful
func (s *String) CopyBytes(out []byte) bool {
n := len(out)
v := s.read(n)
if v == nil {
return false
}
return copy(out, v) == n
}
// Empty reports whether the string does not contain any bytes.
func (s String) Empty() bool {
return len(s) == 0
}

50
vendor/golang.org/x/exp/constraints/constraints.go generated vendored
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@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package constraints defines a set of useful constraints to be used
// with type parameters.
package constraints
// Signed is a constraint that permits any signed integer type.
// If future releases of Go add new predeclared signed integer types,
// this constraint will be modified to include them.
type Signed interface {
~int | ~int8 | ~int16 | ~int32 | ~int64
}
// Unsigned is a constraint that permits any unsigned integer type.
// If future releases of Go add new predeclared unsigned integer types,
// this constraint will be modified to include them.
type Unsigned interface {
~uint | ~uint8 | ~uint16 | ~uint32 | ~uint64 | ~uintptr
}
// Integer is a constraint that permits any integer type.
// If future releases of Go add new predeclared integer types,
// this constraint will be modified to include them.
type Integer interface {
Signed | Unsigned
}
// Float is a constraint that permits any floating-point type.
// If future releases of Go add new predeclared floating-point types,
// this constraint will be modified to include them.
type Float interface {
~float32 | ~float64
}
// Complex is a constraint that permits any complex numeric type.
// If future releases of Go add new predeclared complex numeric types,
// this constraint will be modified to include them.
type Complex interface {
~complex64 | ~complex128
}
// Ordered is a constraint that permits any ordered type: any type
// that supports the operators < <= >= >.
// If future releases of Go add new ordered types,
// this constraint will be modified to include them.
type Ordered interface {
Integer | Float | ~string
}

8
vendor/modules.txt vendored
View File

@ -229,9 +229,8 @@ github.com/prometheus/procfs/internal/fs
github.com/prometheus/procfs/internal/util github.com/prometheus/procfs/internal/util
# github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.4.1 # github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.4.1
## explicit; go 1.20 ## explicit; go 1.20
github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 # github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20240101045026-22b7f7744eb6
# github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.40.1-0.20231203135336-87ef8ec48d55 ## explicit; go 1.21
## explicit; go 1.20
github.com/quic-go/quic-go github.com/quic-go/quic-go
github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler
github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/congestion github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/congestion
@ -323,8 +322,6 @@ golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b
golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish
golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20 golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20
golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305 golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305
golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte
golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1
golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519 golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519
golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field
golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf
@ -338,7 +335,6 @@ golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf
# golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db # golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db
## explicit; go 1.18 ## explicit; go 1.18
golang.org/x/exp/constraints
golang.org/x/exp/rand golang.org/x/exp/rand
# golang.org/x/mod v0.11.0 # golang.org/x/mod v0.11.0
## explicit; go 1.17 ## explicit; go 1.17